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“[A] corporation . . . has no soul to be damned and no
body to be kicked.”1
“Corporations are people.”2
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INTRODUCTION
In both Citizens United v. FEC3 and Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc.,4 the U.S. Supreme Court advanced the
personification of the business corporation in a manner that
should be disturbing to both corporate legal scholars and
communitarians. The Citizens United decision has been roundly
criticized and occasionally lauded for asserting an expansive view
of corporate First Amendment rights in the context of federal
(and, by extension, state) election campaigns.5 Citizens United
held that a federal statute6 restricting corporate and labor union
use of general treasury funds to defeat a candidate for office could
not withstand First Amendment scrutiny.7 While applauded by
an unusual coalition of First Amendment advocates and
conservative politicians,8 the decision has been derided by election
3 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also Am. Tradition P’ship,
Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam) (extending Citizens United’s holding
to Montana campaign spending law).
4 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
5 Compare Atiba R. Ellis, Citizens United and Tiered Personhood, 44 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 717, 739-40 (2011) (praising, albeit marginally, the Court’s logical
progression in defining corporate “personhood”), and Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and
Citizens United: The Future of Labor Speech Rights?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 1-2, 17-46
(2011) (discussing the “silver lining” of the case, as it opens the door for the increased rights
of labor unions), with Alex Osterlind, Giving a Voice to the Inanimate: The Right of a
Corporation to Political Free Speech, 76 MO. L. REV. 259, 281 (2011) (claiming that political
action committees (PACs) already provide corporations with a sufficient avenue to engage
politically), and Nadia Imtanes, Should Corporations Be Entitled to the Same First
Amendment Protections as People?, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 203, 207-10 (2012) (explaining how
the Citizens United decision opened the door for political corruption at the will of the
immense wealth of large corporations).
6 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012).
7 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)).
8 See, e.g., Brief for Senator Mitch McConnell as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 1-5, Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (No. 11-
1179), 2012 WL 1513830 (urging the Court to refuse to overrule its decision in Citizens
United, which was “rooted in long-established First Amendment principles,” and
emphasizing that the “doomsday scenario[s]” posed by critics of the opinion had not
materialized); see also Laura W. Murphy, “Fixing” Citizens United Will Break the
Constitution, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (June 28, 2012, 7:21 PM), https://www.aclu.org/
blog/fixing-citizens-united-will-break-constitution [http://perma.cc/2584-QQ8L] (arguing
that a constitutional amendment to undo the effects of Citizens United would “break” the
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reform advocates and liberal critics, including the President of the
United States.9 Only limited attention, however, has been paid to
Citizens United’s implications for corporate law.10 By declaring
that corporations have First Amendment political participation
rights comparable to those of other citizens and ascribing
“personhood” to corporations, the Court has disturbed long-held
assumptions that narrowly restrict the scope of corporate conduct
to the maximization of shareholder profits. The Citizens United
decision may have thereby provided encouragement to
communitarians who, given the belief that rights imply
responsibilities, will urge that there now remains little excuse for
corporations to deny accountability to any constituencies other
than their shareholders. Unfortunately, it may have also given
license to corporate officers who view the corporate fisc as a
means of financing their own political beliefs and aspirations,
regardless of its effect on other corporate constituencies.11 And it
eroded, in the name of civil liberties, a statute that was carefully
constructed to bring balance to political discourse.
Constitution by paving the way for more radical restrictions on speech, such as amendments
banning the burning of the American flag during political protests).
9 See President Barack Obama, 2010 State of the Union Address (Jan. 27,
2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address
[http://perma.cc/PS45-JY84] (“I don’t think American elections should be bankrolled by
America’s most powerful interests . . . . They should be decided by the American people.”).
10 But see Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the
Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 831 (2013) (claiming an
ongoing “silent” discussion regarding corporate theory in political finance cases such as
Citizens United); Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free
Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 520-
21 (2010) (“Applying a corporate law perspective to the Citizens United debate, five points
for discussion emerge: (1) the economic motivation of corporate speech, (2) the lack of a
single corporate voice, (3) the threat of compelled speech, (4) the prevalence of existing
regulation of corporate speech, and (5) the applicability of the equalization rationale to
corporate speech.”); David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law:
Corporate Social Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1247 (2011)
[hereinafter Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem] (“Corporate law’s task . . . , after
Citizens United, can no longer rely exclusively on external regulatory institutions to
safeguard their interests, but must instead look to the corporation—an association in
which, our best corporate theory informs us, they are already essential participants.”).
11 See John C. Coates IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before
and After Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 657 (2012). Coates found that
corporate political activity increased significantly after Citizens United, particularly in
firms acting in industries that are not heavily regulated or dependent upon the
government for business. Corporate political activity was also higher among firms with
managers who obtained political employment or appointments upon leaving the firm,
which amounted to 11% of the 298 CEOs who left corporate office during the periods
analyzed in the study. Coates’s data suggests that this increase does not bode well for
shareholders. Increased corporate political activity is negatively associated with
measures of shareholder value. Id. at 682. Moreover, politically active corporations are
statistically more likely to engage in behavior that is harmful to shareholders, such as
permitting CEOs to use the corporate jet for personal travel. Id. at 678.
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Four years after the Citizens United decision, the Supreme
Court issued its opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.12
In Hobby Lobby and its companion cases, three privately held
corporations were allowed to invoke the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA)13 to prevail on a religious objection to a
regulation promulgated under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA).14 Hobby Lobby has also been
subject to intense criticism (and defense),15 in no small part
because of its implications for the controversial ACA and the
equally controversial abortion issue. To date, however, the Court’s
statements in that case about the nature of corporations have been
largely overlooked. While the full implications of Hobby Lobby are
by no means clear (its holding would appear to be limited to closely
held corporations and to claims under RFRA, not the First
Amendment), at the very least Hobby Lobby stands for the
principle that a closely held corporation may be the conduit for an
owner’s personal religious beliefs and practices. The case would
appear to attach additional rights and human qualities to
corporations without due consideration for traditional corporate
law. From a communitarian perspective—which seeks to balance
rights with responsibilities—Hobby Lobby raises the specter of
corporate owners being allowed to obtain the protections afforded
to the corporate form (such as limited liability), while also being
permitted to assert what previously had been considered an
individual right. In other words, it provides for new rights
without commensurate responsibilities, and it regards the rights
12 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
13 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to
2000bb-4 (2012).
14 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010); Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed.
Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
15 A roundtable organized by Vanderbilt University Law School produced
excellent commentary both in support of and in opposition to the Hobby Lobby decision.
See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, Establishment, and Freedom of Religion,
67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39, 41 (2014) (arguing federal law requires a religious
exemption for corporations such as Hobby Lobby whose owners’ religious beliefs are not
limited to “what happens in [their] mind[s], home[s], or house[s] of worship” but rather
are deeply intertwined in their public lives); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew
Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the
Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51 (2014) (asserting that a religious
exemption for Hobby Lobby allows the corporation to force its employees, specifically its
female employees, to “foot the bill for [its] religious beliefs”); Gregory P. Magarian, Hobby
Lobby in Constitutional Waters: Two Life Rings and an Anchor, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 67 (2014) (prophesizing that once granted the ability to bring viable religious
exemption claims, all corporate entities—regardless of their size or power—could use
religion as a rationalization for ignoring legal duties).
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of corporate owners as synonymous with those of the corporation
without regard to employees and other corporate constituencies.
In this article, we analyze the Roberts Court’s
personification of the business corporation and the effects of
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby on corporate powers, rights, and
responsibilities. The article examines whether the Court’s analysis
is consistent with generally accepted principles of corporate law
and whether these cases advance or hinder communitarian
principles. Finally, we consider whether these cases’ expansion of
corporate rights should bring with it a commensurate expansion of
corporate responsibilities and whether state legislatures should
take measures (such as mandatory constituency statutes and
enhanced disclosure rules) in support of these responsibilities.
Why the connection between corporate law, First
Amendment/RFRA cases, and communitarianism? Communitarians
value “intermediate communities,” like civic associations and
charitable organizations, that create social capital; consistent
with this view, corporations and unions may be seen as vehicles
through which individuals band together to promote common
purposes. At the same time, there are legitimate concerns, often
articulated by communitarians, regarding the assertion of rights
(by either individuals or entities) that challenge carefully tailored
measures to promote the common good. Cases such as Citizens
United and Hobby Lobby, while thwarting communitarian
objectives such as the regulation of political contributions or the
provision of affordable health care, may have the effect of
expanding the realm of permissible corporate activity—thereby
enhancing the ability of individuals to promote common
objectives. But the expansion of corporate “rights” is of additional
concern to communitarians if those rights come into existence
without concomitant responsibilities.
We begin, in Part I, by briefly describing the evolution of
corporate “personhood.” We then examine the Roberts Court’s
expansion of corporate personification, focusing on Citizens
United and Hobby Lobby.16 Part II provides an in-depth corporate
law analysis of the Citizens United and Hobby Lobby majority
opinions. In particular, we consider whether these cases conflict
with long-held assumptions that narrowly restrict the scope of
corporate conduct to the maximization of shareholder profits. In
Part III we describe the philosophy of communitarianism and
discuss how it might apply to corporations’ activities. We then
16 Our chief area of inquiry will be for-profit corporations, although some of
our analysis will also apply to not-for-profit corporations and trade unions.
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consider the implications of Citizens United and Hobby Lobby for
communitarianism. We conclude, in Part IV, by suggesting
modest reforms at the state level that are consistent with
communitarian principles that promote notions of corporate
responsibility commensurate with corporations’ newfound rights.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE PERSONIFICATION
A. The Pre-Roberts Court’s Conception of Corporate
Personification
Corporate law scholars quickly recognized that the
Roberts Court’s Citizens United decision marked a significant
development in the Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence on
corporate personhood.17 That the Roberts Court was taking a
fresh look at corporate personhood was confirmed by the Court’s
decision four years later in Hobby Lobby, which reflects an even
more expansive view of this concept. Before examining Citizens
United and Hobby Lobby, it is useful to review briefly the
evolution of corporate personhood in the United States18 from the
nineteenth century until the early twenty-first century.
17 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate
Persona, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 785, 785-86 (2013) (summarizing the “historical evolution
of the corporate form” and noting that Citizens United “re-opened a debate that has
occupied legal scholars for at least two centuries about the meaning of ‘personhood’
status under the law”); Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011
UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1629-30 (2011) (focusing on “corporations as rights holders—the
doctrine of corporate personhood,” and arguing “that corporate personhood should be
understood as merely recognizing the corporation’s ability to hold rights in order to
protect the people involved”); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate
Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 999-1000 (2010) (describing Citizens United as
“interesting as another step in the evolution of our legal views of the corporation”).
18 An in-depth review of the historical origins of the corporate form is beyond
the scope of this article and has been amply explored by other corporate scholars. For
example, Blair provides an exceptionally clear and succinct history of the early
evolution of the corporate form, beginning with royal and papal charters granted to
institutions like churches and universities in Europe in the Middle Ages, to charters
issued to trading companies in England and on the Continent in the seventeenth
century, to the proliferation of private business corporations in the United States in the
late nineteenth century. Blair, supra note 17, at 789-95; see also Charles R.T. O’Kelley,
The Evolution of the Modern Corporation: Corporate Governance Reform in Context,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1001, 1008-22 (2013) (analyzing the corporate form’s evolution in
America prior to the Great Depression and noting that in the pre–World War I period,
America eclipsed Great Britain as a world economic power because “America had
developed a uniquely efficient new business form—the modern corporation”).
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1. Nineteenth-Century Concepts of Corporate Personhood
Professor Reuven S. Avi-Yonah has summarized the
historical development of the modern business corporation as
undergoing “four major transformations.” First, in the fourteenth
century, commentators began recognizing the corporation as a
separate legal person from its owners. The second transformation
occurred in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
when corporations in the United States and England changed
from not-for-profit membership corporations to for-profit
businesses. Third came the late nineteenth and early twentieth-
century rise of the publicly traded corporation. The final major
transformation began after World War II when corporations
evolved from conducting business in one country to becoming
multinational enterprises.19
Professor Avi-Yonah’s second and third transformations
are most relevant to the focus of this article because it is during
those periods that the modern conception of “corporate
personhood” evolved. Two Supreme Court decisions were
especially instrumental in shaping the modern conception of
corporate personhood. In 1819, in Dartmouth College v.
Woodward,20 Chief Justice John Marshall created the template
for the modern conception of the corporation21 with his widely
cited proclamation that “[a] corporation is an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.”22
For purposes of our analysis, it is also worthwhile to quote in full
what immediately followed:
Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which
the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental
to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to
effect the object for which it was created. Among the most important are
immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality;
properties, by which a perpetual succession of many persons are
considered as the same, andmay act as a single individual.23
19 Avi-Yonah, supra note 17, at 1000-01.
20 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819).
21 As a matter of analytical precision, it should be noted that Dartmouth
College did not involve a business corporation, but “commentators have noted its
primary significance is with regard to business corporations.” See Pollman, supra note
17, at 1635 n.34 (collecting authorities).
22 Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 636.
23 Id.
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These sentences have inspired scholarly debate and academic
theorizing24 for almost two centuries, but as the controversy
surrounding Citizens United and Hobby Lobby demonstrates, U.S.
law has yet to resolve the vexing question of corporate personhood.25
While a single coherent and universally accepted theory of
corporate personhood remains an elusive goal even today, the
Dartmouth College case nonetheless was a landmark decision.
Despite the fact that the U.S. Constitution makes no mention of
corporations,26 Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion established that
even though private corporations are artificial entities existing
only by operation of law, they nonetheless are entitled to the
protections of the Contract Clause.27 Dartmouth College thus laid
the foundation for explosive growth of the corporate form in the
United States by (1) recognizing the legitimacy of a private
corporation as a separate legal entity in the eyes of the law and
(2) establishing that the contracts entered into by such
24 Professor Avi-Yonah, for example, asserts that throughout the past two
centuries of transformational change in the legal conception of the corporate form, “the
same three theories of the corporation can be discerned”—the aggregate theory, the
artificial entity theory, and the real entity theory. Avi-Yonah, supra note 17, at 1001;
see also Ron Harris, The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate
Personality Theories: From German Codification to British Political Pluralism and
American Big Business, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1421, 1466-69 (2006) [hereinafter
Harris, Transplantation] (asserting that Chief Justice Marshall’s description of
corporations in the Dartmouth College case was the clearest articulation of the “grant
theory” of corporate personality that dominated mid-nineteenth-century American law
before the proliferation of general incorporation statutes in many states from 1840 to
1870 eroded the grant theory and eventually led to the “contract theory” of corporate
personality). Professor Harris has astutely observed that the contract theory of
corporate personality “could not be squared with the limited liability attribute of
business corporations” because when corporations are equated with their shareholders,
there is no justification for limiting corporate creditors’ access to the assets of the
corporation’s individual shareholders. Harris, Transplantation, supra, at 1470. The
modern conception of the contract theory of corporate law is discussed in Part III, infra.
25 See, e.g., Robert E. Mutch, Before and After Belotti: The Corporate Political
Contributions Cases, 5 ELECTION L.J. 293, 294 (2006) (“Legal opinion is deeply divided
over what political rights corporations should have, and it is possible that we cannot
reach consensus on this issue. . . . [T]he debate does matter for [a] practical reason:
Corporation treasuries are where the money is, so parties and other political
organizations pay very close attention to the wording and interpretation of statutes to
know how much of what kind of money can go where and by what routes. As is often the
case with disputes that are not supposed to be about the money, it’s about the money.”).
26 See Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill
of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L. J. 577, 579 & n.8 (1990) (noting that “[t]he Constitution does
not mention corporations” and observing that “[t]he Framers certainly were aware of
corporations” even though “[i]n that era, most corporations were chartered by state
legislatures for specific purposes, including banks, canal companies, railroads, toll
bridge companies, and trading companies”).
27 Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 650 (“The opinion of the Court, after
mature deliberation, is, that this [Charter of Dartmouth College] is a contract, the obligation
of which cannot be impaired, without violating the Constitution of the United States.”).
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corporations were entitled to the same constitutional protections
as contracts entered into by natural persons.28
The second seminal case that defined the concept of
corporate personhood in modern American law was Santa Clara
v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., decided by the Supreme Court
in 1886.29 In Santa Clara, the Court for the first time accepted the
argument that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment applied to business corporations.30 As Professor Blair
has noted, Santa Clara “was the first time the Court had ever
ruled that corporations had constitutional rights as ‘persons,’” and
it “la[id] the foundation for later recognition by the courts of a wide
array of constitutional rights and protections for corporations,
including First Amendment rights to freedom of speech.”31
The Dartmouth College and Santa Clara cases are the
nineteenth-century constitutional cornerstones upon which the
legal foundation of corporate personhood in modern American law
rests. While numerous other cases contribute to that foundation,32
28 Cf. Pollman, supra note 17, at 1636 (citing Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4
Wheat) at 518) (“The decision thus recognized the corporation itself as ‘an artificial
being’ having constitutional rights to protect the property interests of its individual
donors.”). The Court later declined, however, to bestow upon corporations the rights
granted by the Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Bank of Augusta
v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839); see also Pollman, supra note 17, at 1636-38
(observing that after the Dartmouth College and Bank of Augusta cases, “a corporation
was not a ‘citizen’ within the meaning of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause, but the corporate charter was protected by the Contracts Clause, the
corporation was recognized as having properties of ‘individuality,’ and the corporation
was conceived of as a ‘person, for certain purposes in contemplation of law’”).
29 Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). See generally
Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W.
VA. L. REV. 173 (1985) (analyzing the impact of the Santa Clara decision).
30 The case actually was decided on different grounds, but Chief Justice
Waite’s pre-argument statement has been treated as dispositive of the Equal
Protection Clause issue.
The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a
State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.
S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. at 396. For an in-depth analysis of the odd procedural
context and subsequent interpretation of the Santa Clara case, see Pollman, supra note
17, at 1642-46. See also Blair, supra note 17, at 803-05.
31 Blair, supra note 17, at 803; see also Horwitz, supra note 29, at 173 (“In our
own time, in First National Bank v. Bellotti, a five-to-four majority of the Supreme
Court treated the Santa Clara case as if it in effect had already decided that
corporations, like individuals, were entitled to the protection of the first amendment.”
(footnote omitted)); Mayer, supra note 26, at 581 (“The personification of the
corporation occurred in 1886 [when Santa Clara was decided]; the popular literature
marks this as the year that the corporation ‘stole’ the fourteenth amendment.”).
32 A notable example is the Supreme Court’s holding, less than a decade after
Santa Clara gave corporations Fourteenth Amendment due process protection, that
corporations can invoke the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in disputes with the
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the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on the constitutional rights
of corporations in the contexts of the First and Fifth Amendments
merit a brief analysis here.
2. Corporate Personhood and the Fifth Amendment
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The Supreme Court first considered the application of
the Fourth and Fifth33 Amendments to business records in the
“now-discredited”34 case of Boyd v. United States.35 Decided the
same year as Santa Clara, Boyd espoused an extremely broad
concept of the application of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
protections to business records. Boyd held that compulsory
production of “private books and papers” compels the owner to
be a witness against himself within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment and is equivalent to an unreasonable search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.36 This holding, while
perhaps in keeping with the spirit of the Court’s opinion in
Santa Clara giving corporations Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection rights without analysis or precedential support,
proved too broad to stand.37
federal government. See Noble v. Union River Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 165, 176 (1893)
(allowing a railroad corporation to invoke the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause in a
dispute with the Department of the Interior over a railroad right-of-way). As Professor
Mayer has pointed out, however, Noble involved a dispute over traditional property rights,
not an intangible Bill of Rights protection. SeeMayer, supra note 26, at 591.
33 As one of the authors of this paper has previously discussed, the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination had little practical effect for most of the
nineteenth century because under the nineteenth-century common law “party witness” rule
of evidence, a criminal defendant was not permitted to testify at his own trial, even if he
wished to do so. See Lance Cole, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Production of
Personal Documents After United States v. Hubbell—New Protection for Private Papers?, 29
AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 131-39 (2002) [hereinafter Cole, New Protection]; see also Akhil Reed
Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause,
93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 891 n.153 (1995) (“Defendants were not allowed to testify under oath
at trial in America until the midnineteenth century.”).
34 In re Three Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 29, 1999, 191 F.3d
173, 177 (2d Cir. 1999) (summarizing the development of the “collective entity” doctrine).
35 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
36 Id. at 634-35. The Court did not focus on the fact that the document at
issue, an invoice for 29 cases of plate glass, was a business record, instead
characterizing the record as “private” in nature. Id. at 619, 634-35.
37 See generally Lance Cole, Reexamining the Collective Entity Doctrine in the
New Era of Limited Liability Entities—Should Business Entities Have a Fifth
Amendment Privilege?, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 13-21 (2005) [hereinafter Cole,
Reexamining the Collective Entity Doctrine] (describing the breadth of the Boyd holding
and the Court’s subsequent retreat from that broad holding). See also Peter J.
Henning, Finding What Was Lost: Sorting Out the Custodian’s Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination from the Compelled Production of Records, 77 NEB. L. REV. 34, 45 (1998)
(“Taken at face value, Boyd’s broad interpretation of the constitutional privacy right
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In 1906, the Court decided Hale v. Henkel38 and concluded
that natural persons and corporations should be treated
differently under the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment; because a corporation is “a creature of the State,” it
cannot assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.39 At the same time, the Court preserved the
portion of Boyd that permitted corporations to assert a Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.40 Under this so-called collective entity doctrine, a
corporation has no Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Because it is not a “natural person” entitled to
those protections, and the constitutional rights of individual
corporate shareholders are subordinated to the government’s
interest in effective and efficient law enforcement investigations,
shareholders waive their Fifth Amendment rights when they
choose to incorporate. This result is difficult to reconcile with
either the language of the Fourth41 or Fifth Amendments42 or the
view of corporate personhood reflected in Santa Clara and its
progeny. Although Hale’s distinction between corporate rights
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is difficult to explain,43
would make it virtually impossible to force any person to surrender records in a
government investigation.”).
38 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
39 Id. at 74.
40 Id. at 76.
41 The Fourth Amendment decision in Hale is, in the context of the times in
which the case was decided, particularly difficult to understand. As Professor Mayer
has astutely recognized,
For corporations to assert fourth amendment rights against warrantless
regulatory inspections requires according corporate persons the very
intangible right of privacy. In return, this requires a double constitutional
leap. First, the Court must decide that corporations are persons. Second, the
Court must decide that a privacy right of a corporate person has been
violated. Even assuming that the Court employs the natural entity theory to
hold that corporations are persons, the second prong of this analysis presents
difficulties; how a corporation enjoys a privacy interest in its premises
remains unclear.
Mayer, supra note 26, at 644.
42 See Hale, 201 U.S. at 84-85 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (comparing the
language of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and finding no reason to construe the
term “people” in the Fourth Amendment as broader in coverage than the term “person”
in the Fifth Amendment, particularly when the word “person” as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment had been construed to include corporations).
43 Professor Mayer has commented upon the “two-faced” inconsistency of the
Hale holding:
The reasons for Hale’s two-faced view of the corporation remain mysterious.
The opinion may have reflected the growing debate in the legal literature
over corporate personality. It may be that although the Court viewed the
fourth amendment protection of papers to be akin to the protection of
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the Court has never reexamined the Fifth Amendment holding; to
the contrary, the Court has steadfastly clung to the distinction
even as it jettisoned one rationale after another for doing so.
Five years after Hale, the collective entity doctrine was
expanded in Wilson v. United States,44 which held that a
corporate officer could not refuse to produce to a grand jury
corporate documents under that officer’s control, even if the
target of the grand jury investigation was the officer and not
the corporation.45 Wilson reaffirmed Hale’s holding that a
corporation cannot assert a Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination46 and added that allowing a corporate officer
to assert an individual privilege against self-incrimination to
avoid producing corporate records and documents would be “an
unjustifiable extension” of individual rights.47 This holding, like
the subsequent collective entity doctrine cases summarized
below, stands in stark contrast to the Citizens United and
Hobby Lobby conception of corporate personhood.
Two final steps in the Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment
collective entity jurisprudence must be briefly examined in order
to fully explore the inherent conflict between this constitutional
law doctrine and the new approach to corporate personhood the
Court took in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby. In Bellis v.
United States,48 the collective entity doctrine was expanded well
beyond its original concept of the corporation as a creature of the
state retaining visitatorial powers.49 Bellis held that a former
partner in a dissolved three-person law partnership could not
assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
for partnership documents in his possession in a criminal tax
property, the very personal, intangible privilege against self-incrimination is
more difficult to grant a corporate entity.
Mayer, supra note 26, at 622.
44 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
45 Id. at 384-85.
46 Id. at 383-84.
47 Id. at 385.
48 Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974). For further analysis of Bellis
and the partnership law aspects of the case, see Cole, Reexamining the Collective Entity
Doctrine, supra note 37, at 35, 40 nn.117-18, 140 (noting that Justice Douglas’s dissent
stressed that the criminal investigation was focused on Bellis personally and not the
dissolved law partnership, and that while the Pennsylvania law partnership had
dissolved almost four years earlier, it was still in the process of “winding up” and
therefore had not been terminated under Pennsylvania law).
49 Because a corporation is created by state law, and in early times by a
special act of a state legislature, the state retained a “visitatorial” power to intervene in
and obtain information about the corporation’s activities and internal affairs. See infra
note 288 and accompanying text.
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investigation in which he was the target.50 Justice Marshall’s
majority opinion reasoned that a partnership is not a natural
person,51 and a partner in a partnership has no expectation of
personal privacy in the records of the partnership.52 “Justice
Marshall’s opinion . . . [also] mark[ed] the first time, post-Boyd,
that the Court [had] relied explicitly upon personal privacy or
confidentiality as a policy interest protected by [the Self-
Incrimination Clause].”53 The Bellis Court’s refusal to permit the
owners of a business entity, particularly an “aggregate” entity54
like the Pennsylvania general partnership in that case, to exercise
any of their individual rights through the business entity should
have brought pause to the Roberts Court as it approached the
Citizens United andHobby Lobby cases.
In a case that is the final step in our summary analysis of
pre–Citizens United Fifth Amendment self-incrimination cases,
Braswell v. United States,55 the Court stretched the collective
entity doctrine to its logical limit—and arguably beyond that
limit.56 Braswell was the owner and sole shareholder of two
corporations that received federal grand jury subpoenas for the
corporations’ books and records.57 Braswell opposed the subpoenas
by arguing that his compelled production of the subpoenaed
corporate records would incriminate him individually.58 Chief
50 Bellis, 417 U.S. at 90-91.
51 At the time Bellis was decided (and at the time of this writing), under
Pennsylvania law, a general partnership is not treated as a separate entity but rather as
an “aggregate” consisting of its individual partners. See generally Pennsylvania Uniform
Partnership Act, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8301-8365 (2015). Under the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act (RUPA), now adopted in a majority of states but at the time of this
writing not adopted in Pennsylvania, a general partnership is a legal entity separate from
its individual partners, much as a corporation is a legal entity separate from its
shareholders. Partnership Act (1997) (Last Amended 2013), UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Partnership%20Act%20(1997)%20(Last%20A
mended%202013) [http://perma.cc/CA9V-NLGZ] (last visited June 7, 2016). For an
explanation of the differences between the UPA and RUPA, including aggregate theory
versus entity theory, see id.
52 Bellis, 417 U.S. at 89-91.
53 See Cole, Reexamining the Collective Entity Doctrine, supra note 37, at 36
(noting that the Bellis majority opinion even cites the Court’s most controversial
privacy opinion, Griswold v. Connecticut, as supporting recognition of a privacy
rationale for application of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
54 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
55 Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
56 See Cole, Reexamining the Collective Entity Doctrine, supra note 37, at 41-
45 (criticizing the 5-4 majority opinion in Braswell as the ultimate expansion of the
collective entity doctrine and a missed opportunity to rationalize Fifth Amendment
self-incrimination law).
57 See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 100-01.
58 Id. at 102-03. In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the Supreme
Court adopted a new, more “textualist” interpretation of the Fifth Amendment and focused
on whether a communication was testimonial and compelled, as opposed to focusing on
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Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion embraced the collective entity
doctrine, notwithstanding that Braswell was the sole shareholder
of the corporations, and relied primarily on a policy argument
that any retreat from the doctrine “would have a detrimental
impact on the Government’s efforts to prosecute ‘white-collar
crime,’ one of the most serious problems confronting law
enforcement authorities.”59 Most notably, for purposes of our
analysis, the opinion also acknowledged that had Braswell chosen
to conduct his business as a sole proprietorship, rather than
incorporating, the collective entity doctrine would not have
applied and Braswell would have been able to assert the privilege
against self-incrimination in response to the subpoenas for his
business records.60 Thus, the Court acknowledged that, as a
practical matter, Braswell had effectively waived his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination with respect to
all his business records when he incorporated his businesses,
whether or not he had any intent—or even knew that the effect of
incorporating would be—to do so.61
The holding in Braswell, and particularly the Braswell
Court’s acknowledgement that, under the collective entity
doctrine, incorporation can deprive the incorporator(s) of their
whether the contents of a communication were incriminating. See generally Cole, New
Protection, supra note 33, at 142-47 (analyzing the impact of the Fisher holding). Under
Fisher’s new approach to Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination analysis,
voluntarily created private papers were subject to Fifth Amendment protection only if the
“act of production” of such papers (or other records of voluntarily produced communications)
had a sufficient communicative aspect to make it “testimonial” and therefore protected by
the privilege. See id. at 146-47. After Fisher, Braswell’s claim of individual self-
incrimination based upon the preexisting corporate records would have to satisfy the “act of
production” doctrine discussed in note 61, infra, and subsequently developed in the Hubbell
case. SeeUnited States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
59 Braswell, 487 U.S. at 115.
60 As noted above, because the Fisher rule concerning preexisting documents
would preclude any self-incrimination claim based upon the contents of the corporate
records, Braswell would have been required to satisfy the act of production doctrine by
showing that his individual action in producing the corporate records would have some
testimonial aspect that would have incriminated him. Id. at 104. See generally Cole,
New Protection, supra note 33 (analyzing the act of production doctrine).
61 See Cole, Reexamining the Collective Entity Doctrine, supra note 37, at 42-
43 (criticizing this “implied waiver” aspect of Braswell). Compare Richard A. Epstein,
Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right That Big Corporations Should Have
but Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 647 (2011) (discussing the “doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions” and asserting that a state could not condition a
corporation’s limited liability grant on the company’s willingness to waive protection
against searches and seizures or its free speech rights). Professor Epstein also observes
that “[i]t seems beyond reason to say that the choice of a business form—association
versus corporation—that is made for liability or tax reasons should have a significant
effect on the wholly unrelated issue of political participation.” Id. at 647-48. The
Braswell majority obviously did not have the same concern when it deprived Mr.
Braswell of his privilege against self-incrimination solely because he chose to adopt the
corporate form, presumably for liability or tax reasons, in operating his business.
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constitutional rights under the Self-Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, stands in stark contrast62 to the view of
corporate personhood that the Court accepted 20-plus years later in
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby. Under those cases, corporations
are entitled to the same First Amendment and statutory political
and religious expression rights as natural persons. But because the
Court equates the controlling shareholders’ political and religious
preferences with those of the corporation, minority shareholders
and employees who oppose the political activities or religious
policies that corporate managers pursue are left with no effective
recourse;63 by buying stock in the corporation or accepting
employment, they effectively waive their own First Amendment
rights.64 The collective entity doctrine and the Citizens
United/Hobby Lobby line of cases may share a common disregard
for the interests of employees and minority shareholders.65 But in
62 As Professor Mayer has observed, “Since Hale, the privilege against self-
incrimination remains the only Bill of Rights safeguard unavailable to corporations; its
reasoning survives as a relic of a bygone era of corporate theory. Paradoxically, in modern
times, corporations receive other fifth amendment protections: due process liberty rights
and double jeopardy safeguards.”Mayer, supra note 26, at 624 (footnote omitted).
63 See Part II, infra, criticizing the corporate governance assumptions
underlying Citizens United.
64 The contention that shareholders and employees may “vote” by selling
their stock or quitting their jobs is effectively refuted by Justice Stevens’s dissent in
Citizens United and the majority opinion in Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
Justice Stevens noted that “[i]f and when shareholders learn that a corporation has
been spending general treasury money on objectionable electioneering, they can divest.
Even assuming that they reliably learn as much, however, this solution is only partial.
The injury to the shareholders’ expressive rights has already occurred.” Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 477 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Likewise, in Harris, the
Court held the First Amendment prohibits collection of union dues from personal
assistants in state-funded programs who choose not to join or support the union. The
Court sympathized with the burdens faced by objecting nonmembers, noting that even
if an employee suspected that the union had used funds improperly, “‘[t]he onus is on
the employee to come up with the resources to mount the legal challenge in a timely
fashion,’ and litigating such cases is expensive.” Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2633 (citation
omitted) (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2294
(2012)); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?:
The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100
CORNELL L. REV. 335, 370 (2015) (discussing the difference between stock ownership
and even the remotest control over corporate decisionmaking).
65 Cf. Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and
Association Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1024-25
(2013) (“When the Supreme Court held in Citizens United v. FEC that corporations
have a First Amendment right to make unlimited, independent campaign
expenditures, it dismissed in a few sentences the idea that the corporate leadership’s
use of corporate resources on politics might infringe the rights of dissenting
shareholders. . . . Collectively, these recent cases have given organizations a newly
robust First Amendment right to use the entity’s resources and money in ways that
stakeholders within the organization may find anathema and to discriminate against
employees and members in order to advance the expressive interests of the entity.”);
see also Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the
First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 238 (1981) (“A government concerned with
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one instance—the collective entity cases—corporations are denied
Bill of Rights protections, while in the other instance—Citizens
United and Hobby Lobby—corporations’ political participation
and religious expression rights are in important respects elevated
to parity with those of natural persons.
Before analyzing this fundamental inconsistency
further, it is necessary to review briefly the First Amendment
treatment of corporations’ political participation rights prior to
Citizens United.
3. Corporate Personhood and the First Amendment
Prior to Citizens United
Although most commentators66 begin analysis of the First
Amendment political participation rights of corporations with
the Supreme Court’s landmark 1978 case, First National Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti,67 the Court had extended First Amendment
protections to some corporations and other entities prior to
Bellotti.68 For example, in Grosjean v. American Press Co.,69
protecting First Amendment values could reasonably believe it important to free those
citizens [stockholders who disagree with management’s political expenditures using
corporate funds] from bondage to management’s political views, even if the bonds are
seen as no more than restrictions on their investment opportunities.”). The issue of
stockholder disagreement with corporate management’s expenditures of corporate
funds for political purposes is discussed in Part II, infra.
66 See, e.g., Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem, supra note 10, at 1214 (“The
modern jurisprudence on corporate political speech begins in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti . . . .”); Robert L. Kerr, Naturalizing the Artificial Citizen: Repeating
Lochner’s Error in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 15 COMM. L. &
POL’Y 311, 314-15 (2010) (“It was during Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.’s years at the
Court that the entire foundation for First Amendment protection of corporate political
media spending was developed. . . . He authored First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, the 1978 landmark opinion that was the first case to provide constitutional
protection to corporate political media spending, as well as three other majority
opinions while participating in the series of formative related cases decided over the
course of the following decade.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Pollman, supra note 17, at
1656-58 (“Broadly speaking, both commercial and political speech protections date back
to the 1970s for corporations.”).
67 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Bellotti, of course,
built upon the analytical framework established by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976),
in which the Court first ruled on the constitutionality of the 1974 amendments to the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2
U.S.C. § 431 (1972).
68 See Mayer, supra note 26, at 627 (“Although corporations first received
first amendment safeguards in 1978, by that time the Court had considered the first
amendment protections of unincorporated associations, newspaper corporations, labor
unions, and other organizations.” (footnote omitted)). For a summary of pre-Bellotti
corporate First Amendment cases in both the federal and state courts, see Mutch,
supra note 25, at 315 (observing that the legal challenges to restrictions of corporate
political activities in Bellotti were “qualitatively different from previous ones” because
the corporations in Bellotti “claimed First Amendment rights of political speech not as
a defense against prosecution, but by suing the state to prevent prosecution”).
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decided in 1936, American Press Company and eight other
newspaper publishers challenged a Louisiana state license tax
imposed on newspapers and other publications with circulation of
20,000 or more copies a week.70 The publishers relied upon the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to assert a First Amendment freedom of press
claim, which the Court viewed as “present[ing] a question of the
utmost gravity and importance; for, if well made, it goes to the
heart of the natural right of the members of an organized
society, united for their common good, to impart and acquire
information about their common interests.”71 The Grosjean
Court first confirmed that a corporation is a “person” within the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and it then went on to hold the Louisiana tax
“unconstitutional under the due process of law clause because it
abridges the freedom of the press.”72 By 1964, when the Court
decided New York Times v. Sullivan73 (providing a zone of
protection to corporate publishers in defamation cases), the
application of First Amendment rights to corporate speakers
was so well-established that it required no explanation.
Despite these and other corporate First Amendment
precedents,74 it was the 1970s Federal Election Campaign Act
cases, particularly Buckley v. Valeo75 and Bellotti, that defined the
First Amendment political participation rights of corporations76
and laid the groundwork for the Court’s controversial ruling in
Citizens United. Buckley “equated political spending with political
speech and therefore established political spending as deserving a
high level of First Amendment protection.”77 Bellotti then applied
69 Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
70 Id. at 240.
71 Id. at 243. Use of the phrase “united for the common good” calls to mind the
communitarian aspects of the corporate form. See infra text accompanying notes 412-18.
72 Id. at 244, 251.
73 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
74 Both Grosjean, 297 U.S. 233, and Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495 (1952), were among the relevant precedents cited by the majority opinion in First
Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 779-80.
75 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
76 Professor Kerr has noted that “corporate speech” is not an accurate term to
describe corporations’ political activities and suggests that “corporate political media
spending” is the better descriptive term. Kerr, supra note 66, at 314 n.28.
77 Jessica A. Levinson, The Original Sin of Campaign Finance Law: Why
Buckley v. Valeo Is Wrong, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 881, 891 (2013) (also stating that “[t]he
Court’s 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo, in which it reviewed the constitutionality of
the FECA, remains the bedrock of campaign finance law” (footnote omitted)); see also
Kerr, supra note 66, at 317 (“Buckley did not address First Amendment questions
regarding the use of corporate funds in election campaigns, but it made such challenges
inevitable by establishing that ‘political spending and political speech are inextricably
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this “spending is speech” rationale78 to invalidate state law
restrictions on corporate political contributions and expenditures.79
As commentators have noted, the cases decided prior to
Bellotti “have little precedential value for profit-making
corporations,”80 and “[i]t is a measure of the breadth of the Bellotti
ruling that it could be used to uphold corporate political spending
in cases that did not involve elections.”81 Why has Bellotti been so
influential? The answer lies in the way Justice Powell applied
Buckley’s First Amendment interpretation—treating political
expenditures like political speech—to political spending by banks
and corporations. If the late California politician Jesse M. Unruh
was correct when he said, “Money is the mother’s milk of
politics,”82 then it is not surprising that a judicial interpretation of
the First Amendment that protects political spending by banks
and corporations would prove both influential and enduring.
Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Bellotti began by
declining to focus its analysis on what First Amendment rights
corporations have or do not have, as the Massachusetts courts
below had done, and instead focused on whether the
Massachusetts law “abridges expression that the First
Amendment was meant to protect.”83 Justice Powell had little
difficulty concluding both that, because of its importance to the
people of Massachusetts, “[t]he speech proposed by the [banks
and corporations] is at the heart of the First Amendment’s
protections,”84 and that the speech did not lose its First
interrelated and that the former cannot be restricted without adversely affecting the
latter.’” (quoting ANN B. MATASAR, CORPORATE PACS AND FEDERAL CAMPAIGN
FINANCING LAWS: USE OR ABUSE OF POWER 14-15 (1986))).
78 See J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE
L. J. 1001, 1005 (1976) (“The [Buckley] Court told us, in effect, that money is speech.”).
79 The criticism of Citizens United that it commodified constitutional rights
by equating money with speech is therefore untimely. That train had left the station
some time ago.
80 Mayer, supra note 26, at 627.
81 Mutch, supra note 25, at 313.
82 Mark A. Uhlig, Jesse Unruh, A California Political Power, Dies, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 6, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/06/obituaries/jesse-unruh-a-california-
political-power-dies.html [http://perma.cc/Z3NB-HK4W]; see also Wright, supra note
78, at 1004 (“Money does facilitate communication of political preferences and
prejudices. It is also clear that money influences the outcome of elections. Generally
speaking, the more money spent [o]n behalf of a candidate, the better the candidate’s
chances of winning. Indeed, a veteran of political campaigns has declared that money is
the mother’s milk of politics.” (citing TIME, Jan. 5, 1968, at 44 (statement of Jesse
Unruh, former Speaker of the California Assembly))).
83 See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
84 Id.
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Amendment protection because the speakers were banks and
corporations rather than natural persons.85
The Bellotti majority opinion, in addition to treating
corporate expenditures as constitutionally protected speech,
summarily dismissed86 the now more obviously prescient
concerns raised in the dissent by Justices White, Brennan, and
Marshall that corporate political expenditures pose special
risks in our democratic system of government:
The governmental interest in regulating corporate political
communications, especially those relating to electoral matters, . . . raises
considerations which differ significantly from those governing the
regulation of individual speech. Corporations are artificial entities
created by law for the purpose of furthering certain economic goals. In
order to facilitate the achievement of such ends, special rules relating to
such matters as limited liability, perpetual life, and the accumulation,
distribution, and taxation of assets are normally applied to them. States
have provided corporations with such attributes in order to increase
their economic viability and thus strengthen the economy generally. It
has long been recognized however, that the special status of corporations
has placed them in a position to control vast amounts of economic power
which may, if not regulated, dominate not only the economy but also the
very heart of our democracy, the electoral process . . . . Such
expenditures may be viewed as seriously threatening the role of the
First Amendment as a guarantor of a free marketplace of ideas.87
For our purposes, it is the Bellotti majority opinion’s
response to these concerns that merits the most detailed analysis
because analytical flaws that Justice Powell introduced in Bellotti
were subsequently relied upon in Citizens United to dismiss the
same concerns regarding the greater corporate role in electoral
politics.88 Justice Powell dismissed the Bellotti dissenters’
85 See id. at 784.
86 See id. at 793-95 & n.34 (dismissing dissenting opinion’s concern that some
shareholders may be coerced to support political positions with which they disagree because
“no shareholder has been ‘compelled’ to contribute anything” and shareholders are free to
sell their shares and withdraw their investment in a corporation at any time).
87 Id. at 809. Justice Rehnquist also dissented in Bellotti, arguing that
because corporations are artificial entities created by the states, the states can impose
restrictions on corporate political expenditures. See id. at 823 (citing Trs. of Dartmouth
Coll. v. Woodward 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819)). But see Epstein, supra note 61, at
653-61 (asserting that corporations are unlikely to make large political expenditures in
general elections because of the risk of consumer backlash that could damage brands or
harm corporate reputations).
88 Similarly, because the focus of this paper is the “corporate personhood” issue
presented by Citizens United andHobby Lobby, and not campaign finance law generally, we
are not describing here the evolution of the Court’s entire campaign finance jurisprudence,
whether involving political action committees (see, for example, FEC v. National
Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985), and FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Commission, 533 U.S. 431 (2001)), or “independent expenditures” by noncandidates (see, for
example, FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986), and Austin v.
916 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:3
concerns regarding corporate economic power and corporate
shareholder rights based on three assumptions, each of which is
fundamentally flawed. First, Justice Powell asserted that
“[u]ltimately shareholders may decide, through the procedures of
corporate democracy, whether their corporation should engage in
debate on public issues.”89 This idealized confidence in the efficacy
of “the procedures of corporate democracy” was not warranted in
1978 and, as subsequent legal developments and scholarly analysis
demonstrate,90 is certainly not warranted today.
Second, in response to concerns about shareholder
disagreement with management’s use of corporate funds for
political purposes, Justice Powell responded that a “shareholder
invests in a corporation of his own volition and is free to withdraw
his investment at any time and for any reason.”91As explained in
Part II, infra, this is simply not true in the case of most
corporations (those in which there is no public market for the
company’s shares), and in the real world is an unacceptable
alternative in almost all cases. Shareholders in a profitable
corporation are unlikely to give up their investment because they
disagree with a particular management action, such as a political
expenditure, especially when the expenditure is almost certainly
not material to the overall financial condition and business
prospects of the company.92 Finally, as Delaware Chief Justice
Leo E. Strine and Nicholas Walter have recently stated, the
“practical realities of stock market ownership” (i.e., the
intervention of brokers, mutual funds, pension plans, and the
like) render the notion of shareholder control of corporate speech
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (overruled by Citizens United)), or the
constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (the McCain-Feingold Act)
(see, for example, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (overruled by Citizens United), FEC
v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007), and McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct.
1434 (2014)). Nor do we attempt to analyze the various theoretical rationales, such as the
anticorruption rationale (see, for example, Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance
Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012) (“The government interest in the prevention of corruption, or
at least the appearance thereof, is the singular basis for restriction of campaign finance
spending, as all students of campaign finance law well know.”)), or the now-abandoned
antidistortion rationale (see, for example, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010)
(referring to “Austin’s antidistortion rationale”)), that scholars and courts have utilized to
categorize and explain the holdings in those cases. For an insightful analysis of the pre–
Citizens United “doctrinal incoherence” in the Court’s campaign finance cases, see Richard
L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011).
89 First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978).
90 See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
91 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794 & n.34.
92 Cf. Jay B. Kesten, Towards a Moral Agency Theory of the Shareholder
Bylaw Power, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 485, 505 (2013) (observing that with respect to
corporate political spending, “a dissenting shareholder cannot avoid the impact of these
activities simply by exiting the firm”).
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a myth.93 Before further exploring these analytical flaws,
however, it is useful to consider in some detail their eventual
consequence—the Court’s Citizens United decision.
B. Citizens United and Corporate Personification
The U.S. Supreme Court’s January 21, 2010, decision in
Citizens United v. FEC 94 ignited a firestorm of commentary and
criticism. Some of this commentary was quite scholarly and
incisive,95 but some (including depictions in the popular press) was
rather overblown and ill-informed.96 So it is appropriate to at least
briefly explain what the Citizens United opinions (including the
concurring and dissenting opinions) did and did not say.
When the case arose, Citizens United was a nonprofit
corporation that obtained most of its funds from individual
donations, with a smaller portion of its funds coming from for-
profit corporations.97 In January 2008 (in the thick of presidential
primary season), Citizens United released a film entitled Hillary:
The Movie, which by any standard was a harsh critique of then-
Senator Hillary Clinton, who was running for President. Citizens
93 Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 370; see also infra Parts II, III (discussing
corporate law flaws in the Supreme Court’s Citizens United andHobby Lobby decisions).
94 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). For more thorough descriptions
and analyses of the case, see Joel M. Gora, The First Amendment . . . United, 27 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 935 (2011); Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 217 (2010); Jason S. Campbell, Note, Down the Rabbit Hole with Citizens
United: Are Bans on Corporate Direct Campaign Contributions Still Constitutional?, 45
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 171 (2011); Joanna M. Meyer, Note, The Real Error in Citizens United,
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2171 (2012); Ellis, supra note 5; Osterlind, supra note 5;
Imtanes, supra note 5; Garden, supra note 5; Padfield, supra note 10; Matthew J. Allman,
Note, Swift Boat Captains of Industry for Truth: Citizens United and the Illogic of the
Natural Person Theory of Corporate Personhood, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 387 (2011); Steven
L. Winter, Citizens Disunited, 27 GA. ST. U. L. Rev. 1133 (2011); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143 (2010); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Supreme Court—October Term 2009 Foreword: Conservative Judicial Activism, 44 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 863 (2011).
95 E.g., Winter, supra note 94; Chemerinsky, supra note 94.
96 See Keith Olbermann, U.S. Government For Sale, MSNBC NEWS (Jan. 21,
2010, 9:29 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/34981476/ns/msnbc-countdown_with_keith_
olbermann/t/olbermann-us-government-sale/#.VXsWGvlVhxQ [http://perma.cc/LRT8-VSTU]
(describing Citizens United as “a decision that might actually have more dire implications
than ‘Dred Scott v Sandford’” and warning that after Citizens United, “any
restrictions on how these corporate-beings spend their money on political advertising, are
unconstitutional”). For overblown praise of Citizens United from conservative media
outlets, see Ken Klukowski, Founding Fathers Smiling After Supreme Court Campaign
Finance Ruling, FOX NEWS (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/
01/22/ken-klukowski-supreme-court-amendment-mccain-feingold.html [http://perma.cc/J
NH5-QPLD] (“Rather than drown out the little guy, this option allows groups, be they
Citizens United, the National Rifle Association, or the Family Research Council, to be a
megaphone for the little guy, informing the voters of what’s at stake.”).
97 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319.
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United wished to increase viewership for Hillary by releasing it
through video-on-demand, and to promote the film through 10-
second and 30-second advertisements on broadcast and cable
television. Under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), corporations and unions were prohibited from using
general treasury funds to make direct contributions to candidates
or independent expenditures that expressly advocated for the
election or defeat of a candidate;98 an amendment prohibited any
“electioneering communication” as well.99 The BCRA (more
commonly referred to as “McCain-Feingold,” after its two
principal sponsors) defines an electioneering communication as
“any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that “refers to a
clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and is made within
30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election.100 While
corporations and unions were barred from using general treasury
funds for these express advocacy or electioneering communications,
they were allowed to use a “separate segregated fund” (i.e., a PAC)
for such purposes. Concerned that both the film Hillary and the
ads promoting it fell within the BCRA’s prohibitions, Citizens
United sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that
section 441b was unconstitutional as applied toHillary.
A 5-4 majority of the Court rejected Citizens United’s as-
applied claims101 but found the BCRA’s restrictions on corporate
independent expenditures to be facially unconstitutional. Citing
98 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000).
99 Id. § 441b(b)(2) (2006).
100 Id. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2012).
101 The procedural history of the case is unusual. After briefing and argument,
and after draft opinions had been circulated, the Court, at its own initiative, scheduled
the case for reargument and asked the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing
whether the Court’s recent precedents on corporate contributions should be overruled.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 322; see also Yosifon, supra note 10, at 1217 (“In June the
Court shocked the legal world by requesting additional briefing and a new oral
argument on whether the Court should address the broader question of the facial
constitutional legitimacy of the statute.”); Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited, NEW
YORKER (May 21, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/21/money-unlimited?
currentPage=all [http://perma.cc/J7T4-WUZL] (reporting that Chief Justice Roberts
had the case reargued because Justice Souter had initially written a dissent accusing
the Chief Justice of violating the Court’s internal procedures after Roberts withdrew
his own initial majority opinion and assigned the case to Justice Kennedy, who had
written a concurring opinion that would strike down the corporate contributions
limits). But see Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, supra note 88, at 10
(suggesting that the decision to hold the case over for reargument and direct the
parties to file supplemental briefs on the constitutionality of the statute’s prohibition of
corporate independent expenditures was prompted by the government’s concession
during the 2009 oral argument that the statute would permit the prohibition of
corporate-sponsored books containing express campaign speech—“what might be
understood as statutory support for book banning”).
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precedent applying the First Amendment to corporations,102 Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated, “We find no basis for the
proposition that, in the context of political speech, the Government
may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers,”103
notwithstanding that corporations are not “natural persons.”104
Stating that the only justification for restrictions on
political speech was the potential for “quid pro quo” corruption
(permitting a distinction between direct campaign contributions
and independent expenditures),105 the majority, overruling Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,106 repudiated the Court’s
previous finding of a compelling governmental interest in
preventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s
support for the corporation’s political ideas.”107
A concurring opinion by Chief Justice Roberts described
the challenged BCRA provision as “a direct prohibition on political
speech” and roundly criticized Austin as an “aberration.”108 Justice
Scalia’s concurring opinion took issue with the dissent’s
characterization of corporations as enjoying something less than
full First Amendment protection.109
Justice Stevens’s dissent indeed devoted a fair amount
of attention to the distinctions between corporate and human
speakers, describing at length the history of corporate charters
in America and the special status of corporations with respect
to First Amendment activity. Said Justice Stevens,
Although they make enormous contributions to our society, corporations
are not actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office.
Because they may be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their
interests may conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of
eligible voters. The financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental
orientation of corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the
electoral process. Our lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis,
if not also a democratic duty, to take measures designed to guard
102 Much of this precedent was in the form of actions for defamation or
invasion of privacy against media corporations, such as New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), Time, Inc., v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448
(1976), and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
103 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341.
104 Id. at 343.
105 Id. at 345 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
106 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (2010).
107 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).
108 Id. at 372, 379 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
109 Id. at 385-93 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in local
and national races.110
Justice Stevens was equally concerned about the
majority’s activism in jumping to a facial challenge to the BCRA
provision, when an as-applied challenge may have been more
suitable in light of Citizens United’s circumstances as an
organization “funded overwhelmingly by individuals.”111 And, he
pointed out, the majority all but neglected to consider that the
BCRA allowed corporations and unions to make political
expenditures through PACs they could establish without
compromising the First Amendment rights of dissenting
shareholders and members.112
Justice Kennedy’s opinion (in this instance joined by all of
the other Justices save Thomas) preserved the BCRA’s disclaimer
and disclosure requirements as “a less restrictive alternative to
more comprehensive regulations of speech.”113 Justice Thomas,
dissenting to only this portion of the majority opinion, expressed
concern regarding the chilling effect of the disclaimer and
disclosure requirements, citing “death threats, ruined careers,
damaged or defaced property, or pre-emptive and threatening
warning letters”114 as the price advocates of California’s Proposition
110 Id. at 394 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens’s concern about
nonresidents has been taken up by FEC Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub. In a recent
opinion piece, she acknowledged the Citizens United rationale that “the rights that
citizens hold are not lost when they gather in corporate form.” Ellen L. Weintraub,
Taking On Citizens United, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2016, at A21. But she goes on to
reason that the bar on election spending by individual foreigners should likewise
extend to corporations in which they play a significant ownership role.
Arguably . . . for a corporation to make political contributions or expenditures
legally, it may not have any shareholders who are foreigners or federal
contractors. Corporations with easily identifiable shareholders could meet
this standard, but most publicly traded corporations probably could not.
This may sound like an extreme result, but it underscores how urgently
policy makers need to examine these issues with an eye toward drawing
acceptable lines. Perhaps we could require corporations that spend in federal
elections to verify that the share of their foreign ownership is less than 20
percent, or some other threshold.
Id. Commissioner Weintraub closes with a plea that “federal and state policy makers
and authorities . . . ensure that corporations are not being used as a front to allow
foreign money to seep into our elections.” Id.
111 Id. at 397 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Somewhat caustically, Justice Stevens
proclaimed, “Essentially, five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the
case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change
the law.” Id. at 398. At the very least, the majority demonstrated that liberals have no
monopoly on judicial activism.
112 Id. at 393 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 369 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
114 Id. at 485 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
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8 and other political causes have had to pay for engaging in
protected speech.
Lest there be any doubt about Citizens United’s
applicability to state legislation controlling corporate expenditures
on political issues, the U.S. Supreme Court ever-so-briefly
considered that issue in American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v.
Bullock.115 In a per curiam opinion, the Court, reversing the
Montana Supreme Court, declared unconstitutional a Montana
statute that prohibited corporations from making “an expenditure
in connection with a candidate or a political committee that
supports or opposes a candidate or a political party.”116 The
majority felt “[t]here can be no serious doubt” that the holding of
Citizens United applies to Montana state law.117 Justice Breyer,
dissenting (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan),
suggested that even were one to accept Citizens United, “this
Court’s legal conclusion should not bar the Montana Supreme
Court’s finding, made on the record before it, that independent
expenditures by corporations did in fact lead to corruption or the
appearance of corruption in Montana.”118 Never mind: the
findings of Congress, a state legislature, or a state supreme court
are irrelevant in the face of First Amendment absolutism and the
ascendancy of corporate “rights.”119
C. The Hobby Lobby Case, or How a Corporation Can
“Get Religion”
Four years after the Citizens United decision, at the close
of the term on June 30, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores.120 The decision was greatly
anticipated and hotly debated, as it dealt with both an expansion
of the religious exemption from the controversial Affordable Care
Act121 and the equally controversial issue of payment for birth
control, including types of birth control considered by some to be a
form of abortion.
115 Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012); see also Riddle v.
Hickenlooper, 742 F.3d 922 (10th Cir. 2014) (striking down Colorado political
contributions statute as unconstitutional under Citizens United).
116 MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(1) (2011).
117 Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. at 2491.
118 Id.
119 With regard to corporate ascendancy, see John C. Coates IV, Corporate
Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications, 30 CONST.
COMMENT 223 (2015).
120 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
121 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010), popularly (or unpopularly) known as “Obamacare.”
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Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (along with an affiliated
business, Mardel) and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation
are closely held corporations whose owners oppose abortion due to
their deeply held religious beliefs. The Affordable Care Act
mandates that employers include coverage for “preventive care and
screenings” for women without “any cost sharing requirements.”122
Pursuant to that statutory provision, the Department of Health
and Human services (HHS) promulgated regulations mandating
coverage for all contraceptive methods approved by the Food and
Drug Administration;123 of the 20 methods listed, including the
intrauterine device, four may have the effect of preventing an
already fertilized egg from developing any further by inhibiting
its attachment to the uterus, and therefore are considered a form
of abortion by Hobby Lobby’s and Conestoga’s owners.124 HHS
regulations exempted “religious employers,” including churches
and other nonprofit religious organizations, from what the Court
called the “contraceptive mandate,” but the exemption did not
apply to for-profit, closely held corporations such as Hobby
Lobby125 and Conestoga. These corporations sued under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act,126 claiming that the ACA’s
contraceptive mandate “substantially burden[s] a person’s
exercise of religion”127 and requesting an exemption from the rule.
By a 5-4 majority, the Supreme Court agreed. Justice
Alito’s majority opinion rejected the notion “that the owners of the
companies forfeited all RFRA protection when they decided to
organize their businesses as corporations rather than sole
proprietorships or general partnerships.”128 Instead, Justice Alito
asserted, “The plain terms of RFRA make it perfectly clear that
Congress did not discriminate in this way against men and
women who wish to run their businesses as for-profit corporations
in the manner required by their religious beliefs.”129
122 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012).
123 Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed.
Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
124 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764-66.
125 Whether Hobby Lobby is in fact a closely held corporation as described in
Justice Alito’s majority opinion is not altogether clear. See infra notes 251-52 and
accompanying text.
126 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
127 Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
128 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. As discussed in more detail in Part II,
infra, it is difficult to reconcile this position with the Court’s Fifth Amendment
privilege precedent, Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988), which held that
corporate formation by a sole proprietor forfeits the individual’s Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
129 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
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Justice Ginsburg’s dissent (joined by Justice Sotomayor)
took issue with “the Court’s expansive notion of corporate
personhood.”130 Said Ginsburg, “[T]he exercise of religion is
characteristic of natural persons, not artificial legal entities,”
referring to Chief Justice Marshall’s observation in Dartmouth
College that a corporation is “an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law,” and Justice
Stevens’s more recent reminder that corporations “have no
consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.”131
Justices Breyer and Kagan were content to confine their dissent
to Justice Ginsburg’s assertion that “the connection between the
families’ religious objections and the contraceptive coverage
requirement is too attenuated to rank as substantial,”132 and
therefore fails to satisfy that essential RFRA requirement.
Justices Breyer and Kagan therefore declined to decide “whether
either for-profit corporations or their owners may bring claims
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.”133
Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Hobby Lobby departs
from traditional corporate law theory134 as a proclamation of
expansive corporate purpose and a repudiation of the profit-
maximizing view of corporations. The opinion rejects the
argument that for-profit corporations exist solely to make money
as “fly[ing] in the face of modern corporate law.”135 Corporate law
in every American jurisdiction, according to the Hobby Lobby
majority, “either expressly or by implication authorizes
corporations to be formed under its general corporation act for
any lawful purpose or business.”136 These lawful purposes include
engaging in “humanitarian and other altruistic objectives,” such
as undertaking stricter pollution-control measures or providing
better working conditions than the law requires.137 Consequently,
the Court concluded, “If for-profit corporations may pursue such
130 Id. at 2797.
131 Id. at 2794 (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat) 518, 636 (1819)); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 466 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part).
132 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 2806 (Breyer, J., and Kagan, J., dissenting).
134 Cf. Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 345 n.14 (describing Hobby Lobby as
a case in which “the same conservative five-Justice majority that decided Citizens
United held explicitly that profit is not the sole end of corporate governance”). For
additional analysis of the corporate law issues raised by the Hobby Lobby majority
opinion, see Part II, infra.
135 Id. at 2770.
136 Id. at 2770-71.
137 Id. at 2771.
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worthy objectives, there is no apparent reason why they may not
further religious objectives as well.”138
Justice Alito’s exposition on the “modern corporate law”
governing charitable contributions and other socially responsible
corporate activities is at best an inadequate oversimplification
and at worst a results-oriented misstatement of the law. And
Justice Alito appears to take on a different view of corporations
than Justice Kennedy. Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Citizens
United regards the corporation (whether for-profit or nonprofit) as
an autonomous entity, embodying the collective aspirations of its
shareholders and exercising its own will, through the operation of
“corporate democracy.” “Corporations and other associations, like
individuals, contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the
dissemination of information and ideas’ that the First Amendment
seeks to foster.”139 In contrast, Justice Alito’s opinion in Hobby
Lobby pierces the veil, regarding the closely held corporation as
the alter ego of its owners, a mere conduit through which the
owners may express and act on their personal beliefs, even as the
corporate form protects them from personal liability for its debts
and other obligations.140 According to Justice Alito:
Congress provided protection for people like the Hahns and Greens
[owners of the plaintiff businesses] by employing a familiar legal fiction:
It included corporations within RFRA’s definition of “persons.” But it is
important to keep in mind that the purpose of this fiction is to provide
protection for human beings. A corporation is simply a form of
organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends. An
established body of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people
(including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated
with a corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether
constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is
to protect the rights of these people.141
We think the Third Circuit had the better argument:
General business corporations do not, separate and apart from the
actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees,
exercise religion. They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or
138 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
139 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (quoting First Nat’l Bank
of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
140 Justice Alito did not, however, explain how this flexible, porous conception of
the corporate form could be harmonized with the transformative, irreversible conception of
corporate formation articulated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in the Braswellmajority opinion.
See supra notes 62-68 (defining the modern “collective entity doctrine” and holding that
corporate formation effectively waives the incorporator’s Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination). This inconsistency is discussed further in Part II, infra.
141 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
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take other religiously-motivated actions separate and apart from the
intention and direction of their individual actors.142
Justice Alito retorted: “All of this is true—but quite beside the
point. Corporations, ‘separate and apart from’ the human beings
who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at
all.”143 In a tangible, physical sense, that is true.144 But
notwithstanding Justice Alito’s parenthetical reference to
“shareholders, officers, and employees,” the Citizens United and
Hobby Lobby holdings strongly suggest that the only human
beings that count in corporations are the ones who control them.
The people who are employed by them or hold minority ownership
interests in them seem to count for little.145
For a long time, we have understood that corporations
could speak. Now, apparently, they can get religion, too.
II. FUNDAMENTALMISCONCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE LAW IN
CITIZENSUNITED ANDHOBBY LOBBY
Both Citizens United and Hobby Lobby rely upon
misconceptions and oversimplifications of corporate law. Some
of those flaws can be traced back to Justice Powell’s seminal
corporate campaign finance law opinion in Bellotti, while
others appear to be uninformed assumptions or wishful
thinking. These fundamental corporate law flaws are discussed
in greater detail below.
A. Citizens United and Corporate Law
The majority opinion’s corporate law analysis in Citizens
United suffers from two critical flaws, one an error of omission
and the other an unwarranted supposition.146 The error of
142 Conestoga Wood Specialties v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 724
F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp.
2d 1278, 1291 (W.D. Okla. 2012)).
143 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
144 See infra note 246 and accompanying text; see also Amy J. Sepinwall,
Corporate Piety and Impropriety: Hobby Lobby’s Extension of RFRA Rights to the For-
Profit Corporation, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 173, 202 (2015) (arguing that “corporations
may be treated as if they possess rights of religious freedom as a way of protecting the
religious freedom rights of the corporation’s controlling members”).
145 In other recent cases, the Court seems to say that the only human beings
who count in unions are the ones who dissent from them. See Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l
Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014);
infra notes 433-34 and accompanying text.
146 While the U.S. Supreme Court’s primary function may be expounding on
the Constitution, it cannot entirely disregard the nonconstitutional legal context in
which cases arise. It is not surprising, however, that the corporate law implications of
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omission is the Court’s failure to recognize the inherent conflict
between giving corporations a new constitutional right to
participate in the political process by spending shareholder
moneys on political expression and the long-held corporate law
assumption that corporations exist to earn money for their
shareholders147—not to advance the political preferences of
corporate management.148 Most important, by giving corporations
new political clout, the Court has, perhaps unwittingly,
destabilized the delicate balance between managerial discretion
and the public interest in regulating corporate profit-maximizing
actions that can overreach and cause social harms.149 As Strine
and Walter point out, in the absence of regulatory restraints,
corporations in pursuit of profit will do nasty things (spoiling the
environment and such), and Citizens United allows corporations
to influence politics so as to erode regulatory constraints, allowing
them to engage in rent-seeking conduct and do those nasty
things.150 In Part IV, we propose state legislative action to respond
the Court’s Citizens United analysis appear to have received less attention than the
constitutional issues presented by the case. No members of the current Court have
significant experience as corporate law practitioners or scholars, and the inadequate
and incomplete corporate law analysis found in both Citizens United and Hobby Lobby
reflects the Court’s lack of corporate law expertise. Cf. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note
65, at 1024-25 (observing that the Citizens United majority opinion “dismissed in a few
sentences the idea that the corporate leadership’s use of corporate resources on politics
might infringe the rights of dissenting shareholders”). But see Susanna Kim Ripken,
Citizens United, Corporate Personhood, and Corporate Power: The Tension Between
Constitutional Law and Corporate Law, 6 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 285, 286
(2012) (arguing that a careful reading of the Citizens United opinion reveals that “[i]t
did not matter whether the speaker was a corporation or a human being because the
political speech at issue in the case . . . was covered by the First Amendment”); Larry
E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1019, 1031 (2011) (“The Court, however, avoided the artificial entity problem by
holding that the First Amendment ‘protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that
flow from each’ without regard to the speaker’s corporate identity.” (quoting Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010))).
147 See generally David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 181 (2013) [hereinafter Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose] (“Delaware
corporate law requires corporate directors to manage firms for the benefit of shareholders,
and not for any other constituency”); text accompanying notes 483 & 489, infra.
148 “As-applied” consideration of Citizens United might have obviated this
problem, because Citizens United was a corporation explicitly formed to address
political issues. The Court’s overly broad facial consideration of the statute invites
analysis of its effect on for-profit business corporations.
149 Cf. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, supra note 147, at 228 (“But in
Citizens United [ ] the Supreme Court of the United States made clear that the First
Amendment forbids Congress from restricting the political activity of corporations. As long
as Citizens United is good constitutional law, shareholder primacy is bad corporate theory.”
(footnote omitted)). Strine and Walter have explained how this misconception of corporate
law runs counter to traditional conservative notions of the modern business corporation as
limited in its profit-making activities by external regulatory/political constraints. See Strine
&Walter, supra note 64, at 342-43 (discussed in Part I, supra).
150 See Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 383-86.
2016] MAKING CORPORATE LAW MORE COMMUNITARIAN 927
to the tension between Citizens United’s new constitutional
doctrine and the traditional corporate governance model that has
evolved in American corporate law over the last century.
The second corporate law flaw in the Citizens United
decision was Justice Kennedy’s reliance on Bellotti to assert that
there is “little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by
shareholders ‘through the procedures of corporate democracy.’”151
Although that blithe supposition was at best an overly optimistic
assessment when Citizens United was decided, subsequent events
and scholarly analysis have proved it simply wrong. If any doubts
existed as to the impact of the Court’s decision in Citizens United,
the 2014 midterm elections made clear that the Court had opened
a door to unprecedented corporate political spending—with no
meaningful control or limitation by “the procedures of corporate
democracy.”152 Below, we will demonstrate that, contrary to the
dismissive assertion in the Citizens United majority opinion, it is
clear that the “procedures of corporate democracy” of neither
federal nor state corporate law are adequate to protect corporate
shareholders from abuse of the new constitutional right that
empowers corporate management to engage in political spending
with shareholder funds, whether or not the shareholders agree.153
In short, the Citizens United and Hobby Lobby majorities
limited their focus almost entirely to the constitutional issues
presented in the cases154 and failed to recognize the consequences
for both corporate law and corporate shareholders. The Court
failed to see both the outward parameters of the effects its
decisions would have on corporate law at a macro level and the
inadequacy of the corporate law mechanisms the Court assumed
could prevent misuse of shareholder resources.
151 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361-62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794, n.34 (1978)).
152 See, e.g., Derek Willis, Outside Groups Set Spending Record in Midterms,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/11/upshot/outside-groups-
set-spending-record-in-midterms-.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/PCR9-57VE] (reporting that
total independent expenditures by election cycle, in 2014 dollars, increased from $423.2
million in 2010 to $814.1 million in 2014); see also Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of
a Good Thing: Campaign Speech After Citizens United, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2365
(2010) (arguing that corporate political spending increases “corruption” in the political
process and that the Supreme Court wrongly decided Citizens United).
153 See infra Part III.
154 Cf. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem, supra note 10, at 1219 (“Corporate
law is thus wholly irrelevant both to the majority and the dissent in Citizens United.”).
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1. “Missing the Big Picture”—The Analytical Hole in
the Citizens United Corporate Law Analysis
We are not the first commentators to recognize that
Citizens United simply “missed the big picture” corporate law
repercussions of its holding when it granted corporations a new
constitutional right to make unlimited independent political
expenditures. In 2011, Professor David G. Yosifon recognized that
Citizens United conflicts with the “shareholder primacy norm” of
corporate law because it creates a constitutional law barrier to the
external regulation of corporate political activity that is necessary
to “curb corporate exploitation of non-shareholding stakeholders
in corporate enterprise, including workers, consumers, and
communities.”155 Professor Yosifon pointed out that Citizens
United both creates new constitutional impediments to regulatory
legislation that is essential under a shareholder primacy model of
corporate governance156 and “stands for the proposition that
government [now] cannot insulate the political arena from the
influence of corporations.”157
The solution proposed by Professor Yosifon is to change
the fundamental model of corporate governance: “Because the
Supreme Court has told us we cannot keep corporations out of our
democracy, then the next best way to accomplish the goals
motivating such legislation is to bring more democracy into our
corporations.”158 To accomplish this goal, he proposes expanding
the fiduciary duty obligations of corporate directors by allowing
nonshareholder constituency groups, such as employees and
customers, to elect representatives on corporate boards.159 While
we agree with Professor Yosifon’s insight that Citizens United is
incompatible with the shareholder primacy norm of corporate
law,160 and while we applaud the bold audacity of his proposed
155 Id. at 1198, 1237 (“My argument is that shareholder primacy is not viable unless
one is prepared to allow government to restrict corporate political activity, which I argue would
be unprincipled, unwise, and, according to the Supreme Court, unconstitutional.”).
156 Id. at 1212-13.
157 Id. at 1219.
158 Id. at 1235.
159 Id. at 1236-47.
160 We also agree with Professor Yosifon’s analysis in a subsequent work, cited
above, in which he convincingly demonstrates that shareholder wealth maximization is
the law of Delaware, and academic arguments to the contrary are inconsistent with
both Delaware case law and the extrajudicial statements and writings of Delaware
judges. See Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, supra note 147, at 181 (“While I am
a critic of the ‘shareholder primacy norm’ in corporate governance, I am nevertheless
convinced that shareholder primacy is the law.”). To the extent that Citizens United
creates constitutional law impediments to either legislation or shareholder lawsuits
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solution—a fundamental reconception of corporate governance—
we believe there is a simpler and more practical means of
achieving the same fundamental objective. As discussed in Part
IV, infra, we instead argue for an expansion of corporate
constituency statutes, which are already in place in a number of
states, to require corporate directors to consider the interests of
nonshareholder interest groups.161 This dilution of the
shareholder primacy model would impose a modest level of
communitarian social responsibility on U.S. corporations that is
commensurate with the new political participation right that the
Supreme Court bestowed upon corporations in Citizens United.
Like Professor Yosifon, Professor Jay Kesten has
recognized that corporate law is focused on shareholder wealth
maximization and that Citizens United has “constitutionally
foreclosed” an important means of controlling corporate political
activity that is undertaken as a means of avoiding external
regulation which “constrains corporate behavior that society deems
too costly.”162 Professor Kesten argues that “if corporations have a
constitutionally protected right to participate in shaping the very
laws that govern them, moral agents, and not just economic agents,
should guide their activities.”163 As a solution to this “moral agency”
problem, Professor Kesten proposes that corporate law be reformed
that are aimed at enforcing the shareholder primacy norm, the decision conflicts with
the central maxim of modern American corporate law.
161 Our approach differs from Professor Yosifon’s proposal for a “multi-stakeholder
regime” corporate-governance model, which would give both employees and consumers
voting rights in corporate elections—a change that Professor Yosifon believes “would be
complicated, but not insurmountable.” Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem, supra note 10, at
1245. While we agree with Professor Yosifon that his approach might be the optimal model
if we had the luxury of redesigning corporate governance from a “clean slate,” we believe
that the practical difficulties of changing the fundamental system of corporate governance
now shared (with important differences at the margins, of course) by all the states and
territories without question falls at or near the “insurmountable” end of the achievable
change spectrum. Our approach, in contrast, merely expands a statutory provision already
in place in some states and in a way that one state had already adopted prior to Citizens
United. See infra Section IV.A.2.
162 SeeKesten, supra note 92, at 512-13 (noting that “for many companies, political
activity is simply another means to the end of profit maximization” and that corporations
“have strong incentives to oppose efficient regulation, if such laws constrain their ability to
externalize costs and thereby maximize profits”).
163 Kesten, supra note 92, at 513. As Professor Kesten explains his proposal,
To be more concrete, the law should recognize shareholders’ entitlement to adopt,
amend, and repeal bylaws that restrict managerial discretion concerning matters
of substantial social, political, or moral import (collectively “social policy”). Put
slightly differently, this approach to the bylaw power empowers shareholders to
act as moral agents of the corporation.
Id. at 491.
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to allow shareholders “to enact bylaws that restrict managerial
discretion as to matters of social policy.”164
Our reaction to Professor Kesten’s corporate bylaw
proposal is similar to our reaction to Professor Yosifon’s expanded
corporate voting proposal. We agree that Citizens United has
created a serious communitarian moral accountability problem by
constitutionally insulating a broad swath of corporate political
activity from federal or state regulation. We believe, however,
that increasing shareholders’ private, contractual bylaws powers
is neither a practical nor an adequate solution to what is at its
core a public regulatory problem. Many shareholders may prefer
the status quo and decline to expand their bylaw powers or not
care enough about corporate political expenditures to fight for
greater bylaw powers. And even in those cases (which we suspect
would be only an insignificant minority)165 in which shareholders
choose to expand their bylaws powers, those who do so might not
be inclined to exercise those powers in a manner consistent with
the greater public interests that Citizens United has imperiled.166
In contrast, we propose two solutions: (1) expansion of disclosure
requirements to ensure that shareholders are informed of corporate
political activity and (2) expansion of corporate constituency
statutes to require consideration of all stakeholder groups when a
business corporation engages in political spending.167 These
solutions are broader in scope because the statutes would apply to
all businesses incorporated in a state. They are also more targeted
in application because the statutes would require corporate boards
to take into account the interests of all affected constituencies
(employees, customers, suppliers, and communities) when making
decisions concerning exercise of the new corporate political
164 Id. at 519. Professor Kesten acknowledges the practical impediments to
effective shareholder action in this regard, including the problem of institutional
investors who may prefer short-term profits and disregard the social policy preferences
of the ultimate beneficial owners, and the difficulty presented when management and
shareholders disagree on social issues. Id. at 518-21. Despite these practical
challenges, Professor Kesten argues that we should seek “a low-cost mechanism by
which the ultimate beneficial owners of equity securities can express their moral
preferences.” See id. at 521.
165 See the discussion of legal obstacles to shareholder-initiated amendments
of corporate bylaws in Section II.A.2, infra.
166 Cf. Kesten, supra note 92, at 491 n.30 (“For example, it seems odd to argue that
the recent financial crisis was caused by excessive risk taking, but that we should
nevertheless empower the most risk-seeking corporate constituency [shareholders] with
respect to a firm’s business decisions.”); Ribstein, supra note 146, at 1050 (“Investors who
seek maximum returns would favor profit-maximizing commercial speech.”).
167 We elaborate on these proposals later in this article. See infra notes 449-
506 and accompanying text.
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participation rights created by Citizens United or the exercise of
new corporate religious rights created byHobby Lobby.168
2. “Compounding a Prior Error”—Citizens United’s
Unwarranted Reliance on Bellotti
As noted above, the reason for the paucity and
superficiality of the corporate analysis in Citizens United may be
as simple as the lack of corporate law expertise among the current
members of the Court.169 Another, not inconsistent, explanation
may be that the Court relied too heavily on the Bellotti precedent
in dismissing concerns about the effect on corporate shareholders
of striking down the independent expenditure limits previously
applicable to corporations. In any event, the corporate law
analysis in Citizens United is fundamentally flawed.
The linchpin of Justice Powell’s corporate law analysis in
Bellotti was his assertion that “[u]ltimately shareholders may
decide, through the procedures of corporate democracy, whether
their corporation should engage in debate on public issues.”170 It is
much easier today to assess the validity of this assertion than in
1978, when Powell made the statement. Corporate law and
ownership have evolved greatly since 1978, particularly as to how
the “procedures of corporate democracy” actually operate in the
context in which Powell was using the term. Bellotti was, at its
core, a pro-business decision that rejected an effort to limit the
political participation rights of banks and business corporations
168 Obviously, we also favor this approach because it would create a new
communitarian “responsibility” paradigm beyond the present shareholder primacy
norm in corporate law, which we believe would have positive spillover benefits for
society in a wide range of areas—worker rights, consumer protection, community
investment, etc.—extending beyond the imposition of a more socially responsible
approach to corporate political expenditures. Cf. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate
Purpose, supra note 147, at 228 (“Corporations with narrow interests and access to
persuasive agents (like lawyers) will tend to enjoy an advantage in the competition for
regulatory favor over widely dispersed, structurally impotent non-shareholders.
Shareholder primacy in practice gives rise to a public choice problem that renders
shareholder primacy unjustifiable in theory.”); id. at 229 (“Any attention that is given
to nonshareholders presently [under the shareholder primacy model] has to be
done . . . in hushed tones, through lies. This is not sustainable, and it is not desirable.
To govern effectively a corporate board must govern openly and honestly.”). But see
Michael E. DuBow, Communitarianism and Corporate Law, in TO PROMOTE THE
GENERAL WELFARE: A COMMUNITARIAN LEGAL READER 83 (David E. Carney ed. 1999)
(advancing a pre–Citizens United, pre-2008 financial system collapse argument that
the shareholder wealth maximization principle serves the public good and “that there
is effectively no role for communitarian ideas to play in American corporate law”).
169 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
170 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978) (emphasis added).
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compared to the rights of individuals and media companies.171 It
was in the context of rejecting a ban on corporate advertising in
referenda that Powell,172 a former business lawyer and an expert
on corporate law,173 expressed his belief that the “procedures of
corporate democracy” were adequate to protect the interests of
shareholders in corporations that engaged in political activities.
Whether Powell’s confidence in the procedures of corporate
democracy was based on his optimistic assessment of the law’s
future efficacy in his chosen field of legal specialization or his
distaste for regulatory interference in corporate affairs,174 there is
good reason to question the basis for his confidence, even as of
1978 when he wrote the Bellotti opinion.
The essence of Powell’s argument was that shareholders
could control corporate management, either by voting to elect
directors, imposing limitations on political activity in corporate
charters, or bringing shareholder derivative suits “to challenge
corporate disbursements alleged to have been made for improper
corporate purposes or merely to further the personal interests of
171 See id. at 778 (“The question in this case, simply put, is whether the
corporate identity of the speaker deprives this proposed speech of what otherwise
would be its clear entitlement to protection.”); see also id. at 788-95 (recognizing that
“[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption, and
‘sustaining’” individual citizen participation are “interests of the highest importance” in
our democracy, but nonetheless concluding that the arguments advanced to support
limiting corporate participation—at least in a referendum election “held on issues, not
candidates for public office”—were insufficient to support a ban on corporate
advertising); cf. Mutch, supra note 25, at 315 (describing Bellotti as “qualitatively
different” from prior corporate election law cases because for the first time, large,
publicly traded corporations were suing the state to prevent prosecution and obtain the
right to participate openly in the political process).
172 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767.
173 Prior to his Supreme Court appointment, Justice Powell had been a corporate
lawyer at a prestigious Virginia law firm and had served as the president of the American
Bar Association. See Joan Biskupic & Fred Barbash, Retired Justice Lewis Powell Dies at
90, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1998, at A1. During his tenure on the Court, Justice Powell wrote
many of the Court’s most important corporate and securities law opinions, including a
number of decisions limiting the scope of corporate antifraud laws. See, e.g., United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (rejecting application of federal securities law to
a transaction involving the purchase of stock in a cooperative housing project); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (rejecting imposition of federal securities fraud
liability based upon an accounting firm’s negligent conduct); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222 (1980) (rejecting insider trading liability based on nondisclosure absent a
relationship of trust and confidence between the parties to the transaction); Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646 (1983) (rejecting insider trading liability for a tippee absent a breach of
fiduciary duty by the tipper).
174 See Mutch, supra note 25, at 315 (discussing the “Attack on the American
Free Enterprise System” memorandum that Powell wrote to the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce in 1971, shortly before he was appointed to the Supreme Court, warning
among other things of a “massive assault” on the American business’s “right to
continue to manage its own affairs”).
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management.”175 While these multiple means of maintaining
shareholder control over corporate management may sound
comforting to those not steeped in the intricacies of corporate law,
the reality is far less reassuring. Although the relevant corporate
law was less developed at the time, even in 1978, shareholders in
public companies were unlikely to unseat directors for making
political contributions, amend their corporate charters to limit or
prohibit corporate political contributions, or prevail in shareholder
derivative suits challenging corporate political contributions.
Bellotti is now relatively ancient history, of course, so we
can give Justice Powell the benefit of the doubt and assume that
his reassurances were optimistic and perhaps even well
intended.176 But we cannot do the same with what passes for the
more contemporary analysis in Citizens United. The two short
paragraphs in the Citizens United majority opinion that address
the corporate law implications of the case’s holding177 would be
inadequate on their face but for their citation of Bellotti as
dispositive of the issue. Corporate law and ownership have
changed dramatically since Bellotti was decided, and corporate
America no longer looks or operates as it did when Powell wrote
his Bellotti opinion.178 Below we analyze how the Court’s
approach overstates the protections afforded by each procedure
of corporate democracy.
a. Shareholder Voting for Corporate Directors
The assertion that shareholder voting for corporate
directors can curb corporate management’s abuses in political
spending is perhaps the most easily dismissed of the
Bellotti/Citizens United corporate law misconceptions. First, as
Professors Bebchuk and Jackson have observed, for shareholders
to vote based on an issue, they must have information about that
175 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795.
176 Professor Coates credits Justice Powell with a philosophy (formulated prior
to his ascension to the bench) advocating the aggressive use of the courts to defend
capitalism and free enterprise. See Coates, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment:
History, Data, and Implications, supra note 119, at 15.
177 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361-62 (2010).
178 The same Court majority was more than willing to note changes in the
political landscape in striking down provisions of the Voting Rights Act that it felt were
unwarranted several decades after the legislation’s initial enactment. Chief Justice
Roberts, writing for the majority, proclaimed, “Our country has changed, and while any
racial discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it
passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.” Shelby Cty. v. Holder,
133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). In the Court’s view, by extending the Voting Rights Act in
2006, Congress “reenacted a formula based on 40-year-old facts having no logical
relation to the present day.” Id. at 2629.
934 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:3
issue.179 The Federal Election Commission (FEC) only recently
proposed regulations to implement a reporting requirement for
corporate independent expenditures in federal elections,180 and
while a number of states have implemented reporting
requirements for independent expenditures, not all states’
independent expenditure reporting requirements apply to
corporations.181 The SEC has received a petition for rulemaking
on a proposed disclosure requirement for corporate political
expenditures,182 but despite the proposal having received a record
number of public comments—most of which were supportive183—
almost four years later the agency has not adopted a disclosure
rule, and it appears increasingly less likely that it will adopt
one.184 Without a disclosure rule that would inform shareholders
of public companies’ political spending activities,185 it is hard to
179 See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light
on Corporate Political Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923 (2013) (advocating for Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules requiring public companies to disclose their
political spending).
180 See Independent Expenditures and Electioneering Communications by
Corporations and Labor Association, 79 Fed. Reg. 62,797 (Oct. 21, 2014) (to be codified
at 11 C.F.R. pts. 104 and 114).
181 See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATES’ INDEPENDENT
EXPENDITURE REPORTING 2014 (2014), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/
2014_Independent_Expenditures_Chart.pdf [http://perma.cc/D6XS-Y4E6] (summarizing
state reporting requirements for independent expenditures as of July 2014).
182 Committee on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending, Petition for
Rulemaking to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC File No. 4-637 (Aug. 3, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf [http://perma.cc/GTQ9-VPB7].
183 See Alan Dye & Todd Aman, Mandatory Disclosure of Corporate Political
Spending: Prospects for New SEC Disclosure Requirements in an Atmosphere of
Disclosure Reform, 42 SEC. REG. L.J. 207, 207 (2014); see also Comments on Rulemaking
Petition: Petition to Require Public Companies to Disclose to Shareholders the Use of
Corporate Resources for Political Activities, SEC File No. 4-637, http://www.sec.gov/
comments/4-637/4-637.shtml [http://perma.cc/Z7LC-KCZD] (last modified May 12, 2016)
(listing public comments).
184 See Dye & Aman, supra note 183, at 208 (“Despite apparently significant
support and momentum for a political spending disclosure requirement, however, prospects
for the adoption of such a requirement appear to be fading.”); see also Jenna Greene, Dear
SEC: Time to Act, NAT’L L.J., June 1, 2015 (describing May 27, 2015, letter from three
former SEC commissioners to current SEC chair Mary Jo White calling the agency’s failure
to act “inexplicable” and urging it to adopt corporate political spending disclosure rules); cf.
Ribstein, supra note 146, at 1042 (arguing that proposed federal legislation to enhance
reporting of corporate political spending would not survive First Amendment scrutiny under
Citizens United because it would be “based on speech”).
185 In privately held corporations, the situation is no better. Minority
shareholders in a particular company may or may not have access to information about
corporate political expenditures, but the unity of management and controlling
shareholders in almost all private companies makes it unlikely that even minority
shareholders who are aware of and object to such spending can influence it through
voting. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 146, at 1047 (observing that “in a closely held
firm, the majority’s plenary control over corporate acts may result in complete silencing
of minority shareholders with substantial investments”). In addition, while some states
have case law that protects minority shareholders in closely held corporations (which,
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see how shareholder voting can be expected to curb abusive
political spending by corporate managers.186
b. Derivative Suits
The same holds true for the litigation relief avenue
suggested in Bellotti—that “minority shareholders generally have
access to the judicial remedy of a derivative suit to challenge
corporate disbursements alleged to have been made for improper
corporate purposes or merely to further the personal interests of
management.”187 Shareholders of course cannot sue to challenge
activity that they do not know has occurred, so the lack of
disclosure requirements for corporate political spending alone
likely is a crippling impediment to the litigation relief argument
in most cases. More important, even if shareholders do learn of
political expenditures and wish to “challenge corporate
disbursements”188 in the courts, a derivative suit is unlikely to
provide a remedy.
At the time Bellotti was decided, in 1978, the modern law
of shareholder derivative litigation was in its relative infancy, so
again, Justice Powell perhaps can be forgiven for undue optimism
as to the potential impact of the law in this area on corporate
political spending. Most of the landmark cases that now govern
shareholder derivative litigation were decided after 1978, and for
the most part those decisions make recovery by shareholders who
challenge corporate political expenditures extremely unlikely,
particularly when shareholders seek to challenge corporate
of course, are only a subset of privately held corporations) from unfair treatment by
majority shareholders (see, for example, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New
England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975)), it is unlikely that those cases would
provide a remedy for management’s use of corporate funds for political expenditures.
Moreover, Delaware, the state of incorporation for many large privately held
companies, has expressly rejected special rules protecting against unfair treatment of
minority shareholders by majority shareholders in closely held corporations. See Nixon
v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993). In short, corporate law provides no meaningful
information rights, voting powers, or “fairness” protections that would assist minority
shareholders in privately held corporations who wish to challenge political
expenditures by corporate management.
186 Cf. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 179, at 927 (“Without disclosure of
information about public companies’ spending on politics, corporate-governance procedures
that could help address such concerns cannot operate.”). We can only speculate as to
whether the SEC’s reluctance to adopt a disclosure requirement is a consequence of the
corporate regulatory capture Strine and Walter feared as a consequence of Citizens United.
Strine &Walter, supra note 64, at 383-84.
187 See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978).
188 Id.
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management’s business decisions.189 The law is now well settled
that in so-called demand required derivative suits—in which a
dissident shareholder must first make a demand on the board to
itself initiate suit before the shareholder can sue managers or
others—the business judgment rule applies to a board’s decision
to reject the shareholder’s demand and not bring suit.190
Overcoming the business judgment rule’s protections is a
notoriously difficult obstacle for plaintiffs in corporate litigation,191
particularly in Delaware, where the courts are extremely
deferential to managerial prerogatives.192 Thus, as a practical
matter, the law since Bellotti has evolved to make recovery very
unlikely in a “demand required” derivative suit challenging
corporate political spending that does not involve corporate
managers engaging in self-dealing or some other egregious
violation of the duty of loyalty.
189 Cf. David Rosenberg, Galactic Stupidity and the Business Judgment Rule,
32 J. CORP. L. 301, 301-02 (2007) (“It is a truth almost universally acknowledged that
American courts will not review the substance of the business decisions of corporate
directors except under extraordinary circumstances.”).
190 See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10 (Del. 1981) (“In other
words, when stockholders, after making demand and having their suit rejected, attack the
board’s decision as improper, the board’s decision falls under the ‘business judgment’ rule
and will be respected if the requirements of the rule are met.”). Those unfamiliar with the
law in this area are often shocked to learn that it is well-settled law in Delaware and
elsewhere that merely having previously voted in favor of a challenged transaction or
expenditure is not sufficient to disqualify corporate directors from participating in a decision
to accept or reject a shareholder demand. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del.
1984) (holding that board approval of a challenged transaction does not automatically
excuse demand); Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1040 (N.Y. 1996) (noting error in prior
cases that had “excus[ed] demand whenever a majority of the board members who approved
the transaction were named as defendants”).
191 See William Alan Nelson II, Post-Citizens United: Using Shareholder
Derivative Claims of Corporate Waste to Challenge Corporate Independent Political
Expenditures, 13 NEV. L.J. 134, 151-55 (2012) (discussing New York and California cases in
which courts invoked the business judgment rule in refusing to permit shareholder suits
challenging political expenditures to go forward); see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006) (observing that the onerous standard for proving a claim
of corporate waste, the legal theory most likely to apply to a challenge of corporate political
spending, “is a corollary of the proposition that where business judgment presumptions are
applicable, the board’s decision will be upheld unless it cannot be attributed to any rational
business purpose” (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971))); cf.
Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An
Exercise in Futility, 79 WASH. U. L.R. 569 (2001) (analyzing shareholder derivative suits
challenging executive pay decisions).
192 See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 131
(Del. Ch. 2009) (declining to impose liability on corporate managers despite “staggering
losses” caused by their business misjudgments in the subprime mortgage market); In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (applying the business judgment rule
and finding no breach of fiduciary duty in a $130 million severance payout to an officer
terminated without cause).
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Some jurisdictions, notably including Delaware and New
York,193 excuse derivative-suit plaintiffs from making presuit
demand on the board of directors in “demand futile” cases where a
majority of the board is interested in the challenged transaction.194
Even in those kinds of cases, however, the derivative litigation
route is unlikely to provide a remedy regarding political
expenditures. First, some jurisdictions, such as New York, allow
boards to appoint a “special litigation committee” to evaluate
whether or not to pursue “demand futile” claims, and then apply
the business judgment rule to a committee’s decision not to pursue
the claim195 (which is what such committees almost always decide,
other than in cases involving the acts of disgraced and deposed
former managers). Other jurisdictions, like Pennsylvania,196 follow
the approach recommended by the American Law Institute (ALI)
in its Principles of Corporate Governance.197 This approach rejects
the demand futility paradigm altogether and imposes a “universal
demand” requirement, with the business judgment rule applying
to the board’s decision to accept or reject the demand in all cases
except those that involve self-dealing or a “knowing and culpable
violation of law.”198 Finally, even in jurisdictions like Delaware
193 See Zapata, 430 A.2d 779.
194 See Lewis, 473 A.2d 805; Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 1996). The
Delaware Supreme Court has explained that a derivative suit plaintiff is excused from
making a pre-suit demand on the corporation’s board of directors only if the plaintiff can
“articulate particularized facts showing that there is a reasonable doubt either that (a) a
majority of the board is independent for purposes of responding to the demand, or (b) the
underlying transaction is protected by the business judgment rule.” Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244, 255 (Del. 2000) (quoting Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1217 (1996)). This
showing would be especially difficult for a derivative suit plaintiff in a corporate political
expenditure case, because there would be no issue of board independence (assuming the
political candidate had no familial or business relationship with a majority of the directors
on the board (see Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004))) and the board would claim
that the expenditure in some way conveyed some marginal benefit on the corporation that
would be sufficient to satisfy the very lax test for business judgment rule protection (under
which “[d]irectors’ business ‘decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any
rational business purpose.’” See Eisner, 746 A.2d at 264 n.65 (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp., 280
A.2d at 717, 720).
195 See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).
196 See Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042 (Pa. 1997).
197 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 7.03(b) cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1994) (requiring demand in all cases except those in
which the plaintiffs can make a specific showing that “irreparable injury to the
corporation” would result if they are not able to commence litigation without first
making a demand on the board).
198 See id. § 7.10(a)(1). Thus, the ALI approach might allow shareholder
plaintiffs to avoid the hurdle of the business judgment rule in a case involving an
illegal direct political contribution (compare Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759,
762 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that the business judgment rule would not apply if
plaintiffs could show a violation of federal election law)), but it is unlikely to lead to
recovery for shareholders challenging independent corporate political spending of the
kind permitted by Citizens United.
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that provide heightened judicial scrutiny in “demand futile”
derivative cases, in most instances a court reviewing a special
litigation committee’s decision to rebuff a shareholder demand
still will apply the business judgment rule and decline to second
guess a board’s decision not to proceed with litigation.199 As a
consequence, the law of corporate derivative litigation as it has
evolved since Bellotti was decided presents significant obstacles to
effectively using “the judicial remedy of a derivative suit to
challenge corporate disbursements”200 that Justice Powell believed
would serve as a means of preventing corporate political spending
abuses.201 In short, even if a majority of shareholders disapproves
of a political expenditure or religious practice undertaken by
corporate managers, it cannot reverse such action so long as that
action can be regarded as at all reasonable.
For our purposes, however, the point is not to provide an
exhaustive analysis of how the law of shareholder derivative
litigation applies to corporate political expenditures or religious
practices.202 (And in the preceding discussion we admittedly have
done little more than scratch the surface of this complex area of
law.) Rather, the goal is to demonstrate how out of date the
Bellotti precedent was when the Citizens United majority relied
upon it—apparently without any analysis or consideration of
subsequent development of the relevant legal authorities.203 All of
199 See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981) (holding that
a court reviewing a special litigation committee’s motion to dismiss derivative litigation
“may proceed, in its discretion, to the next step” of judicial review of the merits of the
committee’s decision, but is not required to do so).
200 See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 796 (1978). Professor
Stephen Bainbridge has asserted that under the business judgment rule, the appropriate
legal responses to a charge that excessive independent political expenditures have
damaged a for-profit business corporation are “so what” and “who cares.” He observes
that even if the allegation is that corporate officers and directors have “use[d] corporate
treasury funds to further their own personal political goals,” a plaintiff is unlikely to
prevail: “Getting past the motion stage of such a case is thus damned difficult, because
courts will require considerable evidence of self-dealing before the business judgment rule
will be rebutted.” Stephen Bainbridge, Citizens United, Corporate Political Expenditures,
and the Business Judgment Rule, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 24, 2012, 12:25 PM),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/05/citizens-united-corp
orate-political-expenditures-and-the-business-judgment-rule.html [http://perma.cc/JY9W-
VQ52]. Although Professor Bainbridge’s prose may be provocative, and probably
intentionally so, for better or worse his summation of corporate law is spot on.
201 But see Nelson, supra note 191, at 172-73 (proposing that shareholders pursue
derivative claims under the corporate waste doctrine to challenge independent political
expenditures, but recognizing that shareholders “must meet a high burden” to successfully
assert a corporate waste claim that would overcome the business judgment rule).
202 Nelson, supra note 191, provides an analysis of how one kind of derivative
claim, corporate waste, might be used to challenge independent political expenditures.
203 But see Nelson, supra note 191, at 154 (advocating use of derivative
litigation to challenge excessive corporate independent political expenditures and citing
language in Citizens United and other Supreme Court opinions indicating that “the
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the cases cited above governing the modern law of corporate
derivative litigation were decided after Bellotti. For the Supreme
Court in Citizens United to have ignored more than three decades
of development in this critically important and relevant area of
corporate law, with no more than a dismissive citation to
precedent that was questionable even when it was first advanced,
is an abdication of the Court’s responsibility to base its decisions
on thorough, well-reasoned, and up-to-date legal analysis.
c. Shareholder Amendment of Articles of Incorporation
and Bylaws
The other avenue of “corporate democracy” redress for
aggrieved shareholders as identified in Bellotti and re-embraced
in Citizens United—shareholder amendment of corporate articles
of incorporation or bylaws—fares no better under close scrutiny.
State law today, as was the case when Bellotti was decided,
permits corporations to be formed to “conduct or promote any
lawful business or purposes”204 and specifically authorizes
corporations to make contributions and donations.205 In addition,
the business judgment rule likely protects corporate management’s
decisions to engage in political spending.206 Thus, as currently
structured, corporate law is designed to give management wide
discretion that encompasses a decision to engage in political
spending.207 The assertion that shareholders can somehow
contravene this structural support for managerial discretion is
naïve and far-fetched from the reality of modern corporate
governance. As one commentator has summarized the law, “The
primacy of the shareholder franchise is widely understood as a
myth in practice under current law.”208
Court also believes that if the expenditures are detrimental to the corporation,
shareholders have a judicial remedy based upon the corporate waste doctrine”).
204 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2015) (“A corporation may be
incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business
or purposes, except as may otherwise be provided by the Constitution or other law of
this State.”); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301 (2015) (“Corporations may be incorporated
under this subpart for any lawful purpose or purposes.”).
205 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2015) (giving Delaware
corporations the power to “[m]ake donations for the public welfare or for charitable,
scientific or educational purposes”); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1502 (a)(9) (2015) (giving
Pennsylvania corporations the power to “make contributions and donations”).
206 See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text (discussing the application of
the business judgment rule to shareholder challenges to corporate political expenditures).
207 Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 189, at 301-02.
208 Michael S. Kang, Shareholder Voting as Veto, 88 IND. L.J. 1299, 1305 (2013).
We distinguish efforts by corporate founders to place limits on their own conduct, although
such limits are more often reflected in initial public offerings and other disclosures, not in
the governing documents. See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
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First, any effort to amend a company’s charter to limit
managerial prerogatives on political spending (or religious
practices) would require both shareholder knowledge of the
spending and a majority vote of the company’s shareholders in
opposition to that spending or practice,209 and in some states
would also require the approval of the company’s board of
directors.210 As a practical matter, this would end the analysis in
most cases because a majority of shareholders are unlikely to rise
up and oppose the management group they have previously
elected,211 and any minority shareholder group that does oppose
management due to political spending will not have sufficient
votes to effect change.212 Second, even in an extraordinary case
where a majority of shareholders opposes management’s political
spending activities, the mechanics of corporate governance make
a successful shareholder insurgency exceedingly unlikely.213 The
209 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 10.03-10.04 (2005) (providing for
amendment of the articles of incorporation by a majority vote of the shareholders); see
also 7A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 3719 (2015) [hereinafter FLETCHER]
(“Amendments to the articles or certificate of incorporation may require (1) a resolution
of the corporation’s board of directors, although in jurisdictions following the Model
Business Corporation Act, no particular form is required for directoral adoption or
proposal to shareholders; (2) written notice to the shareholders of the proposed
amendment or a summary of the changes to be affected by it; (3) the affirmative vote at
an annual or special meeting of the shareholders of at least a majority or two-thirds of
the shares entitled to vote on the proposed amendment, or of a particular class of
shares when voting as a class, unless a greater proportionate vote on the proposed
amendment is specifically required by the corporation’s original articles or certificate of
incorporation; (4) the preparation of ‘articles of amendment’ or a ‘certificate of
amendment’ and the delivery of such instrument to the secretary of state or other
designated state official.” (footnotes omitted)).
210 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (2015) (specifying procedures for bylaw
amendments beginning with adoption of a board of directors resolution in favor of the
amendments); see also 7A FLETCHER, supra note 209, § 3719 (2014) (“Amendments to the
articles or certificate of incorporation may require . . . a resolution of the corporation’s board
of directors . . . .”); Kesten, supra note 92, at 494 n.46 (discussing Delaware law and noting
that “the charter, which can only be amended if both the board and shareholders agree,
trumps the bylaws” (emphasis added)).
211 Moreover, in Delaware and other states that require board action to amend
the corporate charter, the shareholders almost certainly will not be able to obtain the
requisite board assent.
212 Nor are shareholders of a newly formed business corporation likely to
include in its certificate of incorporation a provision limiting management’s discretion
to engage in political spending. As the brief discussion above suggests, the recent
history of corporate law, from the time of Bellotti to the present, is marked by
development of organic corporate documents that have expanded the range of
managerial discretion, not constrained it by “tying the hands of management” at the
corporate formation stage.
213 See generally Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89
MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990); Christopher Gulinello, The Retail-Investor Vote: Mobilizing
Rationally Apathetic Shareholders to Preserve or Challenge the Board’s Presumption of
Authority, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 547 (2010). See also Alexander G. Simpson, Note,
Shareholder Voting and the Chicago School: Now Is the Winter of Our Discontent, 43
DUKE L.J. 189, 193-94 (1993) (noting that while disaffected shareholders theoretically
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assumption that shareholders can simply amend the
articles/certificate of incorporation to check corporate political
spending is almost entirely theoretical, with little or no basis in
the real world of corporate governance.214
The same is true for the argument that shareholders
might amend a corporation’s bylaws to restrict corporate political
spending.215 While bylaw amendments might at first blush appear
to provide an easier path to shareholder influence over corporate
activity, because shareholders can initiate bylaw changes without
board assent and implement them by a majority vote,216 the
reality is somewhat more complex and considerably less
hospitable to shareholder action. First, the process of using a
bylaw amendment to change corporate policy is subject to a
hidden trap that is not immediately evident to those not steeped
in corporate law: bylaw changes cannot contravene the provisions
of a company’s articles/certificate of incorporation.217 As Professor
Kesten has astutely noted, “the seemingly innocuous carve out—
that the bylaws must not be ‘inconsistent with law’—threatens to
swallow the entire grant of authority, because several other
provisions of the same statute purport to require that any
restraints on managerial authority must be set forth in the
charter.”218 Shareholders are caught in a circular trap: even if
they somehow can act without board assent and muster a
majority of votes to amend the corporate bylaws to restrict
corporate political spending, the corporate charter/articles of
incorporation may contain general (authority to “conduct or
can amend a company’s certificate of incorporation or bylaws, “many authors have
questioned shareholders’ power to control their corporations in this way, noting that
management generally controls the corporate machinery”).
214 The problems stemming from separation of ownership and control
popularized by Berle and Means are exacerbated in the age of Citizens United. In the
current corporate landscape, entities such as mutual and pension funds own the
majority of stock in American public corporations. The result, Strine and Walter posit,
is not simply separation of ownership and control, but “separation of ownership from
ownership.” See Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 370, 376. Strine and Walter
conclude that the realities of separation of ownership from ownership strengthen the
argument that “the tools available to those whose equity capital is ultimately at stake
are not well designed to constrain management from pursuing ends those investors
may not support.” Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 376.
215 Cf. Simpson, supra note 213, at 193-94 (dismissing the argument that
disaffected shareholders will amend the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws).
216 See Kesten, supra note 92, at 494 (“The bylaw power allows shareholders,
by majority vote and by their own initiative, to impose their will directly on a
company’s affairs and governance.” (discussing Delaware law)).
217 Id. (discussing section 109(b) of the Delaware corporate code, which
permits shareholders to amend the bylaws to restrict management’s authority “as long
as the bylaw does not contravene the company’s charter”).
218 Id. at 494-95.
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promote any lawful business or purposes”219) or specific (power to
“make contributions and donations”220) provisions that a court
would construe as invalidating a bylaw change.221
The problems with bylaw amendments go well beyond this
potential technical trap, however. Even if one assumes that
shareholders opposing corporate political activity could amass the
support of a majority of shareholders and amend the corporate
bylaws to prevent or restrict political spending, and even
assuming that no provisions of that particular corporation’s
articles/certificate of incorporation would invalidate the bylaw
amendment, it is not clear that courts would uphold the
amendment.222 As Professor Kesten has explained, the scope of
the shareholder bylaw amendment power is “uncertain,” and it is
unclear that courts will uphold a bylaw amendment that intrudes
upon management prerogatives223 (especially prerogatives that
are now protected by the First Amendment or RFRA under
Citizens United or Hobby Lobby). While an in-depth analysis of
the law governing shareholder-proposed bylaw amendments is
beyond the scope of this article, it is sufficient here to note that
there is no more reason to believe that bylaw amendments can
meaningfully constrain corporate political activity than to believe
that shareholder derivative litigation or corporate charter
amendments can do so.224 None of the “corporate democracy”
219 See supra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing corporate
formation statutes).
220 See supra note 205 and accompanying text (discussing enabling provisions
in corporate charters/articles of incorporation).
221 See Kesten, supra note 92, at 494 n.46 (“It is settled Delaware law that a
bylaw that is inconsistent with the corporation’s charter is invalid.” (quoting Airgas,
Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1189 (Del. 2010))).
222 Cf. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008)
(invalidating a shareholder-proposed bylaw); Gen. Datacomm Indus., Inc. v. State of Wis.
Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818, 821 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“[W]hile stockholders have unquestioned
power to adopt bylaws covering a broad range of subjects, it is also well established in
corporate law that stockholders may not directly manage the business and affairs of the
corporation, at least without specific authorization either by statute or . . . articles of
incorporation.” (quoting Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-
Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 415-16 (1998))).
223 See Kesten, supra note 92, at 492-500 (analyzing authorities and recognizing
that shareholder bylaw amendments that would constrain board authority may run afoul of
the ubiquitous corporate law statutory provision that the business and affairs of a
corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors).
224 Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L.
REV. 675, 732 (2007) (“The shareholder franchise is largely a myth. Shareholders
commonly do not have a viable power to replace the directors of public companies.”);
Kang, Shareholder Voting as Veto, supra note 208, at 1299 (“The Delaware Chancery
Court has famously declared that the ‘shareholder franchise is the ideological
underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests,’ but the effective
practice of the shareholder franchise to constrain board discretion under current law is
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avenues identified in Bellotti and Citizens United provide any
real-world prospects for shareholders to limit or constrain
corporate political spending.
3. “Ignoring Practical Realities”—Disgruntled Shareholder
Exit Options in the Real World
As the discussion above suggests, shareholders who
oppose their company’s political spending and take a hard,
practical look at the available “corporate democracy” options are
left with only one realistic option—“dissatisfied shareholders can
simply follow the ‘Wall Street’ rule and sell off their shares” in
protest.225 Unfortunately for many corporate shareholders, and
contrary to the superficial corporate law analysis in Bellotti226 and
Citizens United,227 even this “ultimate shareholder democracy”
option is realistically unavailable in many instances. When the
option is available, as it is for shareholders in a public company
with a liquid trading market for its stock, shareholders who
decide to sell their shares are unlikely to influence political
spending by the company’s management. To the contrary, the
selling shareholders are likely to suffer by forgoing the future
benefits of their investment, while management will benefit by
ridding themselves of shareholders who disapprove of their
conduct. Each of these points is discussed further below.
The “sell your shares” remedy for disaffected shareholders
who oppose a corporation’s political activities is illusory for at
least four reasons. First, for shareholders in privately held
companies with no liquid trading market for corporate stock, the
option of selling their shares is simply not available.228 There may
‘largely a myth’ in practice.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas
Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988))).
225 Kang, Shareholder Voting as Veto, supra note 208, at 1308 (citing Carl T.
Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate Democracy, 41
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 41 (1993) (explaining the Wall Street rule that “it is more efficient to
sell a particular stock than it is to try to reform the company”)).
226 See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978)
(stating that a corporate shareholder “invests in a company at his own volition and is
free to withdraw his investment at any time and for any reason”).
227 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361-62 (2010).
228 See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 146, at 1047 (observing that “the owners of
closely held corporations, which do not trade in public securities markets, may have no
ability to object to corporate speech by exiting as do shareholders in publicly traded
firms”); see also Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value”: Of
Discounts, Dates, and Dastardly Deeds in the Close Corporation, 54 DUKE L.J. 293, 295
(2004) (describing the lack of a market for shares in closely held corporations). As one
corporate law scholar has recently succinctly explained, “Mistreated minority
shareholders [in a closely held corporation] cannot exit and recover the value of their
investment because the shares are not publicly traded and no rational investor would
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be no buyers for their stock, or at least no buyers who will pay
anything approaching the stock’s underlying economic value.229
Worse still, in some instances the owner of shares in a privately
held company cannot offer to sell those shares to the public
without risking liability under the federal securities laws for an
illegal sale of unregistered securities.230 Therefore, for entire
classes of shareholders—owners of shares in small, closely held
corporations and in large, privately held corporations in which
there is no public market for the company’s shares—Justice
Powell’s generalization in Bellotti that a shareholder “is free to
withdraw his investment at any time and for any reason”231
simply is not the case.232
The second reason the “sell your shares” option cannot
serve as a meaningful check on corporate political spending is
that even in public companies where shareholders could freely
sell their stock to protest management’s political spending of
corporate funds, they may have good reason not to do so. Selling
means that a shareholder must give up significant future
economic benefits, such as corporate growth, dividend payments,
and stock price increases. It seems unlikely that many
shareholders who have made an economic decision to invest in a
company would give up these significant future benefits as a
means of protesting against corporate political spending—
especially shareholders of large, publicly traded companies (the
only companies whose shareholders can readily sell, as explained
above) where such expenditures are likely to be only a de minimis
portion of corporate expenditures.
A recent law review article co-authored by the Chief Justice
of the Delaware Supreme Court233 identifies a third reason that the
pay for the shares of a frozen-out minority.” Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in
Family Businesses, 54 WM. &MARY L. REV. 1185, 1200 (2013) (citations omitted).
229 See Moll, supra note 228, at 315-18 (describing the difficulty of selling
stock in a closely held corporation and discussing the “minority discount” and
“marketability discount” that reduces the price a seller can obtain for minority shares
in a closely held corporation).
230 See generally Thomas M. Devaney & Paul “Chip” Lion, Secondary Markets
for Restricted Securities in Private Markets, ASPATORE (Mar. 2012), 2012 WL 4751795
(discussing federal securities law limitations on sales of restricted securities). For the
definition of “restricted securities,” see id. at 12 n.47. Shareholders in privately held
companies must take care to avoid potential liability under section 5 of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012), which makes it unlawful to offer a security for sale
unless a registration statement has been filed.
231 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794 n.34.
232 This problem is especially likely to be present in a closely held corporation
such as Conestoga or Mardel (as discussed in Part II infra, we question whether Hobby
Lobby is in fact a closely held corporation).
233 Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 365-79 (explaining the “separation of
ownership from ownership” that exists today when most of the stock of publicly traded
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sell your shares “exit” option is “much less tenable today”234 than it
was when Justice Powell wrote the Bellottimajority opinion. Strine
and Walter explain that at the time Bellotti was decided, and even
into the 1980s, “the class of Americans who were invested in the
stock market was likely to be far more affluent than the average
person,” and “ordinary American workers were typically not
considered part of the investing class” because they were not likely
to be invested in the stock market.235 Strine and Walter note that
“[t]he Citizens United majority appears to have adopted this
simplistic idea of the relationship between stockholders and for-
profit, public corporations.”236
Strine and Walter identify a number of significant
impediments to the shareholder exit option relied upon in Bellotti:
most American workers now do not have a defined-benefit
pension plan and, as a practical matter, are forced to save for
retirement in a defined-contribution 401(k) plan. But most 401(k)
plans do not give workers the option to buy or sell particular
stocks—they instead must invest in mutual funds and therefore
have no ability to sell the shares of companies whose political
spending or religious activities they disfavor.237 If a worker
withdraws funds early from a 401(k) plan, he or she will suffer a
significant tax penalty, so the only realistic choice a 401(k)
investor has is to move funds among his or her plan’s mutual fund
options.238 Similar restrictions exist in the section 529 accounts
that many Americans use to invest savings for their children’s
higher education.239 The current reality of investor participation
in the American stock market, as Strine and Walter point out—
and as the Citizens United majority failed to recognize—is that
American corporations is owned by institutional investors such as mutual or pension
funds, rather than directly by individual investors who theoretically might “exit” by
selling their shares in a public corporation if they disagreed with management’s
political activities). For additional analysis of the “separation of ownership from
ownership,” see Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of
Ownership from Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822 (2011).
234 Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 368.
235 Id. (citations omitted).
236 Id. at 369. In a subsequent paper, Strine and Walter have analyzed the
historical understanding of the rights of business corporations as of 1791, when the
First Amendment was adopted, and 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, and concluded that Citizens United is not consistent with an originalist
interpretation of the Constitution. Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or
Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate Law History
(Feb. 13, 2015) (Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance Discussion
Paper 2015-2) (concluding that “the decision in Citizens United to overturn a bipartisan
statute appears to us more original than originalist”).
237 Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 372.
238 See id. at 374-75.
239 See id. at 375.
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“the tools available to those whose equity capital is ultimately at
stake are not well designed to constrain management from
pursuing ends those investors may not support.”240
In other words, even if the Bellotti assurance that a
corporate shareholder “can withdraw his investment at any
time and for any reason” had some merit when first advanced,
in today’s much more complex investing markets, it simply is
no longer true. Instead, as Strine and Walter summarize,
investing has changed to the extent that
[m]ost Americans have become “forced capitalists” who must give
over a large portion of their wealth to the stock market to fund their
retirements and their children’s educations. As a result, the actual
human beings whose capital is invested by these intermediaries do
not directly vote on who sits on corporate boards, do not have the
option to buy and sell the securities of particular companies on any
basis, and only retain very limited rights of exit from the market
without facing expropriatory levels of taxation.241
The Citizens United majority’s failure to recognize the import
of these seismic shifts in the country’s capital markets exposes
the fundamental weakness of the majority opinion’s corporate
law analysis.
The final, but arguably most important, reason the “sell
your shares” option will not correct “abuse” of corporations’
political spending powers is that sales of shares, even if a realistic
possibility, will not influence management’s actions. For
shareholders who sell their shares to influence management, the
sales must be sufficient in volume to affect the company’s share
price.242 In any large, publicly traded company (again, the only
kind of company in which the “sell your shares” option is
realistically available to dissident shareholders), it is unlikely, for
the reasons discussed above, that a significant number of
shareholders will opt to sell their shares to protest political
spending or religiously motivated conduct. So long as selling
shareholders do not reach a “critical mass” sufficient for their
actions to drive down the company’s stock price, management is
unlikely to change its political spending or religiously motivated
practices—and, in fact, probably will not even take notice of the
shareholders’ actions. Only in an exceptional case of egregious
240 Id. at 376.
241 See id. at 370 (footnotes omitted).
242 See, e.g., Kesten, supra note 92, at 493 (“By definition, though, exit is a
market mechanism that affects a firm’s corporate governance only insofar as it causes
sufficient changes in the market price of a firm’s shares and the signals sent thereby
can be linked to the underlying conduct at issue.”).
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and widespread abuse of the corporate political spending power
might there be a widespread “shareholder revolt” and a “mass
exodus” of dumping shares on the market and driving down the
company’s stock price.243 And the decline in stock price as shares
were dumped in this manner would subject the selling
shareholders to significant financial loss. Even if this unlikely
scenario were to occur in the real world, it would be an
unacceptable means of curbing management abuses—a
regulation at the margins that would have no impact on the vast
majority of companies. At most, the ability to dump one’s shares
would provide a dissenting shareholder with a modicum of
freedom (i.e., the option to part company with the corporation, not
to alter its practices). Only the rare institutional investor with a
conscience (perhaps, for example, an institution of higher
education or a socially conscious mutual fund244) might have
enough market clout to stir the corporate conscience.
4. The “Procedures of Corporate Democracy” Provide No
Real Means of Redress for Shareholders Who Oppose
Corporate Political Spending
For all of the reasons set forth above, the portion of Bellotti
that relied upon “procedures of corporate democracy” to curb
corporate political spending abuses was at best a weak argument
when Justice Powell advanced it in 1978 and an outdated and
untenable one when the Citizens United majority cited it in 2010.
If we acknowledge that corporate democracy cannot constrain
corporate political spending, then what can be done? We propose
an answer to that question in Part IV, but first we will examine
the Supreme Court’s more recent exposition on corporate
governance inHobby Lobby.
B. Hobby Lobby and Corporate Law
The flaws in the Citizens United corporate law analysis
described above are important, but for the most part, they are
243 Cf. Ribstein, supra note 146, at 1034 (“Corporations compete for capital in
highly competitive capital markets. Firms that waste money on speech that does not
help their bottom line will have to pay more for capital.”).
244 E.g., Calvert Social Investment Equity and Parnassus Endeavor Fund
employ positive and negative social screens (i.e., investment procedures that eliminate
tobacco and alcohol stocks and prefer investment in firms with strong environmental
records and good employee relations). A state employees’ retirement fund might have
similar concerns. See infra note 501 and accompanying text (discussing New York State
Common Retirement Fund’s lawsuit against Qualcomm, Inc.).
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technical, “real-world application” issues that could be expected to
foster confusion in judges who are not experts in corporate law.245
The flaws in the corporate law analysis in the Hobby Lobby
majority decision, in contrast, implicate the core conceptual
underpinnings of corporate law that should be familiar to all
judges and lawyers.246
1. Conflation of the Identities and Interests of
Corporations and Their Controlling Shareholders
The principal flaw in Hobby Lobby’s corporate law analysis
is that Justice Alito’s majority opinion essentially “pierced the
corporate veil” and disregarded the separate legal identities of the
privately held corporations in the case and the shareholders who
own those corporations. While veil piercing certainly is a viable
corporate law doctrine, and while there certainly are instances in
which corporate law treats closely held corporations differently,
there is no support in corporate law doctrine for the kind of blanket
disregard of the corporate entity (and corresponding attribution of
shareholder interests to the corporation) that the majority opinion
employed inHobby Lobby.247
Hobby Lobby’s flawed conception of the corporate form
rests on two assertions. First, in rejecting the Third Circuit’s
conclusion that RFRA protections do not apply to for-profit
corporations, Justice Alito asserted that “[c]orporations, ‘separate
and apart from’ the human beings who own, run, and are
employed by them, cannot do anything at all.”248 Corporations of
course cannot “do things” in a tangible, physical sense, but as
legal “persons” with separate identities under the law,
corporations in fact can do many, many important things—enter
into contracts, sue and be sued in legal proceedings, be prosecuted
in their own names for violating the law, etc.249 While this
245 The exception is the degree to which Citizens United conflicts with the
prevailing “shareholder primacy norm” in corporate law; the corporate law analysis in
Hobby Lobby suffers from the same analytical oversight.
246 Cf. Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 345 n.14 (discussing the view of
corporate governance held by the five Justices in the Hobby Lobby (and Citizens
United) majority as a view that “conservative corporate legal theory rejects” and “is at
odds with traditional conservative [‘contractarian’ corporate] thought”).
247 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014)
(asserting that “allowing Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel to assert RFRA claims
protects the religious liberty of the Greens and Hahns”).
248 Id. at 2768. The second assertion, regarding the extent to which for-profit
business corporations can act to “further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives”
and to “further religious objectives,” see id. at 2771, is discussed in Part III, infra.
249 See generally supra Part I (discussing the history of corporate
personification). See also Sepinwall, supra note 144, at 202 (arguing that “corporations
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distinction between corporations as artificial legal entities and the
human beings who own and operate them may at times cause
confusion for persons not trained in the law,250 for lawyers and
judges it is second nature to recognize and respect the distinction.
The majority opinion then went on to conflate, repeatedly,
the religious convictions of the individuals who own the
corporations involved in the case (Conestoga, Hobby Lobby, and
Mardel) and the actions of those corporations in refusing to
comply with the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive coverage
requirement. The opinion conveniently ignored that the
corporations were acting “separate and apart from” the
individuals who own them, for it was the corporations, and not
the individuals whose sincerely held religious beliefs the majority
sought to protect, that were subject to the ACA and were refusing
to comply with it.251
Corporate law of course does not support treating
corporate entities and the individuals who own and manage the
corporations as indistinguishable,252 a basic legal proposition that
may be treated as if they possess rights of religious freedom as a way of protecting the
religious freedom rights of the corporation’s controlling members”).
250 Even those trained in law may misstep in this area, as presidential
candidate Mitt Romney, an honors graduate of Harvard Law School, found in 2011,
when he told a heckler in the audience at the Iowa State Fair that “[c]orporations are
people, my friend.” See Ashley Parker, ‘Corporations are People,’ Romney Tells Iowa
Hecklers Angry Over His Tax Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2011, at A16. The
widespread negative response to candidate Romney’s statement suggests that even
though corporations may well be persons in the eyes of the law for most purposes, they
are not “people” in the eyes of the public. This distinction perhaps explains more
powerfully than all our legal analysis why the general public has reacted so strongly,
and so negatively, to the Supreme Court’s holdings in Citizens United and Hobby
Lobby. This article seeks to explain why those holdings are not only inconsistent with
public opinion, but also with relevant legal authorities and longstanding corporate law
theoretical underpinnings.
251 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769 (“[A]llowing Hobby Lobby, Conestoga,
and Mardel to assert RFRA claims protects the religious liberty of the Greens and the
Hahns.”); id. at 2774 (“The companies in the cases before us are closely held
corporations, each owned and controlled by members of a single family, and no one has
disputed the sincerity of their religious beliefs.” (emphasis added)); id. at 2775 (“By
requiring the Hahns and Greens and their companies to arrange for such coverage, the
HHS mandate demands that they engage in conduct that seriously violates their
religious beliefs.” (emphasis added)); id. at 2776 (“[T]he Hahns and the Greens and
their companies have religious reasons for providing health-insurance coverage for
their employees.” (emphasis added)); id. at 2778 (“The Hahns and Greens believe that
providing the coverage demanded by the HHS regulations is connected to the
destruction of an embryo in a way that is sufficient to make it immoral for them to
provide the coverage.” (emphasis added)).
252 To illustrate just how extraordinary is the position taken by the Hobby Lobby
majority and the Tenth Circuit in attributing the shareholders’ religious beliefs to the
corporations they controlled, and then treating those corporations as “persons” protected by
RFRA, it is useful to quote the reaction of U.S. District Judge Joe L. Heaton, the trial judge
in the Hobby Lobby case, after the Tenth Circuit, much to Judge Heaton’s surprise, held
that “business corporations are persons for purposes of RFRA” (in Judge Heaton’s words)
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was ably presented to the Court in the Hobby Lobby briefs253 and
that the Third Circuit recognized in its holding.254 Justice
Alito’s majority opinion departed sharply from established
corporate law and disagreed, at least with respect to “closely
held corporations . . . owned and controlled by . . . a single
family . . . [where] no one has disputed the sincerity of their
religious beliefs.”255
and remanded the case back to him to decide whether or not a preliminary injunction
should be entered for Hobby Lobby and Mardel.
I would say in all candor that in wrestling with the issues in this case, there have
been a lot of them that were close, hard questions, but I, frankly, would never
have envisioned the question of whether Hobby Lobby and Mardel as business
corporations qualify as persons for purposes of RFRA. I don’t see that as a close
question, and I’m frankly extraordinarily surprised that the court of appeals
would draw the conclusion that they have there. It seems to me that that is
extraordinarily difficult to justify as a matter of statutory interpretation. It’s a
conclusion that I think complicates and in some ways makes just simply an
analytical hash of trying to work through some of these hard issues if we’re
proceeding on the basis of the legal fiction that business corporations have
religious exercise rights. I’m not sure that conclusion arises to the status of being
what Justice Scalia would call a jaw-dropping conclusion, but it seems to me that
it gets very fairly close.Nonetheless, that is what they have concluded, and so I’m,
of course, obliged to go forward in connection with that.
Hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v.
Sebelius, 2013 WL 3869832 (W.D. Okla. July 19, 2013) (No. CIV-12-1000_HE), 2013
WL 6994543.
253 See Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 5-6, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v.
Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 985095 (“And we
recognize that in situations involving small closely held corporations owned, directed,
and managed by a tightly knit group of individuals, the claim that the corporations’
actions reflect the religious commitments of their owners is not without appeal. But
respondents cannot articulate a principled justification for allowing claims to proceed
in such circumstances that would not also embroil courts in disputes over corporate
governance (such as the rights of minority owners) or the meaning and sincerity of
religious commitments (such as those made by proxy vote in public corporations) . . . .”);
Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 3-18, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641 (2012) (Nos.
13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL 333889 (arguing that “attributing to a corporation the
religious identity of its controlling shareholders is contrary to corporate law”).
254 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs., 724 F. 3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013).
255 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774. Here we emphasize, as we will
throughout our analysis below, that there is more than adequate support for
interpreting the Court’s RFRA holding as applying only to closely held corporations, as
Justice Alito indicated at the end of his majority opinion, see id. at 2785 (“The
contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held corporations, violates RFRA.”
(emphasis added)), and as Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion that provided the
crucial fifth vote for the majority, emphasized. See id. (“In these cases the plaintiffs
deem it necessary to exercise their religious beliefs within the context of their own
closely held, for-profit corporations.” (emphasis added)).
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2. LimitingHobby Lobby’s Holding to Only Closely Held
Corporations Whose Shareholders Have Unanimously
Agreed to Adopt Explicitly Identified Religious Beliefs
and Apply Those Beliefs to the Operation of the
Corporation’s Business
In addition to distinguishing between closely held family
corporations and publicly traded “corporate giants,” which he
thought “unlikely” to assert RFRA claims,256 Justice Alito asked
the rhetorical question why the for-profit corporations before the
Court in Hobby Lobby “cannot exercise religion,” and then
chastened “HHS and the dissent” for failing to provide an answer
to his question.257 The likely reason no answer was provided is
that prior to Justice Alito’s opinion in Hobby Lobby, no Supreme
Court case had ever protected religious exercise by for-profit
corporations.258 We believe, however, that there is a good answer
to Justice Alito’s question, albeit one that requires a more
nuanced analysis of how corporate law should apply to an effort
by controlling shareholders of closely held corporations to use
those corporations to advance their personal religious beliefs.
As Justice Alito’s majority opinion did recognize, there is
an extensive body of corporate law that applies to the situation
before the Court in Hobby Lobby: “An established body of law
256 See id. at 2774. As noted above, we believe that the majority and
concurring opinions support interpreting the Court’s holding as applicable only to
closely held family corporations, see id. at 2769 (referring to “the closely held
corporations involved in these cases” and the application of RFRA to “these
corporations”), and that a close reading of the opinions is sufficient to dispel any
suggestion that its corporate law/exercise of religion analysis encompasses corporations
that are not both closely held and controlled by a single family with shared religious
beliefs. Unfortunately, however, the majority opinion is disappointingly imprecise on
the all-important question of the extent of its application. See id. at 2774 (stating that
“it seems unlikely that . . . corporate giants . . . will often assert RFRA claims” and
thereby suggesting that larger companies also might be viewed by the majority as
having a right to assert RFRA claims if they sought to do so).
257 See id. at 2769.
258 Justice Ginsburg emphasized this point in her dissent and provided a
comprehensive analysis of how for-profit corporations differ from religious
organizations in terms of the exercise of religion. See id. at 2794-97 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). The same point was included in briefs submitted to the Court. See Reply
Brief for the Petitioners at 1, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641
(2012) (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 985095 (“Respondents have not identified a single case in
this Nation’s history in which a commercial enterprise has successfully invoked either
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment or the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) to secure what respondents seek here: an exemption
from a neutral law regulating a for-profit corporation’s commercial activities.”(citation
omitted)). It was also included by the Third Circuit in its opinion below. See Conestoga,
724 F.3d at 384 (“[W]e are not aware of any case preceding the commencement of
litigation about the [Affordable Care Act contraceptive] Mandate, in which a for-profit,
secular corporation was itself found to have free exercise rights.” (emphasis added)).
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specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including
shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a
corporation in one way or another.”259 Unfortunately, the
majority opinion made no effort to apply that body of law and
instead immediately jumped to the second conclusion Justice
Alito wished to reach: “When rights, whether constitutional or
statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect
the rights of these people.”260 The reality of how corporate law
applies is much more complex, and it implicates concerns and
policy issues that extend far beyond the “rights” of the
controlling shareholders of corporations.261
Corporate law has an intricate and highly evolved set of
rules with which controlling shareholders (such as the Greens
and the Hahns in the cases before the Hobby Lobby Court) must
comply in operating corporations, whether wholly owned,262
closely held,263 privately held,264 or publicly traded.265 Most
259 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
260 Id.
261 For an incisive analysis refuting this new “pass through theory” of
corporate legal rights, see Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 382 n.196 (discussing
pre–Citizens United authorities supporting limiting political participation rights of
corporations and concluding by quoting Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion in Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986): “Extension of the
individual[’s] freedom of conscience decisions to business corporations strains the
rationale of those [First Amendment ‘negative free speech rights’] cases beyond the
breaking point. To ascribe to such artificial entities an ‘intellect’ or ‘mind’ for freedom
of conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality.”). But see Sepinwall, supra
note 144, at 199-200 (arguing that a corporation’s owners and managers should be
treated differently from “rank-and-file employees” because it is the owners and
managers who will be held morally accountable for the corporation’s actions).
262 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation is a Pennsylvania for-profit
corporation that is wholly owned by members of the Hahn family, see Hobby Lobby,
134 S. Ct. at 2764, so presumably that corporation has no minority shareholders who
might raise objections to the Hahn family’s actions in operating the corporation. As
discussed below, however, this lack of minority shareholders does not release the
Hahns from their obligations to comply with the requirements of Pennsylvania law,
including the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, that apply to the operation of all for-
profit corporations organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
263 Hobby Lobby and Mardel are Oklahoma for-profit corporations founded and
controlled by the Green family; Hobby Lobby has more than 13,000 employees, and
Mardel has “close to 400” employees. See id. at 2765. Justice Alito’s majority opinion
stated that although Hobby Lobby and Mardel “have expanded over the years, they
remain closely held, and David, Barbara, and their children retain exclusive control of
both companies.” See id. (emphasis added). The Verified Complaint filed by the
companies and the Greens, however, stated that the companies are “privately held”
(paras. 2-3 and 23-24) and that “members of the Green family operate Hobby Lobby and
Mardel through a management trust, which owns all of the voting stock of these
companies” (para. 38 (emphasis added)). Complaint ¶¶ 1, 6, 9, Hobby Lobby Stores v.
Sebelius, 870 F. Supp.2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (No. 12-cv-0100), 2012 WL 4009450. The
latter phrase is significant because it suggests that the companies may have additional,
nonvoting stock outstanding that is not owned by the Green family. This is important for
two reasons: (1) if the companies have nonvoting stock outstanding that is held by more
than a few shareholders, then they technically are not “closely held” corporations—
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contrary to Justice Alito’s description of the companies but consistent with the
presumably carefully chosen language in the Verified Complaint; and (2) whether or not
the corporations are closely held, any minority shareholders have legal rights that cannot
be ignored, even if the stock they hold is nonvoting. The distinction between a closely held
corporation (a corporation with a small number of shareholders and no public trading
market for its securities) and a privately held corporation that is not closely held can be
confusing even for lawyers who are not experts in corporate law. The district court
spotted this issue, however, and noted that it was “unclear” whether Hobby Lobby and
Mardel had minority shareholders. But because that court denied Hobby Lobby’s request
for an injunction, it was not necessary for it to resolve the issue. See Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284 n.6 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (“It is not altogether clear from the
parties’ submissions whether Hobby Lobby and Mardel are wholly owned by the Green
plaintiffs or just wholly controlled by them, with some portion of the non-voting, equity
ownership of the companies held by others. The complaint alleges only voting control. The
distinction does not affect the disposition of the pending motion.” (citation omitted)).
Hobby Lobby’s Amended Certificate of Incorporation filed with the Oklahoma Secretary
of State on September 30, 2009, increased the amount of the company’s authorized capital
stock to 10 million shares, of which only 100,000 shares are Class A Voting Common
Stock (presumably owned by the Green family, as indicated in the Verified Complaint)
and the remaining 9,900,000 shares are Class B Nonvoting Common Stock (which the
wording of the Verified Complaint suggests may be owned at least in part by minority
shareholders other than the Green family). If, as the district court opinion, Verified
Complaint, and Hobby Lobby Amended Certificate of Incorporation all suggest may be
the case, Hobby Lobby has minority shareholders who hold shares of the company’s Class
B Nonvoting Common Stock, then Justice Alito’s characterization of Hobby Lobby as a
closely held corporation may be inaccurate and his analysis inadequate because it does
not take into account the interests and rights of Hobby Lobby minority shareholders.
Copies of the Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. certificate of incorporation and amendments to the
certificate of incorporation obtained from the Oklahoma Secretary of State are on file
with the authors.
264 A privately held corporation does not have publicly traded securities
outstanding but has more than the small number of shareholders that characterizes a
closely held corporation. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1103 (2015) (defining a
“[c]losely held corporation” in Pennsylvania as a business corporation that either “(1)
has not more than 30 shareholders; or” (2) has registered as a “statutory close
corporation” under Pennsylvania law). Section 501 of the JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
106, § 501, 126 Stat. 326 (2012), amended section 12(g)(1) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, to require companies to register their equity securities with the SEC if the
company has total assets of more than $10 million and any class of equity securities
(such as the Hobby Lobby Class B Nonvoting Common Stock) that is “held of record” by
either (1) 2,000 persons, or (2) 500 persons who are not “accredited investors” as
defined by SEC regulations. See generally Changes to Exchange Act Requirements to
Implement Title V and Title VI of the JOBS Act, SEC Release No. 34-73876 (Dec. 17,
2014) (proposing release). So long as a privately held company, such as Hobby Lobby,
stays within these limitations, it is not required to register its securities with the SEC.
Privately held companies can thus be very large and can now have up to 2,000
shareholders of each class of shares it has outstanding. As Justice Ginsburg pointed
out in her Hobby Lobby dissent, examples of large, privately held corporations include,
among many others, the agribusiness giant Cargill, Inc., with $136 billion of annual
revenue and the Mars, Inc. family-owned candy company. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct.
at 2797 n.19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). If companies of this size, even though privately
held, can exercise religious and other First Amendment rights in the way the Hobby
Lobby decision permits, without considering the interests and rights of minority
shareholders, then Hobby Lobby has abandoned longstanding corporate law principles
without offering adequate supporting analysis or a sufficient rationale for doing so.
265 Cf. Brian M. McCall, The Corporation as Imperfect Society, 36 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 509, 565 (2011) (“Even when the shareholders elect to govern a close
corporation directly, Delaware law says they are still subject to the liabilities
(presumably including fiduciary duties) of directors.”).
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important among these rules is the requirement that controlling
shareholders who serve as directors and officers266 comply with
their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in performing their
corporate roles.267 The Hobby Lobby majority opinion did not
examine the application of these fundamental principles of
corporate law to the actions of the Green and Hahn families or
consider whether the families’ actions—and the holding of the
majority opinion—contradict long-standing and universally
accepted precepts of corporate law.
Although the paucity of corporate law analysis in the
majority opinion makes it difficult to discern why the Court does
not consider the application of traditional fiduciary duty
requirements to the actions of the Greens and Hahns, it appears
that Justice Alito (whether intentionally or unwittingly)
embraced an extreme “contractarian” view of corporate law.268
This view would have no application beyond closely held family
corporations with express provisions in their organic corporate
documents memorializing the religious convictions of the
shareholder-owners and agreed to by all of those shareholder-
owners.269 At the very least, one can hope that in future cases, the
Court will recognize theHobby Lobby holding as so limited.
The Hobby Lobby majority opinion quoted Conestoga’s
“Vision and Values Statements” and its “board-adopted ‘Statement
on the Sanctity of Human Life,’” which reflects the Hahn family’s
belief that “human life begins at conception.”270 Similarly, the
majority opinion quoted Hobby Lobby’s “statement of purpose” that
266 The Delaware Supreme Court has confirmed that corporate officers owe
fiduciary duties to the corporation they serve that are “identical” to the duties owed by
corporate directors. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 & n.37 (Del. 2009).
This holding eliminates any uncertainty, for Delaware corporations at least, as to
whether corporate directors owe fiduciary duties that are “higher” or “stricter” than the
fiduciary duties of corporate officers.
267 See generally PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS pt. IV, intro. note (c) (AM. LAW INST. 1994) (discussing the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty and describing the American Bar Association’s Corporate
Director’s Guidebook as “properly distinguish[ing] between the two,” and quoting it as
stating that under the duty of loyalty, “the corporate director commits allegiance to the
enterprise and acknowledges that the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders must prevail over any individual interest of his own”).
268 See infra Part III (discussing the theoretical battle between “contractarian”
and “communitarian” legal theorists).
269 Cf. Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 376 (“Respected scholars have noted
that it is problematic for public corporations to make political expenditures even if
those expenditures are supported by a majority of stockholders, because that would
associate the minority [shareholders] with political speech they might find inconsistent
with their own consciences.”); Sepinwall, supra note 144, at 177 (recognizing that the
Hobby Lobby ruling applied to “a closely-held for-profit corporation” and questioning
whether the ruling could be extended to publicly traded corporations).
270 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764 (2014).
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commits the Greens to operating the company “in a manner
consistent with Biblical principles,” and the opinion noted that
“[e]ach family member has signed a pledge to run the businesses
[Hobby Lobby andMardel] in accordance with the family’s religious
beliefs.”271 The opinion went on to detail how Hobby Lobby and
Mardel pursue business policies, such as closing all stores on
Sundays and “refus[ing] to engage in profitable transactions that
facilitate or promote alcohol use,” that reduce corporate profits and
are motivated by the Greens’ religious beliefs.272 Although the
Hobby Lobby majority opinion did not explicitly say so, it appears
that the Court took the position that if a corporation’s shareholders
have unanimously agreed to operate a business in a certain
manner, even a manner that reduces corporate profits and thereby
harms the shareholders’ economic interests, then they should be
permitted to do so, and analysis of the application of the traditional
requirements imposed upon for-profit corporations, including the
duties of care and loyalty, is not necessary.273
This outcome may well be correct as a practical matter, if
there are no minority shareholders who will object or take legal
action to challenge the manner in which the business is being
operated,274 but it nonetheless raises important doctrinal issues,
discussed below, that the Court did not address. It also strictly
limits the application of the Court’s Hobby Lobby holding to those
companies in which there is unanimous agreement among the
shareholders275 to forgo greater profits for the business in the
interest of operating the business in conformity with the
shareholders’ religious beliefs.276 That point merits emphasis
because it means that any for-profit corporation seeking to avail
itself of the new RFRA rights recognized in Hobby Lobby must
271 Id. at 2766.
272 Id.
273 In this sense, Conestoga’s, Hobby Lobby’s and Mardel’s founding
documents express concepts analogous to the secular precepts expressed in Google’s
founding documents. See infra text accompanying notes 382-87.
274 As noted above, it appears that is the case with Conestoga, and perhaps
also Mardel, but it may not be the case with Hobby Lobby.
275 As discussed in note 273, supra, for Hobby Lobby at least, there is a
significant question whether all the company’s shareholders—holding both voting and
nonvoting stock—agreed to operate the business in conformity with the religious beliefs
of the Green family (who hold all the voting stock of the company).
276 Cf. PRINCIPLES OFCORPORATEGOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.01 note (6), at 53 (AM. LAW INST. 1994) (discussing “the question, under what
circumstances may a corporation that is organized under a business corporation law restrict
the general profitmaking objective” in a shareholders’ agreement or certificate of
incorporation provision, and noting that “there is little doubt that such limitations would
normally be permissible if agreed to by all the shareholders” (emphasis added)). This point is
discussed in more detail in Part III, infra.
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demonstrate that all its shareholders have embraced a common
set of explicitly defined “sincerely held religious beliefs”277 and are
willing to give up greater profits, incur the risk of reputational
harm among some customers, and perhaps incur legal expenses
or be subject to legal sanctions by operating the business in the
manner that they believe those religious values dictate.
Otherwise, corporate law requires consideration of the rights of
the minority shareholders, who have not agreed to give up profits
or expose the business to the risk of economic harm to further the
religious convictions of the majority shareholders, no matter how
“sincerely held” the controlling majority stockholders’ religious
beliefs may be.278
Justice Alito’s opinion implicitly recognized this point,
although admittedly not in the context of any fiduciary duty or
minority shareholder rights analysis, when it dismissed the
dissent’s concerns about the breadth of the Court’s holding and its
potential application to large, publicly traded corporations by
stating that “the idea that unrelated shareholders—including
institutional investors with their own set of stakeholders—would
agree to run a corporation under the same religious beliefs seems
improbable.”279 While this language is imprecise, it appears to
recognize that all of a corporation’s shareholders must agree to
“run a corporation under the same religious beliefs” if RFRA is to
apply.280 This point is significant because it strongly suggests—
more clearly than the very general and imprecise language
277 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
278 Cf. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATEGOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
pt. V (Duty of Fair Dealing), intro. note (d), at 195-96 (AM. LAW INST. 1994) (discussing
the duty of fair dealing and noting that “the principles set forth in Chapter 3 [Duty of
Fair Dealing of Controlling Shareholders] would not apply to situations where all
existing shareholders have approved a transaction or agreed upon a specific course of
conduct” (emphasis added)). We note, however, that the duty of fair dealing as defined
by the ALI Principles applies only to instances in which a director, officer, or
controlling shareholder has a pecuniary interest in a matter involving the corporation,
and “Part V does not address nonpecuniary conflict-of-interest situations which might
be dealt with by the courts in appropriate cases.” Id. at intro. note (a), at 192. Although
the actions taken by the Greens and Hahns as controlling shareholders of their
companies that were at issue in Hobby Lobby undoubtedly will have an indirect
pecuniary effect on those companies, they are not like the traditional “self-dealing” and
“taking of corporate opportunity” transactions that Part V of the ALI Principles was
intended to address, and therefore those actions might be viewed as within the ALI
Principles’ “nonpecuniary” exception quoted above. Accordingly, our analysis below
focuses on the duty of care and its procedural corollary, the business judgment rule.
279 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774.
280 This is consistent with the ALI Principles’ acknowledgment that the duty of
fair dealing of controlling shareholders “would not apply to situations where all existing
shareholders have . . . agreed upon a specific course of conduct.” PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS pt. V (Duty of Fair Dealing), intro. note
(d), at 195-96. See infra Part III for additional analysis of this issue.
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elsewhere in the majority opinion—that the holding of Hobby
Lobby applies only to corporations where all of the shareholders
have agreed to operate the business in conformity with particular
religious tenets.
Equally important, this point provides the answer to
Justice Alito’s rhetorical question of why for-profit corporations
cannot “exercise religion” for purposes of RFRA and the First
Amendment. The two-fold answer is that first, a corporation is a
separate entity from the shareholders who own and control it, and,
second, only in the most unusual circumstance will those
shareholders unanimously and explicitly adopt a set of religious
beliefs as applicable to and governing the corporation’s operations.
Absent either of these necessary predicates—an explicit and
express adoption of religious principles in the corporation’s organic
documents and unanimous agreement of all shareholders (voting
and nonvoting, because nonvoting shareholders have economic
interests in the corporation that are protected by law, even if they
do not have the right to vote) to adopt those principles—it cannot
properly be said that a corporation has religious beliefs that it can
“exercise” under either RFRA or the First Amendment.
3. Hobby LobbyMisstates the Discretion That State
Law Provides Corporate Managers to Operate Their
Businesses in Accordance with Their Personal
Religious Beliefs
Justice Alito’s Hobby Lobby corporate law analysis
becomes more suspect when he seeks to use state incorporation
statutes to bolster his conclusion that for-profit corporations can
exercise religious beliefs.281 The majority opinion made reference
to “modern corporate law”282 and cited a leading corporate law
treatise283 for the proposition that the general incorporation laws of
all states now include provisions stating that corporations may be
formed “for any lawful purpose,” or similar statutory language.284
This is an accurate description of the modern statutory language,
but to suggest that the “any lawful purpose” language supports the
281 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770-72.
282 Id. at 2770.
283 Id.at 2770-71. The opinion refers to “J. Cox & T. Hazen, Treatise of the
Law of Corporations” (emphasis added). The correct name is “Treatise on the Law of
Corporations” (emphasis added).
284 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770-71 (quoting J. COX & T. HAZEN, TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4:1 p. 224 (3d ed. 2010)).
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actions of the Greens and Hahns in theHobby Lobby case is at best
inaccurate285 and at worst disingenuous.
The “any lawful purpose” language in modern statutes
providing for the formation of for-profit corporations was a
legislative response to antiquated corporate law rules, dating
back to the nineteenth century “concession theory” era when
corporations were chartered by the state for a particular purpose,
requiring that a corporation’s charter explicitly identify a
corporate business purpose.286 This requirement resulted in the
practice of including in articles of incorporation long lists of
corporate purposes,287 intended to give greater flexibility to
corporate managers to expand into new business arenas over time
as the corporation grew and new opportunities arose.288 This
practice changed when the Model Business Corporation Act of
1969 permitted incorporation “for the transaction of any lawful
business,” and states subsequently amended their incorporation
statutes to reflect this innovation.289
As the Hobby Lobby opinion noted, for-profit business
incorporation statutes in both Oklahoma and Pennsylvania
include the “any lawful purpose” provision.290 The majority
opinion went on to say, however, that these “any lawful business or
purpose” statutory provisions permit for-profit corporations to
engage in the “pursuit of profit in conformity with the owners’
religious principles.”291 As the history summarized above
demonstrates, this misstates the intent and effect of these
statutory provisions. They were meant to give corporations greater
flexibility to pursue new and different “lines or kinds of
285 Cf. Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 345 n.14 (quoting the “any lawful
purpose” argument in Hobby Lobby and stating that traditional “conservative corporate
[contractarian] legal theory rejects this view”).
286 In fact, this history is explained in the same corporate law treatise that the
Hobby Lobby majority cited, just a few sections before the section cited by the majority
for the modern practice of “any lawful purpose” statutes. See 1 J. COX & T. HAZEN,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 3.6 (3d ed. 2010).
287 Id.
288 As two prominent corporate law scholars have explained, “it was possible
to string together a large number of such clauses to produce articles of incorporation
that were impressively long,” and purpose clauses “often ran pages in length but
usually gave little or no information as to what precise business the corporation
actually planned to engage in.” ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES 217 (10th ed. 2007).
289 See id.
290 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771-72 (2014).
291 Id. (citing PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301 (2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18 §§ 1002, 1005
(West 2012), Brief for State of Oklahoma as Amici Curiae, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354)).
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business,”292 without the need to include long and prolix lists of
business purposes in their articles of incorporation.
Viewing these statutes in their proper legal and
historical context, it is striking that the Hobby Lobby majority
opinion could interpret them as supporting activity that is both
contrary to legal mandate (i.e., the Affordable Care Act)293 and
not in furtherance of any business objectives. None of the
companies argued that their business activities and prospects
would be enhanced by the actions they were taking. Instead,
they argued only that their owners had a right to operate their
companies in conformity with their personal religious beliefs.294
The weakness of the majority’s analysis of this point is
underscored by the reference in the same section of the opinion to
the “benefit corporation” that over half of the states now permit.295
Benefit corporations were developed as a new form of business
entity that could pursue both public benefits and profits for the
entity’s owners.296 The mere fact that a new form of entity was
perceived as needed (and in a relatively short time was adopted
by over half the states) to pursue public benefits at the potential
expense of maximizing shareholder profits demonstrates that the
law governing traditional for-profit corporations does not clearly
permit such a dual role. Once again, however, the Hobby Lobby
majority opinion stood logic on its head when it asserted that the
existence of benefit corporations somehow demonstrates that for-
profit corporations should be permitted to pursue nonprofit
religious or charitable goals.297 This argument makes even less
292 See HAMILTON&MACEY, supra note 288, at 217.
293 See infra note 313 for a discussion of legal authority permitting a
corporation to violate a rule for the purpose of testing its validity or interpretation.
294 Unlike Conestoga and Hobby Lobby, which are companies that offer goods
and services to the general public without any religious or faith-based aspect to their
business models, Mardel as a Christian bookstore chain might easily have made an
argument that the company’s business performance and prospects would be enhanced
by adherence to its owners’ religious principles. The Hobby Lobby opinion, however,
draws no such distinction and, to the contrary, repeatedly strains to find support in the
law governing for-profit corporations for the faith-based position taken by all three of
the companies before the Court.
295 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
296 See id. In Pennsylvania, for example, a benefit corporation can be formed with
a corporate purpose of creating general public benefit, or have as a purpose the creation of
one or more specific public benefits. For an existing business corporation to convert to
benefit corporation status, a supermajority vote of two-thirds of the company’s shareholders
is required. Every benefit corporation must file an “Annual Benefit Report” with the
Department of State each year describing its efforts to create public benefit during the
preceding year. See Pennsylvania Benefit Corporation, PENN. DEP’T STATE,
http://www.dos.pa.gov/BusinessCharities/Business/Resources/Pages/Pennsylvania-Benefit-
Corporation.aspx#.Vzzn5vkrLGg [http://perma.cc/7YRJ-42N7] (last visited June 7, 2016).
297 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
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sense than the “any lawful business purpose” argument that
accompanies it. In short, the majority opinion’s treatment of both
of these points appear to be makeweight arguments that strain to
support its preferred result, without any discerning or principled
analysis of the basic corporate law concepts that are invoked.
4. Hobby Lobby’s Expansion of Controlling Owners’
Rights to Pursue Personal Objectives
Although the topic has been the subject of extensive
academic commentary and debate,298 it is widely accepted among
corporate shareholders, courts, corporate law practitioners, and
business executives that, as the American Law Institute has
stated, “A corporation [ ] should have as its objective the conduct
of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit
and shareholder gain.”299 This is not to say, of course, that every
activity undertaken by corporate management must be intended
solely to enhance corporate profit and shareholder gain. The ALI
Principles of Corporate Governance recognize, in accordance with
longstanding corporate law precedents,300 that corporations “[m]ay
devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare,
humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.”301 In
addition, and most important for purposes of a corporate law
analysis of the Hobby Lobby holding, the ALI Principles permit a
corporation, in the conduct of its business, to “take into account
ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate
to the responsible conduct of business.”302
Despite the obvious relevance of these fundamental
corporate law principles to the corporate actions that were before
the Court in Hobby Lobby, the majority did not address their
application to the case. This analytical gap also includes a failure to
298 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161
U. PA. L. REV. 2003 (2013); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW
PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC
(2012). But see, e.g., Strine & Walter, supra note 64; Yosifon, The Law of Corporate
Purpose, supra note 147; Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric
Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907 (2013).
299 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.01, at 53 (AM. LAW INST. 1994).
300 A leading and influential case, well-known to law students who take a
course in basic corporate law, is A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J.
1953). A leading Delaware authority on this point is Theodora Holding Corp. v.
Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969).
301 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.01(b)(3), at 53 (AM. LAW INST. 1994).
302 Id. at § 2.01(b)(2), at 53 (emphasis added).
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recognize the obvious relevance of one of the best-known cases in
all of American corporate law—Dodge v. Ford Motor Company.303
Although it may (or may not) technically be dicta,304 and
although it has been the subject of academic criticism,305 the
famous line from Dodge v. Ford that corporations are “organized
and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders”306 is
well-known to students of corporate law. Moreover, the similarity
of the facts in Dodge v. Ford to the facts in the Hobby Lobby cases
is striking. In Dodge v. Ford, the Michigan Supreme Court
characterized the plaintiffs’ objections to Henry Ford’s plan to
increase worker pay and cut prices on cars in part to benefit the
general public as a plan “to continue the corporation henceforth
as a semi-eleemosynary institution and not as a business
institution.”307 That, the court concluded, was beyond the
discretion corporate law bestows upon managers of for-profit
corporations and therefore could not be permitted.308 The
discretion of corporate managers in operating a business
corporation “does not extend to a change in the end itself [of profit
of the stockholders]” or “to the reduction of profits . . . in order to
devote them to other purposes.”309 In the Hobby Lobby cases, the
Green and Hahn families were seeking the right to operate their
companies as semi-religious institutions and not solely as profit-
maximizing business institutions.310 The obvious parallels
between the cases raise two questions: (1) How could the Court
303 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); see also Lynn A.
Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 164
(2008) (“The facts underlying Dodge v. Ford are familiar to virtually every student who
has taken a course in corporate law.”).
304 See Stout, supra note 303, at 168 (“[N]ot only is the Michigan Supreme
Court’s statement on corporate purpose in Dodge v. Ford dicta, but it is much more
mealy-mouthed dicta than is generally appreciated.”). But see Jonathan R. Macey, A
Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177,
180 (2008) (“[T]he shareholder maximization ideal actually drives the holding and is
not mere dicta.”).
305 See Stout, supra note 303.
306 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
307 Id. at 683.
308 See id. at 684.
309 Id.
310 Here it is worth noting again that many of the business practices adopted
by the Greens and Hahns, such as not opening stores on Sundays, would reduce
corporate profits and were based solely on the families’ religious convictions rather
than upon some goal of enhancing the general goodwill of the business, loyalty among
customers, etc. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2766 (2014)
(“In accordance with those commitments, Hobby Lobby and Mardel stores close on
Sundays, even though the Greens calculate that they lose millions in sales annually by
doing so.”). In this regard, the actions of the Greens and Hahns are similar to Henry
Ford’s avowed plan to subjugate his company’s profitmaking activities to his personal
beliefs about the good of society at large.
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decide Hobby Lobby without at least acknowledging Dodge v.
Ford, and (2) how can the holding in Hobby Lobby be reconciled
with Dodge v. Ford and the consistent line of corporate law
authorities that followed that case, including the relevant
provisions of the ALI Principles?311
For better or worse, the corporate actions by the Green
and Hahn families contradict the general principle of shareholder
profit maximization set out in Dodge v. Ford. Their actions also
would not meet any of the ALI Principles’ exceptions to the general
requirement of maximizing “corporate profit and shareholder
gain.”312 Even the exception for “ethical considerations” cannot be
stretched to cover the religiously motivated practices of the
companies before the Court inHobby Lobby, because that exception
applies only to actions “that are reasonably regarded as
appropriate to the responsible conduct of [a] business.”313 As the
commentary to that section of the ALI Principlesmakes clear, the
exception would not apply to the actions of the Greens and Hahns
in refusing to comply with the Affordable Care Act.314 It is hard to
311 Conceivably, the U.S. Supreme Court could say that the corporate law
implications of Dodge v. Ford with respect to Hobby Lobby are for the relevant state
courts to decide. But it is the Court’s neglect of these implications that allows it to
conflate the interests of the corporation with those of its controlling shareholders.
312 See PRINCIPLES OFCORPORATEGOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS ANDRECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.01, at 53 (AM. LAW INST. 1994).
313 See id. § 2.01(b)(2), at 53. We do acknowledge that the commentary to the
ALI Principles recognizes as an exception to the “norm of obedience to law” situations
“where, under appropriate conditions, a rule is violated openly for the purposes of
testing its validity or interpretation.” Id. cmt. g, at 60-61. While this exception might
well cover the actions of the Greens and Hahns in challenging the Affordable Care Act
provisions to which they objected (and insulate them from suit by objecting
shareholders for pursuing a “test case” to challenge the ACA), it does not dictate a
conclusion that their challenges had merit or in any way support creating an exception
to the general corporate profit and shareholder gain requirement of the ALI Principles.
Moreover, none of the other “obedience to law” exceptions discussed in comment g
support a corporation violating a duly enacted and applicable law because of the
personal religious beliefs of the corporation’s controlling shareholders. See id. at 60-61.
314 See id. cmt. h, at 62-63. In fact, the commentary states that “[b]ecause
[corporate] officials are dealing with other people’s money, they will act properly in
taking ethical principles into account only where those considerations are reasonably
regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business.” Id. at 63 (emphasis
added). This incisive observation in the ALI Principles commentary supports our
conclusion, discussed above, that the holding of Hobby Lobby should apply only to
closely held corporations where the shareholders have unanimously agreed to conduct
their business in accordance with certain religious principles and in so doing forgo
some corporate profits. As discussed in more detail in Part III, infra, if properly
understood as so limited, the Hobby Lobby holding not only avoids conflict with the
Dodge v. Ford/ALI Principles’ shareholder profit maximization requirement, it also is
explicitly permitted by established corporate law practice as reflected in the
commentary to the ALI Principles. See id. reporter’s note (6), at 73 (stating that “a
corporation that is organized under a business corporation law” can “restrict the
general profitmaking objective, in a manner that goes beyond § 2.01(b), by a
shareholders’ agreement or certificate [of incorporation] provision” and “there is little
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imagine how RFRA would allow a for-profit corporation’s
controlling shareholders not only to elevate their religious beliefs
over the mandates of the ACA, but also to elevate these beliefs
over the rights of the minority shareholders of the same
corporation in contravention of the controlling shareholders’
fiduciary obligations.
This inconsistency between the corporate law analysis
of the Hobby Lobby majority and the basic profit maximization
principle of corporate law315 reflects a deeper deficiency in the
Hobby Lobby majority’s corporate law analysis. The reason that
the actions of the Hahns and Greens are contrary to
established corporate law principles goes beyond the profit
maximization issue. Their actions also are contrary to the
central precept of corporate law that governs the conduct of
corporate managers—the duty of care (and its procedural
corollary the business judgment rule).
The actions of the Hahns and Greens violate their
fiduciary duties to their corporations because those actions were
based not on the best interests of the corporations, but instead on
the families’ personal religious beliefs. Both the duty of care and
the business judgment rule, however, require that corporate
managers put aside their personal interests and make decisions
based on the corporation’s business interests. The ALI Principles
articulate the duty of care as requiring that corporate directors
and officers act “in good faith, in a manner that he or she
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation,
and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would
reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under
similar circumstances.”316 The actions of the Green and Hahn
families did not meet this fundamental requirement because they
acknowledged—and the Hobby Lobby majority emphasized—that
they were acting based on their personal religious beliefs and not
based on an argument (even a makeweight argument) that their
actions were also in the best interests of their corporations.317
doubt that such limitations would normally be permissible if agreed to by all the
shareholders” (emphasis added)). But see Sepinwall, supra note 144, at 181 (arguing
that the ALI Principles support the holding in Hobby Lobby).
315 Cf. Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 345 n.14 (noting that Hobby Lobby is
further evidence that the five-Justice majority in that case and the Citizens United case
are “at odds with traditional conservative [contractarian corporate] thought”).
316 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 4.01(a), at 133 (AM. LAW INST. 1994) (emphasis added).
317 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2766 (2014)
(describing the adverse economic impact on Hobby Lobby and Mardel of the Green
family’s adherence to religious convictions in the operation of the corporations).
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The duty of care of course does provide corporate
managers with wide latitude in making decisions that are in the
best interests of the corporation.318 This latitude is ensured by the
courts’ application of the “business judgment rule” to determine
whether corporate managers have violated the duty of care.319 The
ALI Principles provide that a director or officer who makes a
business judgment fulfills the duty of care if the director or officer
(1) is not interested in the subject of the business judgment; (2) is
informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the
extent the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate
under the circumstances; and (3) rationally believes that the business
judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.320
Courts in Pennsylvania321 and Oklahoma322 recognize and
apply the duty of care and the business judgment rule in
determining whether corporate managers have met their
fiduciary obligations to the corporations they manage. Thus, the
actions of the Greens (Oklahoma) and Hahns (Pennsylvania) in
refusing to comply with the ACA should have been evaluated in
light of the duty of care and the business judgment rule.323
318 Like Henry Ford’s actions in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., the Green and Hahn
families’ actions most likely (and in the case of the Mardel company almost certainly)
could survive judicial scrutiny under the business judgment rule if some effort had been
made to present their business practices as consistent with the goal of profit
maximization for shareholders. See Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on
Dodge v. Ford, supra note 304, at 182 (asserting that “it would have been [easy] for Mr.
Ford to have won [the] case” if he testified that his plans were consistent with the goal of
profit maximization for shareholders). Likely because of their desire to obtain the
protections of RFRA, however, the Greens and Hahns put all their eggs in the personal
religious convictions basket, which should have lost the case for them in the same way
that Ford’s unwillingness to downplay his personal beliefs and motives lost his case for
him. In Hobby Lobby, of course, the majority saved the Greens and Hahns by ignoring
Dodge v. Ford and other relevant corporate precedents and instead creating a new
concept of the (closely held, we emphasize) for-profit business corporation.
319 In this sense, the Hobby Lobby managers’ principles are indeed distinguishable
from those professed by Google’s managers. See infra text accompanying notes 385-86. At
Google, the founders’ principles went more to the manner in which the company would
produce profits, rather than to matters that took precedence over the production of profit.
320 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 4.01(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1994) (emphasis added).
321 See Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042 (Pa. 1997) (confirming that the
business judgment rule is the law in Pennsylvania and adopting portions of the ALI Principles
of Corporate Governance to apply in shareholder derivative litigation in Pennsylvania alleging
breach of fiduciary duties or other wrongdoing by corporate management).
322 See Egleston ex rel. Chesapeake Energy Corp. v. McClendon, 318 P.3d 210,
215 (Okla. Civ. App. 2013) (confirming that the business judgment rule is the law in
Oklahoma and noting that because “Oklahoma law in this area is not well-developed,”
the Oklahoma courts look to Delaware law on corporate law issues); Beard v. Love, 173
P.3d 796, 805 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007) (applying the business judgment rule and
recognizing the precedential value of Delaware law).
323 Here again, the failure of the Hobby Lobby majority to include Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co. in its corporate law analysis is a critical oversight. Had the majority
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Here, we finally come to the core failing of the Hobby
Lobby majority’s corporate law analysis. Because the Greens
and Hahns relied solely upon their personal religious
convictions as reasons for their actions in managing their
corporations, the case was presented to the Court in a manner
that would not have permitted the Court to uphold the families’
actions under universally accepted principles of corporate law
(except by limiting the holding in the manner described below).
Whether it recognized this or not, the Hobby Lobby majority
simply ignored most of the relevant corporate law legal
principles—shareholder wealth maximization, the duty of care,
and the business judgment rule—and embraced a new “pass
through” concept of the closely held corporation as a vehicle for
the expression of the corporation’s owners’ personal religious
convictions. We are not certain that this is altogether bad for
closely held corporations in which all the shareholders are in
agreement (as was the case with Conestoga). But if extended
beyond that narrow context, it signals a radical change in
American corporate law that we believe calls for a significant
modification to the way for-profit corporations are governed
(which we propose in Part IV, infra).
As a final point on this issue, we note that had the Court
rigorously and scrupulously applied the universally accepted
corporate law principles discussed above to the Hobby Lobby
cases, it could have reached the same outcome—but in a way that
would have resulted in a much narrower and clearer holding. Had
the majority centered its analysis on the unanimous shareholder
agreement requirement, already recognized in corporate law,324
and confirmed that none of the corporations before the Court had
any minority shareholders who could be harmed,325 it could have
held that the corporations had appropriately and lawfully adopted
business policies and practices that reflected their owners’ religious
done so, it almost certainly would have been compelled to consider the application of
the business judgment rule to the actions of the Greens and Hahns, because in addition
to the shareholder profit maximization principle discussed above, Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co. is well-known to every student of corporate law for its early articulation of the
business judgment rule, recognizing that “judges are not business experts” in declining
to enjoin Henry Ford’s business expansion plans. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 70 N.W.
668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
324 See supra note 276 and accompanying text (noting that under the ALI
Principles and their commentary, a corporation can restrict the general profitmaking
objective by a shareholder agreement or certificate of incorporation provision and that there
is little doubt that such limitations are permissible if agreed to by all the shareholders).
325 As is discussed above, this may not have been the case with the Hobby
Lobby company, but again it is impossible to tell from the opinion whether the majority
simply missed this issue or chose to ignore it.
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beliefs. A holding based on this rationale would have comported
much more closely with prior Court precedent recognizing religious
free exercise rights of nonprofit religion-based organizations326 and
would not have conflicted so dramatically with the core principles
of American corporate law.327
5. TheHobby Lobby Court’s Lack of Deference to Precedent
Finally, and in addition to disregarding the importance of
the separate legal identity of corporations and the established
legal principles governing the discretion of corporate managers,
the Hobby Lobby majority ignored relevant Supreme Court
precedent holding that converting a business from a sole
proprietorship (or partnership) to a corporation can indeed affect
the constitutional rights of the business owner(s).328 As discussed
earlier,329 in Braswell v. United States,330 the Court explicitly held
that Mr. Braswell’s choice to operate his businesses as
corporations rather than sole proprietorships prevented him from
asserting his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
under the Fifth Amendment.331
326 Cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794-97 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
327 An oddity of such a holding would be that the Court in essence would be
upholding unlawful conduct (actions that violated the duty of care and the business
judgment rule) simply because no one who was harmed (by the lower corporate profits and
the other costs associated with the actions) wished to pursue a remedy for the harm (which
is the effect of unanimous shareholder agreement to pursue those actions). While we
recognize that this technically comports with the requirements of corporate law, we
nonetheless believe that it has significant negative “spillover costs” for nonshareholder
corporate constituent groups, especially employees and maybe creditors. This is one of the
reasons we propose, in the next part, a revised corporate-governance system featuring
mandatory constituency statutes that would require corporate managers to consider the
effects of such actions on employees, suppliers, creditors, and communities. As we discuss in
Part IV, in extreme cases—such as a company closing or selling stores and plants to
generate corporate funds to make political contributions based upon the personal religious
beliefs of the corporation’s owners—those powerless constituency groups should be able to
seek judicial relief to prevent damage to the corporation from such extreme departures from
what the ALI Principles call “responsible conduct of business.” Any business owners who did
not wish to be constrained by the threat of lawsuits of this kind would be free to operate
their businesses as sole proprietorships or partnerships or to divert their personal assets to
nonprofit organizations, but they would not have carte blanche to operate a for-profit
corporation in the manner that Citizens United and Hobby Lobby will permit if the holdings
of those cases are stretched to their logical extremes. But see Sepinwall, supra note 144, at
181 (arguing that the ALI Principles support the holding inHobby Lobby).
328 See supra Part I (discussing “Corporate Personhood and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination”).
329 See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
330 Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
331 See id. at 104; see also supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text
(discussing the Braswell holding).
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Although Braswell was cited in both the government’s
briefs submitted to the Court332 and an amicus curiae brief
submitted to the Court by 44 law professors who specialize in
corporate and criminal law,333 neither Braswell nor the collective
entity doctrine334 was mentioned in Justice Alito’s Hobby Lobby
majority opinion.335 The failure of the Court to address the glaring
inconsistency between the holdings in Braswell and Hobby Lobby
is another strong indicator that the Hobby Lobby majority was
taking what might be charitably called a novel approach under
corporate law.336 We would have expected the Hobby Lobby Court
to have acknowledged the inconsistency with Braswell and
invited future reconsideration of its holding to harmonize it with
Hobby Lobby.
We are inclined to disagree with the holdings in both
Braswell and Hobby Lobby. We do not believe that the collective
entity doctrine should have been applied to deprive Mr. Braswell
of his Fifth Amendment privilege, and we do not believe that the
shareholders’ First Amendment religious beliefs in the Hobby
332 See Brief for the Respondents at 20-21, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v.
Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1536 (2014) (No. 13-356), 2014 WL 546900 (discussing Braswell and
arguing that the Conestoga owners’ claims should “fail for the same reasons” that the Court
rejected Braswell’s Fifth Amendment claims); Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 10, Sebelius
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 985095 (citing
Braswell and arguing that “[w]hen the Greens act on behalf of the corporations [Hobby
Lobby and Mardel], they do not do so in their personal capacities.”).
333 See Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 13, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) (Nos. 13-354,13-356), 2014 WL 333899 (citing Braswell and noting that the
Court had recognized the principle of corporate separateness “even between a sole
shareholder and the corporation for purposes of the Fifth Amendment”).
334 See supra Part I (discussing “Corporate Personhood and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination”).
335 The failure of the Hobby Lobby majority opinion to consider the relevance
of the Braswell case is particularly curious in view of the fact that Justice Alito, the
author of the majority opinion, wrote a law review article in 1986 about the application
of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to documents, the same
issue before the Court in Braswell. See Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Documents and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 27 (1984). In addition, while a
Department of Justice Prosecutor, Justice Alito argued in the Supreme Court one of
the leading cases on the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege to documents.
See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 606 (1984) (Samuel A. Alito Jr. argued the
cause for the United States). It seems unlikely, in light of his extensive personal
involvement with this area of law, that Justice Alito would have been unaware of
Braswell and its obvious inconsistency with the majority’s holding in Hobby Lobby.
336 Cf. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 1, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 985095 (“Respondents have not
identified a single case in this Nation’s history in which a commercial enterprise has
successfully invoked either the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment or the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) to secure what respondents seek
here: an exemption from a neutral law regulating a for-profit corporation’s commercial
activities.” (citation omitted)).
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Lobby cases should have been attributed to their corporations.
Braswell was an unduly formalistic application of a questionable
legal doctrine, which the Court admitted was motivated by a
desire to protect “the Government’s efforts to prosecute ‘white-
collar crime.’”337 Hobby Lobby attributed to corporations a
characteristic peculiar to individuals—the ability to practice
religion. Application of rights to corporations should be based on
the values underlying these rights, whether they make any sense
in the corporate context, and whether the corporation has taken a
form that makes it the functional equivalent of a natural person (as
may be the case with a closely held corporation). While
communitarians would like corporations to behave in a humane
manner, corporations can go to neither heaven nor hell. Application
of RFRA to broadly held corporations is simply inapposite.
6. Unless Limited to Its Facts, Hobby Lobby
Fundamentally Unsettles Basic Concepts of
American Corporate Law
The failure in Hobby Lobby to follow established corporate
law principles and distinguish properly between the corporations
subject to the ACA and the shareholders who controlled those
corporations and sought (successfully after the Court’s ruling) to
use those corporations as vehicles for their personal religious
beliefs is a legal bombshell—or more accurately a yet-to-be-
triggered depth charge—in American corporate law. To avoid
destabilizing the entire corporate law regulatory regime that has
been in place over the last century, the case must be limited to the
facts as presented by the Court in the majority opinion.338 If the
holding of the case is interpreted as applying only to closely held
corporations where the shareholders have unanimously agreed to
operate the corporation in accordance with explicitly identified
religious principles, even when doing so reduces corporate profits,
then the case represents only a relatively minor expansion of
RFRA to cover a small subset of corporations that previously were
not understood to be entitled to the protections of that law. We
believe that this is the only rational and principled interpretation
ofHobby Lobby.
Even limited in this manner, however, Hobby Lobby
represents a further expansion of the corporate personification
337 See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 115 (1988).
338 Thus, for purposes of our analysis, we need not determine with certainty
whether the majority opinion is incorrect when it characterizes the Hobby Lobby company
as a closely held corporation. See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying text.
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that the Citizens United decision recently introduced into
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Taken together, the two cases
create a new concept of the corporation in American law—the
corporation as a legal person with political expression and
religious-exercise rights that are almost, if not yet entirely,
coextensive with the rights of individuals. This new concept of
corporate personage necessitates a new approach to corporate
governance, which we propose in Part IV.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s expansive view of
corporate rights and its limitation on the ability of the
legislature—state or federal—to constrict those rights broadens
the constitutionally protected functions of the corporation and
repudiates those who would limit corporate objectives to only the
maximization of shareholder profit. In the section that follows,
we will show how the Roberts Court’s personification of
corporations provides unexpected support for the arguments of
corporate communitarians, notwithstanding the difficulty in
perceiving the holdings of Citizens United and Hobby Lobby as
communitarian in nature.
III. COMMUNITARIANISM AND CORPORATIONS
A. Communitarianism Briefly Explained
Communitarianism has been described as “a social
movement aim[ed] at shoring up the moral, social, and political
environment.”339 Communitarians desire to strike a reasonable
balance between the extremes of repressive authoritarianism
and radical libertarianism. They subscribe to the notion that
“even (or perhaps especially) in a rights-conscious society, rights
have limits and involve concomitant responsibilities.”
Consequently, “Communitarians support basic civil liberties, but
fear that our ability to confront societal problems effectively is
compromised by the claims of ‘radical individualists’ who would
subordinate the needs of the community to the absolute
fulfillment of individual rights.”340
339 AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES,
AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 247 (1993). Etzioni, a social scientist who has taught
at George Washington University for many years, is generally considered the leader of
the communitarian movement, and his book, The Spirit of Community, is considered
the movement’s definitive work.
340 Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where Rights
Meet Responsibilities, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 649, 650 (1995) (quoting ETZIONI, supra
note 339, at 11).
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Two decades ago, Professor Amitai Etzioni, widely regarded
as the communitarian movement’s founder, promulgated a
communitarian agenda, the first item of which called for a
moratorium on “the manufacturing of new rights” because “[t]he
incessant issuance of new rights, like the wholesale printing of
currency, causes a massive inflation of rights that devalues their
moral claims.”341 Rights come at a cost, Etzioni reminds us, because
“each newly minted right generates a claim on someone.”342 The
extension of rights, as in Citizens United or Hobby Lobby, is
therefore not something to be taken lightly or to be exercised
mechanically.343 In Hobby Lobby, for example, the extension of
rights under RFRA to closely held corporations generated a claim
on those employees who would be denied reproductive care
coverage or, more likely, on the U.S. Treasury (and indirectly, the
citizenry at large), which would be called upon to step in and
finance coverage in lieu of the corporations.344
Second, the communitarian agenda insists that rights
presume responsibilities.345 The state may assign these
responsibilities as duties of citizenship (think taxation, military
service, or jury duty), but more often, citizens assume them as
moral obligations. In the United States, unfortunately, too many
people and institutions tend to regard their moral obligations as
extending no further than their legal duties. Professor Mary Ann
Glendon has observed, “Buried deep in our rights dialect is an
unexpressed premise that we roam at large in a land of strangers,
where we presumptively have no obligations toward others except
341 ETZIONI, supra note 339, at 5.
342 Id. at 5-6.
343 See Winter, supra note 94, at 1141-42 (criticizing the formalist approach of
which the Citizens United opinion is an example).
344 At least two scholars have asserted that the Establishment Clause precludes
the application of RFRA to exempt employers from the ACA mandate because doing so
would impose significant costs on employees and other third parties who do not share the
employer’s religious beliefs. See Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 15, at 60. Justice Alito
suggested in Hobby Lobby that the government could foot the bill for the objected-to
contraceptive coverage and that the cost would be relatively small compared to the overall
cost of the ACA. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014). Of
course, one could contend that shifting the cost of the objectors’ religious beliefs to the
government would itself violate the Establishment Clause. But because the costs of
pregnancy and childbirth normally exceed those of obtaining a contraceptive device, health
insurance policies with full contraceptive coverage are generally no more costly than those
that are not. See Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 15, at 53. Therefore, it may not impose
any additional financial cost on the taxpayers to pick up the tab for contraceptive coverage
for employees of corporations like Hobby Lobby or Conestoga. The case is different where
the objecting employer self-insures (e.g., the University of Notre Dame, a nonprofit that has
obtained an exemption from HHS under 29 C.F.R. §§ 2590.715-2713A(a) (2013)) and will
not take on the additional coverage itself.
345 ETZIONI, supra note 339, at 9.
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to avoid the active infliction of harm.”346 But history demonstrates
that we are far more interdependent than our American myth of
rugged individualism would have us believe. Citizenship is a two-
way street, and we must be prepared to give as we get.347 It is not
enough for Hobby Lobby’s or Conestoga’s owners to act on their
own religious beliefs, without regard to the rights of their
employees (to health care) or the burden on taxpayers (if they
must step up to supplant the coverage the owners are
withholding). We are, in fact, our brothers’ and sisters’ keepers.
Third, we should recognize that certain responsibilities
may exist without an immediate payback in the form of
capturable rights.348 As the late American philosopher Yogi Berra
said, “[A]lways go to other people’s funerals; otherwise, they won’t
come to yours.”349 A responsibility not to engage in activities that
over time degrade the environment is a prominent example of this
principle at work.350 In the business world, a corporation might
forgo a short-term advantage (e.g., a substantial shareholder
dividend that might temporarily boost stock value) to thrive in
the long term (e.g., by investing in research and development, or
346 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 77 (1991).
347 During the 2012 presidential election campaign, Republican candidate
Mitt Romney was roundly criticized for a recorded remark in which he spoke of the
47% of the American public who had, in his view, a philosophy of entitlement.
[T]here are 47 percent of the people who are . . . dependent upon government,
who believe that they are victims, who believe the government has a
responsibility to care for them, who believe that they are entitled to health
care, to food, to housing, you-name-it. That that’s an entitlement. And the
government should give it to them. And they will vote for the president no
matter what. These are people who pay no income tax. . . . [M]y job is not to
worry about those—I’ll never convince them they should take personal
responsibility and care for their lives.
Mitt Romney, 2012 Republican Party Nominee for President of the United States, Remarks
at Private Fundraising Event (May 17, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/
09/secret-video-romney-private-fundraiser [http://perma.cc/QZJ9-K8LH]. Romney appears
to have erroneously used the 2009 figure of 46.4% of Americans who paid no income tax
(which included many working people with very low incomes) as the basis for 47% of the
people who were “dependent upon government.” Robert Farley, Dependency and Romney’s
47 Percenters, FACTCHECK.ORG (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.factcheck.org/2012/09/
dependency-and-romneys-47-percenters/ [http://perma.cc/C4F4-D8FM]. Romney also
neglected to acknowledge that most of the people receiving government benefits were
veterans, retirees, and others who had made significant contributions to society (and to the
public treasury). It would have been less offensive, and more to the point, had he pointed out
that a government that is supported by only 53.6% of the population is not economically
sustainable. The very term “entitlement” suggests a nation in which we feel that the country
owes us something, and we owe little in return.
348 ETZIONI, supra note 339, at 10.
349 Yogi Berra Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/
y/yogi_berra.html [http://perma.cc/7LSL-RQ8L] (last visited June 8, 2016).
350 ETZIONI, supra note 339, at 11.
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in practices that sustain the natural resources on which the
corporation depends).351
Fourth, Etzioni asks that we engage in “[c]areful
[a]djustments” to reconcile individual rights with the public
welfare.352 “[T]he best way to curb authoritarianism and right-
wing tendencies is to stop the anarchic drift by introducing
carefully calibrated responses to urgent and legitimate public
concerns about safety and the control of epidemics,” declares
Etzioni.353 We might add that the best way to curb the drift
toward oligarchy and increased income inequality may be the
placement of reasonable restraints on the use of corporate funds
in political campaigns. We will return to that later. Suffice it to
say, for now, that there is an appropriate role for the regulatory
state in constraining conduct that might harm the public at large.
Society cannot survive a return to Lochner.354
Etzioni and others have produced a “Communitarian
Platform,” which has drawn signatures from several hundred
political, community, and academic leaders, including both of your
authors.355 The major point of the communitarian enterprise is
that we acknowledge that we are interdependent members of a
society that can ill-afford more atomization, that the myth of
rugged individualism has never sustained us, that “I’ve got mine,
Jack” can no longer be our rallying cry (if it ever was).
Communitarianism does not always demand government
intervention, but it rejects a formalism that transforms rights into
abstract caricatures of rugged individualism that serve neither
the community nor the individual in the long run.
B. Communitarianism in the Corporate Context
In writings about corporate law, communitarianism
usually refers to a philosophy that corporations have legitimate
constituencies beyond their shareholders and that they should look
beyond the narrow objective of shareholder wealth maximization
351 Whether our corporate structure, with its emphasis on short-term shareholder
value, buttressed by the practice of corporate raiding, is conducive to such a far-sighted
approach is open to question. See COLINMAYER, FIRMCOMMITMENT (2013).
352 ETZIONI, supra note 339, at 11.
353 Id.
354 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a labor law that
restricted the hours employees could work and finding the restriction unnecessary to
protect employee health and characterized the law as an improper attempt by the state
legislature to regulate the terms of private employment).
355 ETZIONI, supra note 339, at 253-67; see also Institute for Communitarian
Policy Studies, GEO. WASH. UNIV., http://icps.gwu.edu/ [http://perma.cc/P7ND-LXHB]
(last visited June 7, 2016).
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and assume responsibility for constituencies such as employees,
customers, the communities in which the corporations operate, and
even the entire world.356 Communitarians regard the corporation as
something grander than a wealth-maximization machine and
prefer a legal regime designed to “promote a richer array of social
and political values.”357 Presumably, most corporations are
organized by people who wish to make a contribution beyond the
mere making of money: to provide a desirable product or service,
to meet an unmet need, to serve the public in some fashion, to
build a better mousetrap. The making of profit is certainly an
objective of such corporations, but it need not be the only or even
the primary objective. This was as true of the nineteenth-century
robber barons as it is for today’s high-tech entrepreneurs. Andrew
Carnegie naturally wanted to make money, but he purposefully
set out to make steel. Commodore Vanderbilt had a penchant for
railroads. Horace Greeley, Joseph Pulitzer, and William
Randolph Hearst wanted to disseminate the news, and thereby
affect public opinion. (Indeed, traditional media corporations,
which generally enjoy a smaller profit margin than many other
corporations, tend to have intrinsic motives that rarely start with
money. “Rosebud,” indeed!358) The fragmentation of corporate
stock ownership (including institutional, mutual fund, and
retirement account investors) brings with it a less purposeful
class of owners, but the shareholders of the Ford Motor Company
hardly have cause to fret if the corporation aims first and
foremost to put America on wheels.359
356 See, e.g., David Millon, Introduction: Communitarians, Contractarians,
and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993) [hereinafter
Millon, Communitarians]; Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders,
Nonshareholders and Corporate Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18
DEL. J. CORP. L. 393 (1993); Paul N. Cox, The Public, the Private and the Corporation,
80 MARQ. L. REV. 391 (1997); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era:
Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993). No less an advocate for the prerogatives of corporate
boards than Martin Lipton recognized the obligation of corporations to nonshareholder
constituencies at least as early as 1979. Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s
Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. (ABA) 101 (1979).
357 David Millon, Theories of the Corporation,1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 202 (1990).
358 See CITIZEN KANE (RKO Radio Pictures 1941) (Orson Welles’s critically
acclaimed allegory roughly based on the life of publisher William Randolph Hearst).
359 Recently, Ford’s management has been trying to restyle this industrial giant as
a “transportation company.”Mike Ramsey, Ford Says It Will Focus More on Transportation-
Services Sector, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5, 2016, 12:49 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ford-says-
it-will-focus-more-on-transportation-services-sector-1452016172 [http://perma.cc/3JA8-6MTK].
But it remains significant that Ford does not seek merely to be a “money-making company”;
it maintains a purpose.
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1. Communitarians Versus Contractarians
During most of the history of the modern business
corporation, it has been corporate law dogma that corporate
boards of directors could lawfully act only if their action conferred
some benefit—direct or indirect, short-term or long-term—on the
shareholders who owned the corporation.360 Underlying this
widely accepted dogma, however, was ongoing tension between
those who conceived of the role of the corporation as a wealth-
generator for its shareholders and those who advocated for broader
responsibilities for the corporation as a legal “person” with societal
obligations that extend beyond merely maximizing shareholder
wealth.361 To date, the shareholder wealth maximization model has
largely prevailed,362 with one important exception—the advent of
so-called constituency statutes in the 1980s.363
360 See ABA Comm. on Corporate Laws, Other Constituency Statutes: Potential for
Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. (ABA) 2253, 2255 (1990) [hereinafter ABA Report] (“With few
exceptions, courts have consistently avowed the legal primacy of shareholder interests when
management and directors make decisions. This conventional wisdom has not, of course,
prevented courts from permitting on various grounds the limited use of corporate resources
for eleemosynary and other non-profit oriented purposes; usually the conceptual
justification has been the long-range interest of the corporation (and therefore the
shareholders).”); see also Millon, Communitarians, supra note 356, at 1373-74 (footnote
omitted). For much of this century, at least since the publication of Berle and Means’s
classic in 1932, the orthodox assumption has been that corporate law’s objective is to
develop legal structures that will maximize shareholder wealth. This shareholder primacy
vision of corporate law therefore disregards claims of various nonshareholder constituencies
(including employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and communities in which firms
operate) whose interests may be adversely affected by managerial pursuit of shareholder
welfare. Managerial accountability to shareholders is corporate law’s central problem.
Nonshareholder interests, if entitled to any legal protection at all, are for other,
noncorporate law legal regimes. Millon, Communitarians, supra, at 357. For historical
analysis of the evolution of the nineteenth-century “special purpose”mercantile corporation,
which received a special charter from the state to achieve some public good or objective, to
the “classical corporation” formed under general incorporation acts and permitted to engage
in any lawful business activity, see HERBERTHOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE ANDAMERICANLAW
1836-1937 (1991). Hovenkamp observes that, with the rise of the classical corporation and
its separation of corporate ownership and control, such that its shareholders’ only interest is
in corporate profits, “[t]he American business corporation had become a person but had lost
its soul.” Id. at 16.
361 The most influential scholarly debate on this topic was between Professor
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. of Harvard Law School, see E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932), and Professor A. A.
Berle, Jr. of Columbia Law School, see A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers
are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932). For a summary of the history of
debates over “corporate social responsibility” in the twentieth century, see C.A.
Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical
Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002).
362 See PRINCIPLES OFCORPORATEGOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS ANDRECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.01(a), at 53 (AM. LAW INST. 1994) (stating that “a corporation [] should have as its
objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit
and shareholder gain,” but recognizing that “[e]ven if corporate profit and shareholder
gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its business . . . [m]ay
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As more states enacted constituency statutes in the late
1980s and early 1990s, the statutes became hotly contested fronts
in an ongoing battle between corporate law “contractarians” and
“communitarians” who were disputing the validity of the
“shareholder primacy” conceptual foundation of corporate law.364
The ideological and philosophical differences between
contractarians and communitarians, however, extend far beyond
the issues that surround corporate constituency statutes:
Contractarians start from the presumption that people ought to be free
to make their own choices about how to live their lives (subject to an
overriding duty not to harm others). Legal rules that redistribute
wealth, mandate particular forms of behavior, or prevent people from
making bargains they would otherwise choose to make are
presumptively objectionable because they interfere with people’s ability
to live their own lives according to their own preferences, structuring
their relationships with others and defining their duties toward them by
means of consent. This idea focuses on the individual as an autonomous
being and is based on a particular vision of human liberty as freedom
from external, unconsented-to restraint. Contractarians are willing to
admit the legitimacy of certain mandatory rules, but such restraints on
individual liberty must themselves be justified in terms of the liberty
interests of those who may be harmed by the conduct restrained.
devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational,
and philanthropic purposes”); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.02(b)(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1994) (stating that in taking action to
block an unsolicited tender offer, a corporate board may “have regard for interests or groups
(other than shareholders) with respect to which the corporation has a legitimate concern if
to do so would not significantly disfavor the long-term interests of shareholders”); cf. Steven
M.H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and
Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163, 168 (1991) (“By reaffirming the
fundamental precept that the duty of directors is to act in the best interests of the
corporation, the corporate constituency statutes have placed corporate law back on
track. The statutes have arrested the recent misguided tendency of the corporate law to
venture away from a corporation-focused concept toward the erroneous notion that the
directors’ duty is to act exclusively in the interests of the shareholders, with that
interest increasingly defined by reference to short-term stock prices.”).
363 See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW
86-97 (3d ed. 2011) (noting that “other-constituencies” statutes “alter the traditional
orientation that corporate decisions are to be adjudged by their impact on stockholder
wealth as contrasted with some greater good, such as happier workers and a more
vibrant community”). For further discussion of constituency statutes, see infra notes
456-67 and accompanying text.
364 See generally Millon, Communitarians, supra note 356, at 1377-79 (explaining
that contractarians “would . . . leave it up to the various participants in corporate activity to
specify their respective rights and obligations through contract” and therefore believe that
“state corporate law provides the terms of the contract by which shareholders purchase
management’s undivided loyalty to their welfare,” while communitarians “more readily look
to legal rules to structure relations among the corporation’s diverse constituent groups,
believing that corporate law must confront the harmful effects on nonshareholder
constituencies of managerial pursuit of shareholder wealth maximization” and therefore are
more willing “to use legal intervention to overcome the transaction costs and market failures
that impede self-protection through contract”).
976 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:3
Communitarians approach these questions from a different perspective.
Their view of society contrasts sharply with the contractarians’
animating vision, emphasizing the social arena in which individual
activity occurs. Simply by virtue of membership in a shared community,
individuals owe obligations to each other that exist independently of
contract. We are born into civil society and thereby inherit the benefits
of life in a community. . . . Acknowledging our interdependence, we must
recognize our responsibility for the quality of the lives of all community
members. The state acts appropriately when it enforces such duties. . . .
The market alone cannot adequately fulfill basic human needs for
everyone because many people lack the resources to participate effectively
in the market. Insistence on the market’s sufficiency for the sake of
individual liberty therefore ignores those civic obligations that flow from
the social aspect of human existence. To communitarians, life chances
should not depend entirely on accidents of birth and bargaining power:
people are entitled to more out of life than what they can pay for.365
Corporate contractarians acknowledge that corporate
actions can “cause enormous disruption in the lives of everyone
connected with [the] firm[ ] ,”366 but they nonetheless believe that
“the private contracting process, though not perfect, generates
outcomes superior to the outcomes generated by government
regulation.”367 They therefore take the position that the interests
of nonshareholder constituencies, such as creditors and
employees, can and should be protected through the private
contracting process rather than by “regulatory intervention.”368
Contractarians also believe that shareholder interests should
drive corporate directors’ decisions because shareholders “have
the greatest stake in the outcome of corporate decision-making.”369
365 Millon, Communitarians, supra note 356, at 1382-83 (footnotes omitted).
For a collection of essays exploring the impact of communitarianism across the U.S.
legal spectrum, see DAVID E. CARNEY, TO PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE: A
COMMUNITARIAN LEGAL READER (1999).
366 Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and
the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 173
(1989) [hereinafter Macey, Externalities] (noting that employees, managers, suppliers,
customers, philanthropists, rival firms, local governments, and the community in
which the firm operates may all be significantly affected).
367 Id. at 174. Additionally, some commentators argue that constituency
statutes may lead to reduced management accountability. See William J. Carney, Does
Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385, 424 (1990); see also Lawrence
E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 582 (1992) (arguing that “constituency
statutes diminish the board’s accountability to stockholders”).
368 Macey, Externalities, supra note 366, at 200-01. Professor Millon has
characterized this contractarian position as a belief that “to the extent that
management’s pursuit of shareholder welfare threatens nonshareholder interests,
workers, creditors, and other affected nonshareholders are free to bargain with
shareholders (through their agents) for whatever protections they are willing to pay
for.” Millon, Communitarians, supra note 356, at 1378.
369 Macey, Externalities, supra note 366, at 175 (asserting that it is more
efficient for shareholders to retain control of the corporation because they place the
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Most important, as Professor Bratton has pointed out, the
contractarian shareholder wealth maximization principle has
maintained its dominance because it “is assumed to be the means
to the end of maximum wealth for the society as a whole.”370
Despite the force of these contractarian arguments,
corporate communitarians counter that “the shareholder primacy
model has exhausted its usefulness”371 and that, contrary to the
claims of contractarians, nonshareholder constituencies need
external protections because these groups in fact are not able to
protect their interests through private contracting.372
2. Ford and Google: Don’t Be Evil
A century ago, the model for corporate communitarianism
was Henry Ford.373 We have previously alluded to the case ofDodge
v. Ford Motor Co.,374 in which John and Horace Dodge, minority
shareholders in the Ford Motor Company, challenged Henry Ford’s
decision to limit Ford’s shareholder dividend in order to build the
enormous River Rouge plant, ostensibly for the purpose of
providing gainful employment for more workers and building more
cars at prices the workers could afford.375 In the end, the court
ordered a larger dividend, but it also declared that Henry Ford’s
expansionist plans, which arguably would result in a lower return
highest value on the right to do so). In addition, some commentators assert that the
broader discretion that constituency statutes give corporate boards may be abused to
elevate the interests of incumbent management above the interests of shareholders
and thereby to “maximize managers’ welfare.” See Carney, supra note 367, at 423
(allowing “managers to claim that they have ‘weighed all the factors’ . . . is to grant
them unfettered discretion that cannot be monitored”).
370 See William W. Bratton, Confronting the Ethical Case Against the Ethical
Case for Constituency Rights, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1449, 1450 (1993).
371 Millon, Communitarians, supra note 356, at 1377.
372 See id. at 1379 (noting that nonshareholder constituencies may be unable
to contract to protect their interests for a variety of reasons, including an inability to
foresee future harm, management’s informational advantages, and the practical
difficulties in coordinating the bargaining efforts of similarly situated constituent
groups); see also Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 379-87. As Strine and Walter
succinctly distill the fundamental problem, “Flesh-and-blood humans do not have the
wallet to compete with corporations.” Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 386.
373 We hasten to add that Ford did many evil things, not the least of which
was establishing a notorious “Sociological Department” that policed the private lives of
his employees. ROBERT LACEY, FORD: THE MEN AND THE MACHINE (1986); see also
VICTORIA SAKER WOESTE, HENRY FORD’S WAR ON JEWS AND THE LEGAL BATTLE
AGAINSTHATE SPEECH (2012).
374 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); see also supra Part I
(discussing Dodge v. Ford).
375 Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. at 671; see also Jonathan Romiti, Note, Playing
Politics with Shareholder Value: The Case for Applying Fiduciary Law to Corporate
Political Donations Post-Citizens United, 53 B.C. L. REV. 737, 737-39 (2012); supra
Part I (discussing Dodge v. Ford).
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to stockholders, were legitimate corporate objectives that could be
legally pursued under the “business judgment” rule.376
Ford went on to prove that he could have his cake and eat
it, too. His quest for profits, notoriety, and power were often
cloaked in populist, humanitarian rhetoric. But in fact,
investment in the River Rouge plant (along with a generous
dividend) was not only within the Ford Motor Company’s means,
it resulted in unprecedented profits for Ford Motor and the Ford
family.377 The Dodge Brothers, for that matter, used the Ford
dividend to finance their own automotive company; their effort to
enjoin Ford’s construction of the River Rouge plant was seen as a
delay tactic designed to give the fledgling Dodge Motors a fighting
chance against the growing Ford automotive empire.378 But it is
instructive that the Dodges did not go into banking, publishing, or
plastics; they continued to invest their assets in automobiles.
They, too, wanted to make more than money; they wanted to
make cars.379
Corporate communitarianism can encompass a vast array
of objectives, including the welfare of workers, environmentally
sustainable business practices,380 the welfare of communities
in which the business is located, charitable contributions, and
other well-meaning endeavors. The language of “corporate
communitarianism” is entirely compatible with the more general
language of Etzioni-style communitarianism, not only because
such activities are seen as promoting the general welfare, but also
because the communitarian view of legitimate corporate
objectives is consistent with the “brother’s keeper” philosophy of
the communitarian movement.381
376 Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. at 684. While the case is often mischaracterized
as an example of the narrow, “shareholder value maximization” view of corporate
purpose, it is a better example of the fiduciary duty owed to minority shareholders. See
M. Todd Henderson, The Story of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company: Everything Old Is
New Again, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 37 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009).
377 No sooner was the River Rouge plant constructed than Henry Ford turned
his attention to other matters, including the construction of Greenfield Village. The first
theme park of its day, Greenfield Village was a paean to the type of American village life
that manufacturing processes and products such as Ford’s had largely brought to an end.
American Experience: Henry Ford (PBS television broadcast Jan. 29, 2013).
378 Henderson, supra note 376, at 56.
379 This professed enthusiasm on the part of the Dodge Brothers is portrayed
(perhaps in an exaggerated manner) in a contemporary television commercial
commemorating the centennial of Dodge Motors. See Dodge Motor Co., 2015 Dodge Charger
Commercial Dodge Brothers: John v. Horace (Oct. 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=Oicu39lda0E [http://perma.cc/2GYD-6RU2].
380 See Judd F. Sneirson, The Sustainable Corporation and Shareholder
Profits, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 541 (2011).
381 See AMITAIETZIONI,MYBROTHER’SKEEPER: AMEMOIR ANDAMESSAGE (2003).
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The modern counterpart to Ford-style corporate
communitarianism may be Google. Employing an unofficial motto,
“Don’t Be Evil,”Google’s management has claimed that it aspires
to make Google an institution that makes the world a better place. In
pursuing this goal, we will always be mindful of our responsibilities to
our shareholders, employees, customers and business partners.382
Our goal is to develop services that significantly improve the lives of
as many people as possible. In pursuing this goal, we may do things
that we believe have a positive impact on the world, even if the near
term financial returns are not obvious.383
Elements of Google’s “Don’t Be Evil” ethos can be found in
the Founders’ Letter accompanying its 2004 initial public offering
and a Code of Conduct384 to which all Google employees are
obligated to subscribe and follow. To a great extent, the Code
reiterates principles that all corporations and their employees are
obliged to follow: obeying the law, avoiding conflicts of interest,
protecting corporate secrets. But the Founders’ Letter and Code of
Conduct aspire to something greater than mere adherence to the
law and generally accepted duties. Google’s founders are explicit
about seeking long-term growth and profitability rather than
short-term gain, even if it adversely affects the corporation’s
balance sheet or profits—and therefore shareholder value—in the
short term.385 They profess a desire to make Google a force for
382 2004 Founders’ IPO Letter, GOOGLE, https://investor.google.com/corporate/2004/
ipo-founders-letter.html [http://perma.cc/W6M6-4F9L] (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
383 Id.
384 Investor Relations, GOOGLE, http://investor.google.com/corporate/code-of-
conduct.html [http://perma.cc/R4HB-CGUQ] (last visited June 7, 2016).
385
As a private company, we have concentrated on the long term, and this has
served us well. As a public company, we will do the same. In our opinion,
outside pressures too often tempt companies to sacrifice long term
opportunities to meet quarterly market expectations. Sometimes this
pressure has caused companies to manipulate financial results in order to
“make their quarter.” . . . A management team distracted by a series of short
term targets is as pointless as a dieter stepping on a scale every half hour.
2004 Founders’ IPO Letter, supra note 382, at 2-3. The IPO established two classes of
stock—one with far more voting power than the other—to give the founders ongoing
control and make the corporation a less attractive hostile takeover target, thereby
avoiding some of the dilemmas identified by Colin Mayer in Firm Commitment. Mayer
posits that the increased market for “corporate control”—mergers, acquisitions, and
hostile takeovers—impedes the ability of corporations to serve as “commitment
devices,” institutions that provide the self-restraint necessary for individuals to reach
long-term goals by eroding trust in corporate ability to serve shareholder values. The
solution, according to Mayer, is not a return to family ownership, but rather
appointment of managers “whose interests are in the long-term success of the
corporation.” MAYER, supra note 351, at 112, 151-52.
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good, largely through variations on its initial function of providing
access to information.386 And they announce the formation of a
foundation, “ambitiously applying innovation and significant
resources to the largest of the world’s problems” and employing
“employee time and approximately 1% of Google’s equity and
profits” to that end.387
These are lofty aspirations, and to Google’s critics388 that is
all they are. Some detractors suggest that Google, through its
alleged theft of intellectual property, its quasi-monopolistic efforts
to dominate the information search industry, its collection of data
on millions (perhaps billions) of people and businesses, and its use
of this data to inflict targeted advertising on most anyone in
possession of a computer, is the very essence of evil.389 But we are
386 “We aspire to make Google an institution that makes the world a better
place. In pursuing this goal, we will always be mindful of our responsibilities to our
shareholders, employees, customers and business partners. With our products, Google
connects people and information all around the world for free.” 2004 Founders’ IPO
Letter, supra note 382, at 10.
387 Id.
388 See, e.g., Joshua Topolsky, Maybe It’s Time for Google to Rethink Its ‘Don’t
Be Evil’ Motto, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-01
-25/business/35439271_1_search-product-google-search-search-feature [http://perma.cc/
UA6H-EL3G]; Christopher Zara, Google Kills Reader, Force-Feeds Us Google+: Don’t Be
Evil?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2013, 12:31 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/google-kills-
reader-force-feeds-us-google-dont-be-evil-1127159# [http://perma.cc/Q6ZS-KCUD]; Tom
Watson, Google’s Strange Attack on Bloggers and the Public Internet: The Massive Reaction
to Reader Shutdown, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2013, 10:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
tomwatson/2013/03/13/googles-strange-attack-on-bloggers-and-the-public-internet-the-
massive-reaction-to-reader-shutdown/ [http://perma.cc/B5KZ-Y8G4].
389 One of your authors used Bing to search “Google is evil” and found, for
example, Steve Tobak, Why Google Really is Evil, FOX BUS. (Jan. 17, 2014),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/2014/01/17/why-google-really-is-evil/ [http://perma.cc
/UJ82-ZX67] (alleging Google’s theft of the iPhone and tablet concepts from Apple,
suggesting that the company has a “Big Brother” mentality with respect to privacy, and
concluding that “the very idea of a company that behaves the way Google does knowing
everything about me makes the hairs stand up on the back of my neck”); Ira Israel, Why
Google Is Evil, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7 2013, 12:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
ira-israel/why-google-is-evil_b_3716786.html [http://perma.cc/CVR8-YLHH] (complaining
about Google’s poor customer service, arguably a product of its domination of the search
market); Ian Bogost, What is ‘Evil’ to Google, ATLANTIC (Oct. 15, 2013), http://
theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/what-is-evil-to-google/280573 [http://perma.cc/
XLG3-ZQM7] (claiming that “Google’s motto seems to have largely succeeded at
reframing ‘evil’ to exclude all actions performed by Google,” suggesting that Google
defines evil as anything inimical to Google’s idea of progress, and stating, “All companies,
particularly public ones, exist to maximize their own benefit,” and “Google never claimed
otherwise; even in 2004 ‘Don’t be evil’ mostly clarified that the company wouldn’t sprint
to short-term gains”); Rory O’Connor, Google Is Evil, WIRED (June 12, 2012, 8:02 PM),
http://www.wired.com/2012/06/opinion-google-is-evil/ [http://perma.cc/9YT7-7CXH] (claiming
that Google’s “Street View cars surreptitiously collected private internet communications,”
and asking, “Who gave these new media companies the right to invade our privacy
without our permission or knowledge and then secretly store the data until they can
figure out how to profit from it in the future?”). Recently, Google’s parent, Alphabet, Inc.,
became the world’s most valuable company. Jack Clark & Adam Satariano, Google Parent
Overtakes Apple as World’s Most Valuable Company, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 1, 2016),
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not willing to accept that, because Henry Ford, Google, and for
that matter, Hobby Lobby, have all been accused of excessive zeal
in pursuit of their objectives, one must accept the contractarian
argument that corporation managers should pursue profit and
profit alone.
C. Corporations and Social Capital
One thing Google professes to do is to create social capital,
largely by connecting people to information and, indirectly, to
other people. In his acclaimed book, Bowling Alone, Robert
Putnam distinguishes between bonding social capital (i.e.,
connections within groups) and bridging social capital (i.e.,
connections between different groups).390 He observes that
bridging social capital is most likely to be created where bonding
social capital is strong.391 The ethos that creates the raison d’etre
for a corporation—be it the building of automobiles (Ford), the
connection of people to information (Google), the construction of
lawn furniture (Conestoga), or even the desire to convey a political
message (Citizens United)—creates bonds inside the corporation,
where investors, managers, and workers engage in a common
effort to create a product or provide a service.392 That same ethos
creates bridging social capital in two forms: (1) between people
bringing different skills, backgrounds, cultures, and beliefs into
the corporation, and (2) between those inside the corporation and
those outside of it who are the consumers of its products or
services. Even Conestoga—a seemingly homogeneous collection of
people possessing similar skills and common ethnicity and
professing a single religious belief—creates bridging social capital
when it reaches out to the rest of the world (or at least
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-02/google-parent-to-overtake-apple-as-
world-s-most-valuable-company [http://perma.cc/3L5F-K4T9].
390 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 22 (2000) (“Of all the dimensions along which forms of social
capital vary, perhaps the most important is the distinction between bridging (or
inclusive) and bonding (or exclusive). Some forms of social capital are, by choice or
necessity, inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous
groups. Examples of bonding social capital include ethnic fraternal organizations,
church-based women’s reading groups, and fashionable country clubs. Other networks
are outward looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages. Examples of
bridging social capital include the civil rights movement, many youth service groups,
and ecumenical religious organizations.” (footnote omitted)).
391 Id. at 23-25.
392 The historic clash between labor and management tells us that labor and
capital do not always blend seamlessly. But most modern business corporations (Ford
being a good example) now recognize that the interests of labor, management, and
investors are most often reconcilable and even overlapping, if not identical.
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neighboring communities), advertises its products, and sells them
to purchasers of different professions, ethnicities, and religious
backgrounds.393 And bridging social capital is presumably what
Citizens United hoped to create when it tried to persuade the
electorate that Hillary Clinton would be unsuitable for the
presidency. About three decades earlier, Ronald Reagan won the
presidency—and started what some would call a revolution394—
not by courting just Republicans, but by winning over millions of
“Reagan Democrats.”395 The point of marketing, including political
marketing, is getting the world to beat a path to your door.
There is, to be sure, a downside to this. Putnam warns
that bonding social capital can create a sense of insularity and
strong out-group antagonisms.396 Indeed, the current extreme
political partisanship we lament may be an unhealthy
manifestation of this phenomenon. But groups that cultivate out-
group antagonisms (be they the Ku Klux Klan or the American
Nazi Party) are unlikely to thrive for long either in the economic
marketplace or the marketplace of ideas. Corporations, especially
those formed for profit, operate at their peril if they try to be
exclusionary.397 To employ Putnam’s language, a corporation may
393 One need not share the Hahns’ religious beliefs to appreciate their
craftsmanship. Disclosure: About 20 years ago, one of the authors purchased a set of
lawn furniture from Conestoga; he continues to enjoy the furniture today.
394 Others might call it a counter-revolution. Thomas Piketty connects the
electoral victories of Britain’s Margaret Thatcher (1979) and the United States’ Ronald
Reagan (1980) to the growth of capital’s share of the income split between labor and
capital. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 42 (2014).
395 STANLEYB. GREENBERG, MIDDLECLASSDREAMS: THE POLITICS AND POWER OF
THE NEW AMERICAN MAJORITY 39-40 (1996). Greenberg spent most of his prolific career
studying the middle-class residents of Macomb County, Michigan, who abandoned their
traditionally strong Democratic views and overwhelmingly supported Ronald Reagan in the
1980s. According to Greenberg, the Reagan Democrats arose out of a deep-seated fear
among white, blue-collar workers that the Democratic Party was no longer a champion of
working class dreams; rather, their party now sought to benefit only the very poor, the
unemployed, and minorities. Reagan, in contrast, was credited with ushering in a new
period of economic growth and held similar views on issues such as pornography, crime, and
taxes. See also William Schneider, The New Shape of American Politics, ATLANTIC (Jan.
1987), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1987/01/the-new-shape-of-american-pol
itics/303363/ [http://perma.cc/JZX6-7JZU] (commenting on Reagan’s ability to unite
disparate interests into new political coalitions).
396 PUTNAM, supra note 390, at 23.
397 Snob appeal may be an advertising ploy, but it is designed to make
everyday folks feel as if they are something special if they purchase the advertiser’s
product or service. See Marie D. Smith, Decoding Victoria’s Secret: The Marketing of
Sexual Beauty and Ambivalence, 25 STUD. IN POPULAR CULTURE 39, 40 (2002)
(concluding that the popular women’s lingerie brand appeals to women and men alike
via a marketing scheme that employs “the snob appeal of European luxury” combined
with sexualized ambivalence to convey the message that women who wear its products
are more desirable). Even many formerly exclusive private clubs now seek to expand
their membership, reaching out to previously excluded groups as a survival strategy.
See Britt Peterson, Private Social Clubs Try to Delay Their Doom, WASHINGTONIAN
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function as a centripetal force serving the predilections of its
members, or as a centrifugal force, sending its energy outward
and forging connections.398
D. Citizens United and Communitarianism
At first blush, there is much reason to criticize Citizens
United from a communitarian perspective. In Citizens United, a
statute enacted by a democratically elected legislature “in
response to a virtual mountain of research”399 as part of a “delicate
and interconnected regulatory scheme”400 designed to level the
playing field and promote fair elections, was struck down in favor
of a corporation’s “right” to influence elections on a par with flesh-
and-blood individuals. Many communitarians, subscribing to
Amitai Etzioni’s proposed moratorium on the minting of new
rights401 and aware of the need for carefully calibrated regulations
to balance rights with responsibilities, would regard the decision
as a step backward. The Court elevated the right of a private,
discrete entity (i.e., a corporation or union) over a broad-based
endeavor—promoted by politicians as conservative as Republican
Senator John McCain and as liberal as his Democratic
counterpart, Russell Feingold—to provide for balanced elections
and assure a democratic future for the nation. The Citizens
United majority rejected a product of the political process in favor
of radical libertarian individualism.402 It also rejected centuries of
legal tradition in which corporations had been treated as a hybrid
legal entity, sometimes possessing human characteristics but
more often treated as something less than a fully incarnate legal
being, a history noted in Justice Stevens’s dissent.403
(Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.washingtonian.com/blogs/capitalcomment/private-social-
clubs-are-doomed.php [http://perma.cc/9UDK-KTGK] (commenting on strategies employed
by previously exclusive Washington, D.C., social clubs to maintain membership in
troubled economic times, including a “half-price-beer-and-burger night” designed to
attract younger crowds).
398 ROBERT D. PUTNAM& LEWISM. FELDSTEIN, BETTER TOGETHER: RESTORING
THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 255 (2003).
399 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 400 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
400 Id. at 412 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,
172 (2003)).
401 ETZIONI, supra note 339, at 4.
402 See Steven L. Winter, John Roberts’s Formalist Nightmare, 63 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 549, 557-58 (2009).
403 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 394-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Cole,
Reexamining the Collective Entity Doctrine, supra note 37, at 77-84 (discussing the rise
of new forms of business entities, such as limited liability companies and limited
liability partnerships that blur the traditional distinctions between individual and
group business activities).
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Citizens United has been attacked for equating
corporations with people and for equating money with speech (i.e.,
as a commodification of rights).404 These criticisms fall somewhat
wide of the mark. We have discussed earlier how Buckley and
Bellotti had previously broached the “money equals speech”
boundary.405 Citizens United leaves intact restrictions on
corporate campaign contributions,406 as distinguished from direct
corporate expenditures. And while Justice Kennedy’s language
regarding corporate free speech rights is more sweeping than it
need be,407 it is unnecessary to equate corporate First Amendment
rights with those of natural persons to recognize that there is
value in allowing people to use a corporate vehicle to pool their
resources and express their political views.
More to the point, Citizens United is an example of the
Roberts Court’s excessive formalism. The opinion makes much of
constitutional principle, but it largely ignores empirical data and
social context408 and is lacking in broad constitutional vision.409 It
404 See, e.g., Allman, supra note 94, at 403-06; Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom
of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2668 (2008) (“Corporations are not
human beings. They only have the qualities and the rights given to them by law, no more,
no less.”); Lydia Saad, Public Agrees with Court: Campaign Money Is “Free Speech,” GALLUP
(Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/125333/public-agrees-court-campaign-money-
free-speech.aspx [http://perma.cc/52RB-ASRL].
405 See supra Part I.
406 “Citizens United has not made direct contributions to candidates, and it
has not suggested that the Court should reconsider whether contribution limits should
be subjected to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359;
see also Jason S. Campbell, Down the Rabbit Hole with Citizens United: Are Bans on
Corporate Direct Campaign Contributions Still Constitutional?, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
171, 174 (2011) (“[C]itizens United does not reach the question of the constitutionality
of the ban [on direct corporate expenditures].”); Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact
of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217 (2010) (explaining how neither First
Amendment concern applies to campaign contributions, as this type of expense has
“limited inherent speech content” and has a “greater perceived relationship to
misconduct”). In a subsequent case, however, the Court did strike down limitations on
aggregate contributions by an individual to congressional campaigns. McCutcheon v.
FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014).
407 “The Court operates with a sledge hammer rather than a scalpel when it
strikes down one of Congress’ most significant efforts to regulate the role that
corporations and unions play in electoral politics. It compounds the offense by
implicitly striking down a great many state laws as well.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
399 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
408 At one point, the Court declared, quite disingenuously, “[W]e now conclude
that independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to
corruption or the appearance of corruption.” Id. at 357. Witness, for example, some $6
million in recent “independent” expenditures by the Koch Brothers to defeat Michigan
Senate candidate Gary Peters, who had the temerity to object to a huge petroleum coke
pile positioned by a Koch-related business alongside the Detroit River in Southwest
Detroit, polluting the air and water. Greg Sargent, When the Koch Brothers Become a
Liability for Republicans, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/plum-line/wp/2014/08/07/when-the-koch-brothers-become-a-liability-for-republicans/
[http://perma.cc/5LGN-7N5V]; see also Manu Raju, Senate Battle in Michigan, POLITICO
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has been justifiably criticized for elevating “assertion over
tradition, absolutism over empiricism, [and] rhetoric over
reality.”410 In so doing, it elevates the rights of an individual entity
(a corporation or union) over the general welfare, striking down
an act of Congress that came into law with bipartisan support.411
That enactment, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, was
designed to address the perceived evils inherent in the private
financing of elections, evils addressed in the Communitarian
Platform as follows:
Campaign contributions to members of Congress and state legislatures,
speaking fees, and bribes have become so pervasive that in many areas
of public policy and on numerous occasions the public interest is ignored
as legislators pay off their debts to special interests . . . . It is said that
giving money to politicians is a form of democratic participation. In fact,
the rich can “participate” in this way so much more effectively than the
poor, that the democratic principle of one-person one-vote is severely
compromised . . . . [T]hose who cannot grease [Congress] at all or not as
well, lose out and so do long-run public goals that are not underwritten
by any particular interest groups.412
Of course, not all statutes can be defended on
communitarian grounds simply because (by definition) they are
the product of a democratically elected legislature. McCain-
Feingold’s limitations on corporate speech could be viewed as
having the purpose and effect of narrowing political participation.
But that is true only in a formalistic sense (particularly given the
availability of corporate and union PACs); the real-world effect of
the Citizens United decision was to allow the economically well-
endowed to wield disproportionate influence over elections,
(Feb. 20, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://politi.co/1fjdleW [http://perma.cc/LP4Y-VPGL]; How to
Blow a Right-Wing Billionaire’s Money, WILL BUNNETT (Sept. 30, 2014),
http://willbunnett.com/how-to-blow-a-right-wing-billionaires-money/ [http://perma.cc/MS5L-
2JPE] (Disclosure: One of the authors is acquainted with Peters and was a minor
contributor to his campaign.). And the Court expresses the shockingly naive view that
“[t]here is . . . little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders “through
the procedures of corporate democracy.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361-62 (quoting
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
409 See Winter, Citizens Disunited, supra note 94, at 1135 (“Yet, while the
Court’s opinion in Citizens United is long on free speech rhetoric, it is painfully short
on empirical data, social context, and constitutional vision.”).
410 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 478-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
411 Add to that Strine and Walter’s observation that Citizens United is not
even consistent with an originalist interpretation of the Constitution. See supra note
236 and accompanying text.
412 ETZIONI, supra note 339. The platform’s language focuses on campaign
contributions, not independent expenditures. But it is naive to assume that politicians
are unaware of the identity of those individuals and entities that support their
campaigns and causes through “independent” expenditures. Id.
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producing undemocratic results.413 By stating that the avoidance
of quid pro quo influence buying is the only legitimate basis for
statutory restraints on corporate political contributions, the Court
ignored the deleterious effects of vast sums of money, amassed
through corporate capital concentration, on the political system
(the “antidistortion rationale”).414 Supporters of the decision would
nonetheless say that the First Amendment requires that the
electorate, and not the courts, be credited with the ability to
discriminate between the speech it chooses to heed and that
which it prefers to ignore.415
1. The Communitarian Side of Citizens United
There is, indeed, a communitarian side to Citizens United
that is suggested by the very form of the corporation or union.
Community is not always embodied in the form of government. As
we have discussed earlier, intermediate communities—religious
413 Strine and Walter have argued that this disproportionate influence
is likely as a general matter to make candidates of all persuasions more beholden
to corporate desires . . . . [T]his will increase the danger of externality risk,
because corporate expenditures will be made with the singular objective of
stockholder profit in mind, and therefore will be likely to favor policies that leave
the corporation with the profits from their operations, while shifting the cost of
these operations (including . . . excessive risk taking or safety shortcuts) to others.
Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 383.
414 In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), the
Court, in upholding a Michigan ban on corporate expenditures in support or opposition
of candidates for political office, recognized “the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s
political ideas.” Id. at 660. Austin was derided in the Citizens United majority opinion,
and particularly in Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion. Citizens United, 558
U.S. at 351-52 (noting that Austin’s antidistortion rationale allows for the “dangerous,
and unacceptable, consequence that Congress could ban political speech of media
corporations” and “wealthy media corporations could have their voices diminished to
put them on par with other media entities”); id. at 354 (“Austin interferes with the
‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First Amendment.” (quoting New York
State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008))); see also id. at 381
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“The First Amendment theory underlying Austin’s holding
is extraordinarily broad. Austin’s logic would authorize government prohibition of
political speech by a category of speakers in the name of equality—a point that most
scholars acknowledge . . . .”). But Strine and Walter have pointed out that “because the
for-profit corporation has been so successful as a means to generate wealth, the means
at its disposal will be huge. Even before McCain-Feingold was struck down by Citizens
United, corporate political spending far exceeded that of labor or other interest groups.
After Citizens United, that imbalance grew.” Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 384
(footnote omitted). Professor Coates regards Citizens United as a step in a “corporate
takeover of the First Amendment [that] represents a pure redistribution of power over
law with no efficiency gain.” John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech and the First
Amendment: History, Data, and Implications, supra note 119, at 265.
415 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371; see Garden, supra note 5, at 29.
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organizations, nonprofit organizations, political clubs, civic
improvement associations, bowling leagues (what we call “civil
society”)—play an important role in knitting together community
and building social capital.416 Corporations and labor unions may
be seen as vehicles through which people with common values or
objectives organize themselves to have an impact on the world.417
Whether that impact is largely economic, as in the case of most
business organizations, social, as in the case of many nonprofit
corporations, or political, as in the case of the Citizens United
organization, we ought not delegitimize such efforts. In fact,
communitarians are generally supportive of such organizations.418
“Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of
disposition are forever forming associations,” Alexis de
Tocqueville famously wrote.419 Professor Margaret Blair has more
recently observed,
Historically, the use of the corporate form for business activity
developed first as a mechanism to enable groups of people to combine,
invest, and preserve capital to provide a needed product or service to a
community—be it churches, colleges, bridges, canals, etc.—and to
provide a governance structure for that committed capital.420
In this sense, the Citizens United decision might be viewed not
as a triumph of radical libertarian individualism, but as an
assertion of the rights of the collective, as expressed through an
intermediate community (i.e., the corporation or union).421
Citizens United indeed expands the rights of unions, and
in his acclaimed work, Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam extols the
role of unions in the building of social capital.422 Indeed, we can
416 PUTNAM, supra note 390, at 22; ROBERT F. COCHRAN JR. & ROBERT M.
ACKERMAN, LAW AND COMMUNITY: THE CASE OF TORTS 5 (2004).
417 PUTNAM, supra note 390, at 49.
418 Communitarians would differentiate groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan or
Nazi Party, that create bonding social capital (i.e., strong ties within groups) but evince
strong out-group antagonisms and deplore bridging social capital (ties between groups).
Most corporations (business and nonprofit) and unions have more inclusive goals. See
id. The organization Citizens United, as much as it deplored Hillary Clinton, sought to
engage other people in the political spectrum and bring them to its side.
419 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 485 (Jacob Peter Mayer
& Max Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., 1966).
420 Margaret M. Blair, Boards of Directors as Mediating Hierarchs, 38
SEATTLEU. L. REV. 297, 298 (2015).
421 Those who value the free speech rights of dissenting corporate
shareholders and union members might point out that the collective opinions of the
majority of shareholders and members could have been expressed through the use of
corporate and union PACs, rather than by use of corporate or union treasuries.
422 Unions provide “an important locus of social solidarity, a mechanism for
mutual assistance and shared experience.” PUTNAM, supra note 390, at 80. Putnam
notes, “[w]ork-related organizations, both unions and business and professional
organizations, have traditionally been among the most common forms of civic
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see a direct correlation between the demise of labor unions and
the growing income disparities that not only challenge our notions
of equality, but also the very foundations of American
democracy.423 Those who would eviscerate unions because they
submerge the identity of the individual to the collective424 ignore
the reality that it is only through the collective raising of voices
that some people are heard at all.
2. The Court’s Selective Deference to the Entity
Oddly, however, the Supreme Court has acted recently to
muffle the collective voices of trade unions even as it seemingly
extended their First Amendment rights in Citizens United. While
the Court gave short shrift to the rights of dissenters in the
corporate context in Citizens United (assuring us that “corporate
democracy” would sufficiently protect their interests425) and to
individual corporate employees in Hobby Lobby (subordinating
their statutory right to health care and their constitutionally
protected procreative rights), it has been especially deferential to
dissenters’ rights in a union context.426 In a recent article,
Professor Catherine L. Fisk and Dean Erwin Chemerinsky noted
that in Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local
1000,427 the Court recently held “that a union may make a special
assessment to support political activities only if employees first opt
in, and suggest[ed] that it is poised to require opt in for other union
expenditures.”428 As a result, “[a]nti-union employees in unionized
workplaces thus enjoy a right to refuse to subsidize organizational
political activity that no shareholder or corporate employee enjoys
and that no nonprofit association member enjoys.”429
The problem was exacerbated in Harris v. Quinn,430
announced on the same day as Hobby Lobby. In that case, the
Court held that the collection of agency fees (paid by nonunion
connectedness in America,” and concludes that in measures of social capital
involvement in such organizations is “an important ledger.” Id.
423 An influential writer on contemporary economics has observed that
“minimum pay can be markedly lower in sectors that are relatively underregulated or
underunionized.” PIKETTY, supra note 394, at 310-11.
424 See, e.g., Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014); infra notes 431-32 and
accompanying text.
425 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361-62 (2010) (quoting First Nat’l
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
426 Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 65, at 1026.
427 Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
428 Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 65, at 1026.
429 Id.
430 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
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employees in lieu of union dues, so as to avoid financing the
union’s political activities) violated dissenting workers’ First
Amendment rights.431 Thus, in both Citizens United and Hobby
Lobby, the Court upheld the rights of the collective (the
corporation) over those of its individual constituents (i.e., the
corporation’s dissenting shareholders and employees), while in
Knox and Harris, the Court upheld the rights of dissenting
employees over a collective entity (the union) democratically
chosen to represent them.432
3. The Corporation as an Instrument of Free Speech
Given the cost of “publication” in modern media, freedom
of expression often requires concerted action.433 While the Internet
makes instant publishers of us all (or almost all, in light of the
digital divide), there are very few individuals who, acting alone,
could have funded production and distribution of the movie
(Hillary) that Citizens United produced.434 Many of the same
431 The plaintiffs were employed as home-care personal assistants who were
hired by the recipients of care but whose salaries were paid by the state. While highly
critical of its prior decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977)
(upholding “fair share” agency shop provisions in public employee collective bargaining
agreements), the Court, in an opinion by Justice Alito, stopped just short of
overturning Abood, finding that the Harris plaintiffs were not public employees in the
strict sense. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2644. Justice Kagan, dissenting, found this to be a
distinction without a difference. Id. at 2645 (Kagan, J., dissenting). We quite agree.
The decision has the potential of turning so-called right-to-work laws into a
constitutional mandate and undermining labor unions that would be disabled from
collecting even an agency fee from individuals whom they remained legally required to
represent in collective bargaining and grievance procedures. It is one of the most
anticommunitarian decisions of a Court that has all too often elevated claims of
individual rights over the general welfare. The Court was invited to overturn Abood
entirely in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, 135 S. Ct. 2933 (2015). The
Court’s 4-4 tie in that case (almost certainly a consequence of Justice Scalia’s death
earlier in the term) left Abood in place, averting a calamity for public sector unions and
affording communitarians a momentary sigh of relief.
432 This mirrors the inconsistency we have earlier noted in connection with
the Court’s Fifth Amendment corporate jurisprudence. See supra Part I.
433 During the most recent election cycle, much attention was focused on
wealthy individuals like the Koch brothers and Sheldon Adelson, who alone bankrolled
a few political campaigns. So who is the antidemocratic culprit here? The corporate or
union vehicle of group effort or (to borrow a phrase from Theodore Roosevelt) the lone
“malefactor of great wealth”? President Theodore Roosevelt, Address on the Occasion of
the Laying of the Corner Stone of the Pilgrim Memorial Monument (Aug. 20, 1907),
https://www.archive.org/stream/addressofpreside00roo/addressofpreside00roo_djvu.txt
[http://perma.cc/L3VR-KHU3].
434 The Koch brothers, frequently derided by liberals, are individuals with the
financial wherewithal to do so. That they sometimes choose do so through a corporate
mechanism owes more to disclosure issues than the inherent evil of the corporate form.
And Citizens United leaves intact the disclosure requirements of the challenged statute
(Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 315, 319 (2010)), notwithstanding Justice
Thomas’s spirited partial dissent. Id. at 480 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
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people who have derided Citizens United justifiably applauded
the Court’s 1964 decision in New York Times v. Sullivan,435
holding that the New York Times Corporation enjoyed First
Amendment protection when sued by a public official for allegedly
defamatory speech.436 Why should that same protection not apply
where a corporation wishes to influence an election through
production and distribution of a motion picture, as in Citizens
United? As Professor Joel Gora said in defense of the Citizens
United decision, “First Amendment rights should be unified,
universal, and indivisible.”437 While Professor Gora’s statement
may be somewhat overdrawn and formalistic—much as the
majority opinion in Citizens United—we cannot discriminate
between those organized speakers we like and those we disdain.
Just as we were compelled to accept Nazis marching through
Skokie, we cannot treat Citizens United or the Koch brothers any
differently than the New York Times and Ralph Abernathy and
his associates.438
Indeed, the Communitarian Platform recognizes the
organizing role of corporations and labor unions as intermediate
communities, asking “how ‘private governments,’ whether
corporations, labor unions, or voluntary associations, can become
more responsive to their members and to the needs of the
community.”439 The platform’s call is for responsibility, not
435 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
436 We have, in the past, criticized the concept of “mediaocracy,” through
which media organizations would enjoy special First Amendment privileges. One of us
declared, years ago, “Clearly, you and I should have the right to discuss on the street
corner in the afternoon what The New York Times has published on its front page that
morning.” Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to Defamation Law Through
Uniform Legislation: The Search for an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C. L. REV. 291, 303
(1994). Should any less protection be accorded a nonmedia corporate speaker? The
Citizens United opinion emphatically says no:
The law’s exception for media corporations is, on its own terms, all but an
admission of the invalidity of the antidistortion rationale. And the exemption
results in a further, separate reason for finding this law invalid: Again by its
own terms, the law exempts some corporations but covers others, even
though both have the need or the motive to communicate their views.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352.
437 Gora, supra note 94, at 939.
438 The Reverend Ralph Abernathy, Martin Luther King’s deputy in the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, was the principal defendant in Abernathy
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 967 (1964), the companion case to New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964). Abernathy had joined with several other prominent civil rights
advocates in placing the advertisement in the New York Times that gave rise to this
precedent-setting case.
439 The Responsive Communitarian Platform, COLUMBIAN COLL. OF ARTS &
SCIS., http://communitariannetwork.org/platform [http://perma.cc/3ST5-NST3] (last
visited June 7, 2016).
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censorship. Responsibility may be provided for by requiring
greater accountability on the part of corporations and unions (e.g.,
by requiring disclosure of the major contributors to the corporate
effort and the recipients of the corporation’s or union’s largess), as
we suggest below.440 Citizens United’s preservation of the statutory
disclaimer and disclosure requirements is an acknowledgment of
the importance and constitutional legitimacy of accountability.441
Indeed, more comprehensive statutory disclosure requirements
would advance communitarian norms and free speech rights; by
identifying the true sources of speech, they would edify a public
whose access to information and ideas is often cited as the major
justification for First Amendment speech rights.442
Democratic institutions and the community at large
benefit from encouraging corporations and other intermediate
associations to engage in a variety of behaviors, not by narrowly
circumscribing the range of permissible behaviors. Even when a
corporation, in its charter or bylaws, does not explicitly embrace
activities other than profit maximization, the default premise
should be that these activities are not only constitutionally
permissible, but socially desirable. Communitarian principles
would have us seek a proper balance such that the collective voice
may be heard without placing a corporate stranglehold on
political discourse.
E. Hobby Lobby as Communitarian Tract . . . Not
It is more difficult to conjure up a communitarian silver
lining around the cloud that is Hobby Lobby. Granted, Hobby
Lobby and Conestoga, like Google, may be regarded as
corporations that place principle (in this case, religious principle)
over profit and hew to an ethos other than profit maximization.
But notwithstanding Justice Alito’s effort to portray the
corporation as an embodiment of the efforts and aspirations of its
constituent parts, his opinion in Hobby Lobby fails as a
communitarian text. It rejects the efforts of Congress and a
government agency to adopt rules to provide health care coverage
440 See infra text accompanying notes 494-512.
441 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370-71; see also id. at 483-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
442
When Government seeks to use its full power, including the criminal law, to
command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted
source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought. This is
unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.
Id. at 356, 371; see also Garden, supra note 5, at 29.
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to a broad array of Americans (including constitutionally
protected health measures)443 while taking pains to carve out
carefully tailored exceptions for religious organizations (as
distinguished from corporations with religiously committed
owners). Some would say that religious liberty requires that
owners of closely held corporations be allowed to exercise their
beliefs through those corporations, even if it means treading on
access to health care for corporate employees or imposing the
burden of paying for that health care on the taxpaying citizenry.
But most communitarians would characterize such a construction
of RFRA as a radical libertarian view that advances the rights of
the few at a cost to the many. Communitarianism calls for finer
tuning and greater subtlety, not the analytical meat cleaver
wielded by the Supreme Court’s majority.
One could argue that the Hobby Lobby decision, by
allowing a closely held corporation to be guided by the religious
precepts of its owners, has allowed the corporation a conscience
that would otherwise be lacking apart from the sentiments of its
owners.444 But the majority in Hobby Lobby completely ignores
the rights and interests of every corporate constituency except the
owners. Neither the employees’ own religious beliefs nor their
access to health care counts for much in the face of the owners’
religious imperatives. To the extent that employee access to
contraception is given any regard, the majority appears confident
that it is a burden that the government (i.e., the taxpayers),
rather than the corporation, can assume. Thus, all needs and
interests apart from those of the owners are externalized. The
corporation owes nothing to anyone, except those who have an
ownership interest. Any communitarian purpose served by the
collective attributes of the corporation is ignored.
Finally, Hobby Lobby focuses myopically on the corporate
owners’ rights but says nothing of their responsibilities. The
owners are allowed to avail themselves of the corporate form (such
as perpetual existence and limitations on liability), but are relieved
of its burdens, shedding the corporate veil only when it suits
443 See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Planned Parenthood Assoc. of Kansas City v.
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
444 Professor Robert F. Cochran has argued, “Religious people should enter the
business square and bring their values with them and their religious values should be
protected. In my view, they will provide much more public benefit as a result of following
their values than any public benefits that might come from placing limitations on their
activities.” Email from Robert F. Cochran to Robert M. Ackerman, July 17, 2015 (on file
with author).
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them.445 And they exercise their personal rights at a cost to their
employees and the American taxpayers. Hobby Lobby, perhaps
more so than any other case, reminds us of Etzioni’s admonition
that “each newly minted right generates a claim on someone.”446
F. The Problem for Communitarians: Rights Without
Responsibilities
The problem for communitarians, then, is not in a refusal
to recognize the utility of corporations. The problem for
communitarians arises when, through rent-seeking conduct,
corporations obtain the rights of natural persons without assuming
commensurate responsibilities. The result is an asymmetrical
distortion of rights and political power and a lack of accountability.
Even as they advocated for principles embracing
shareholder profit maximization as the sole function of the
corporation, conservatives and contractarians recognized that
external regulation of corporate behavior would be necessary to
curb corporate rapaciousness.447 But, as Strine and Walter have
noted, the Citizens United decision disturbed the delicate
mechanism for external regulation that previously served as such a
check, and replaced it with . . . nothing. Corporations previously
limited in their political activities and regulated in matters such as
employment practices and environmental control could now employ
their wealth to tilt the political playing field and advocate (with
increasing success) for the lifting of constraints on their behavior.448
Long before cases such as Citizens United and Hobby
Lobby, it was feared that the corporation was a Frankenstein
monster, and a disembodied one at that.449 Writing in another
era of economic displacement caused in part by corporate
overreaching, John Steinbeck placed the following words in the
mouths of bank representatives foreclosing on farmland:
We’re sorry. It’s not us. It’s the monster. The bank isn’t like a man.
Yes, but the bank is only made of men [replied the tenant farmers].
445 It is fair to acknowledge that corporate owners may have the burden of double
taxation (in the absence of a Subchapter S corporation or a corporate “inversion”).
446 ETZIONI, supra note 339, at 5-6.
447 Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Responsibility and Economic Efficiency, 21 PUB.
POL’Y 303 (1973); Donald J. Kochan; Corporate Social Responsibility in a Remedy-
Seeking Society: A Public Choice Perspective, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 413, 427 (2014);
STEPHENM. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 425 (2002).
448 Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 383.
449 Edward, 1st Baron Thurlow, English jurist and Lord Chancellor (1731-1803).
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No, you’re wrong there—quite wrong there. The bank is something else
than men. It happens that every man in a bank hates what the bank
does, and yet the bank does it. The bank is something more than men, I
tell you. It’s the monster. Men made it, but they can’t control it.450
Justice Alito would have it both ways, if one takes his
Hobby Lobby opinion seriously. He agrees with Steinbeck’s tenant
farmers that the corporation is only made of men (and women).
But he refuses to hold these men and women responsible for
anyone but themselves. To paraphrase Hovenkamp, the
American corporation has become a person but has lost its soul.451
We believe that if corporations are to be endowed with human
qualities and human rights, those qualities should include due
regard for those who (along with shareholders) are affected by
corporate conduct. Along with rights come responsibilities.
Neither presumed shareholder greed nor owners’ personal
convictions can be all-controlling.
IV. TAMING THEMONSTER BYMAKING CORPORATIONSMORE
COMMUNITARIAN
In his fine book, Firm Commitment, Colin Mayer recognizes
the need to curb corporations as they engage in rent-seeking
conduct. Says Mayer, “What have been progressively extinguished
from the corporation are its values beyond its value to
shareholders.”452 Mayer advocates for a diverse mix of management
structures and corporate philosophies to curb harmful
tendencies.453 Under the traditional view of corporate law,
corporate greed and government regulation were seen as point and
counterpoint, thesis and antithesis, yin and yang. Citizens United
and Hobby Lobby have upset this balance. Our communitarian
view therefore calls upon corporations to take on the responsibility
of self-regulation by recognizing a broader array of corporate
objectives. In light of the Supreme Court’s personification of
corporations, we see a need for at least two measures to embed a
human conscience inside the brain of the corporate Frankenstein
monster: effective “other constituency” statutes and compulsory
disclosure to shareholders of political expenditures.
450 JOHNSTEINBECK, THEGRAPESOFWRATH 33 (Steinbeck Centennial ed. 2002).
451 HOVENKAMP, supra note 360, at 16.
452 MAYER, supra note 351, at 240.
453 Id. at 187-90.
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A. The Need for Action at the State Level
In Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, the Roberts Court
changed the law to make for-profit business corporations more
like “real people.” Many “real people” do not agree with these
changes to the law, but it appears unlikely that Congress (to the
extent it can or is even inclined) or the Supreme Court (to the
extent it might reverse itself) will act to change the law back to
what it was before those cases were decided.454 Recognizing that
change is unlikely at the federal level, we believe that meaningful
change nevertheless can be attained at the state level—if state
legislatures are willing to make modest adjustments to their
disclosure and corporate law statutes. By requiring disclosure of
independent political expenditures by corporations and adopting
mandatory constituency statutes for business corporations, state
legislatures can help ensure that for-profit corporations exercise
the new rights conferred on them by Citizens United and Hobby
Lobby in ways that are both more transparent to all those affected
by corporate actions and more responsible to broader societal
interests. In other words, if the Supreme Court is going to treat
corporations more like people, the states should make corporate
governance law more communitarian and corporate political
spending more transparent.
1. “Other Constituency” Statutes: A Communitarian
Wedge in the Shareholder Primacy Wall
As we have discussed previously, traditional American
corporate law has been dominated by the principle of shareholder
primacy (i.e., that corporate boards of directors could lawfully act
only if their action conferred some benefit—direct or indirect,
short-term or long-term—on the shareholders who owned the
corporation).455 Advocates of constituency statutes envision
broader responsibilities for the corporation as a legal “person”
with societal obligations that extend beyond merely maximizing
shareholder wealth.456 Constituency statutes are controversial457
454 Justice Scalia’s recent passing might, however, put this issue back in play,
depending on the choice of his successor. The doctrine of stare decisis looms strong, however.
455 For a discussion of the debate surrounding shareholder primacy, see supra
note 360 and accompanying text.
456 See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
457 See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 16-17 (1992) (referring to “the
unusually passionate debate over the proper interpretation of corporate constituency
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and remain an unsettled area of corporate law,458 but the
Supreme Court’s Citizens United and Hobby Lobby decisions
necessitate a fresh look at these measures, suggesting this
question: Do constituency statutes provide a bridge between the
newly recognized constitutional and statutory rights of
corporations to engage in political spending and religious activities
that the Citizens United and Hobby Lobby cases bestowed on
business corporations and the shareholder wealth maximization
principle that corporate law has for almost a century stubbornly
refused to surrender?
Although the genesis of constituency statutes was as an
antitakeover measure,459 their conceptual underpinnings stem
from “stakeholder” management theories460 and the classic debate
over corporate social responsibility between contractarians and
communitarians.461 Accordingly, even though constituency statutes
were conceived as antitakeover legislation, in most instances their
application is not confined to takeover situations.462 A principled
statutes” and characterizing the ABA Report as “the best-known and most trenchant
attack” on constituency statutes).
458 See PRINCIPLES OFCORPORATEGOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS ANDRECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.01(a) cmt. a, at 53 (AM. LAW INST. 1994) (“Present law on the matters within the scope of
§ 2.01 cannot be stated with precision, because the case law is evolving and not entirely
harmonious, while the statutes cover only some of the relevant issues and leave open
significant questions even as to the issues they do cover.”).
459 See ABA Report, supra note 360, at 2253 (“Other constituency statutes
have typically been adopted as one measure, among others, designed to assist directors
in forestalling unwanted takeovers.”); Bratton, supra note 370, at 1466-67 (stating that
constituency statutes originated as “interest group legislation” designed to protect
managers defending against hostile takeovers by allowing them to consider constituent
interests to justify their actions); cf. Orts, supra note 457, at 25-26 (“Legislative history
in Pennsylvania, the first state to adopt a constituency statute, confirms that
politically diverse coalitions commonly supported antitakeover statutes, even though
particular native corporations threatened by takeovers usually initiated the legislation.
The Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce sponsored the original bill, and Scott Paper
Company, which at the time faced a hostile acquisition attempt from a Canadian-based
firm, strongly supported it. In addition, a proxy battle at the time pitted T. Boone
Pickens and Mesa Petroleum Co. against Pittsburgh-based Gulf Oil Corp. Although
state legislators were aware of the two contests for control, they appear not to have
voted for the statute purely at the behest of the two targets. On the contrary, the
evidence demonstrates significant involvement of labor interests and other
considerations. Whatever the precise configurations of the various political coalitions
responsible for constituency statutes, one aspect of the birth of the statutes is
undisputed: an antitakeover motive. As one Pennsylvania legislator stated, ‘I am not
naive. . . . I also know this bill will probably have a chilling effect on adverse corporate
takeovers.’ On the antitakeover birth of constituency statutes, commentators agree.”
(footnotes omitted)).
460 Orts, supra note 457, at 20.
461 Id. at 21-22 (observing that constituency statutes pose the same issues as
the debate between Professors Berle and Dodd over whether corporations owe a duty to
society beyond the interests of shareholders).
462 See Wallman, supra note 362, app. A, at 194 (summarizing state
constituency statutes as of 1991); Millon, Communitarians, supra note 356, at 1376.
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analysis must account for some underlying substance to the
statutes; they cannot be justified merely as pretext to ward off
hostile takeovers. The statutes differ from state to state, but a
common element is that they “purport to allow directors of public
corporations to consider an expanded group of ‘interests’ when
making decisions on behalf of the corporation.”463 The “interests”
that the statutes allow directors to consider extend beyond those
of the corporation’s shareholders and most often include
“corporate employees, suppliers, and customers, as well as the
communities in which the corporation does business.”464 Directors’
consideration of these “other constituencies” is not mandatory,465
however, and some states’ statutes explicitly provide that
directors are not required “to afford any particular weight to any
of the specified factors or interests defined under the statutes”—
thereby avoiding the risk of suits by nonshareholder constituency
groups.466 Proponents of constituency statutes believe that the
legislation rightly recognizes the “profound effect” modern
corporations have “on the lives of a variety of groups not
traditionally within the corporate law structure.”467 Viewed “in
this light,” they argue, “constituency statutes provide a basis for
Surveying the range of corporate constituency statutes in 1992, Professor Orts identified
two common variations in constituency statutes across states, “opt-in” provisions and
provisions applying to director decisions involving corporate control. See also Orts, supra
note 457, at 30-31 (explaining that states with “opt in” statutes allow corporations to
adopt charter amendments recognizing constituency interests, but if a corporation does
not amend its charter, the statute does not apply). As of 2011, 30 states had enacted some
form of constituency statute. McCall, supra note 265, at 563 & n.274.
463 See Orts, supra note 457, at 26.
464 Id. at 26-27.
465 Connecticut was the exception in initially enacting a statute that made
directors’ consideration of other constituencies mandatory in takeover situations, but in
2010, the Connecticut legislature amended the statute to change the language of the
operative provision from requiring that directors of publicly traded companies in takeover
situations “shall consider” the interests of other constituencies to providing that public
company directors “may consider” the interests of other constituencies if they wish to do
so. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d) (West 2014) (providing that “a director of a
corporation which has a class of voting stock registered pursuant to Section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . may consider, in determining what he reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, (1) the long-term as well as the
short-term interests of the corporation, (2) the interests of the shareholders, long-term as
well as short-term, including the possibility that those interests may be best served by
the continued independence of the corporation, (3) the interests of the corporation’s
employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, and (4) community and societal
considerations including those of any community in which any office or other facility of
the corporation is located”). The Connecticut statute also provides that a public company
director in a takeover situation “may also in his discretion consider any other factors he
reasonably considers appropriate in determining what he reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation.” See id.
466 Orts, supra note 457, at 29-30.
467 SeeMitchell, supra note 367, at 584.
998 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:3
reallocating those costs among all constituent classes that directly
or indirectly benefit from fiduciary rules.”468
By injecting new political participation and religious
exercise rights into the debate, the Supreme Court’s Citizens
United and Hobby Lobby decisions necessitate reexamination not
only of constituency statutes, but also of the fundamental debate
between the contractarian shareholder wealth maximization
doctrine and the competing communitarian approach to corporate
governance and corporate social responsibility. We believe—and
Professors Coates, Kesten, and Yosifon, as well as Chief Justice
Strine, apparently all agree—that Citizens United has
undermined the conceptual foundation of the conservative,
corporate law shareholder wealth maximization model by
exposing the political system to a new risk of regulatory capture
by corporate interests.469 This flaw is sometimes called the
“externality risk” problem.470 The best way to alleviate this risk is
to change the core principle that drives it, the shareholder wealth
maximization imperative, and we believe that the most realistic
available way to accomplish that objective is with the enactment
of mandatory constituency statutes by the states.
2. A Proposal for Mandatory State Constituency Statutes
We can draw upon a prior legislative example to illustrate
our proposal for mandatory constituency statutes. In 1994,
Connecticut enacted a new Business Corporation Act that, among
other things, included various provisions regulating mergers and
468 Id. at 585; see alsoMillon, Communitarians, supra note 356, at 1378-79 (noting
that communitarians view corporate law as necessary to confront the negative impacts a
corporation can have on nonshareholder constituencies); Tara J. Radin, Stakeholders and
Sustainability: An Argument for Responsible Corporate Decision-Making, 31 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 363, 406 (2007) (arguing that a corporation has an obligation to act
responsibly because it “can and does affect the lives of others”).
469 See Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 342 (stating that Citizens United
“undermines conservative corporate theory’s reliance upon the regulatory process as an
adequate safeguard against corporate overreaching for non-stockholder constituencies
and society generally”); see also Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem, supra note 10, at
1198; Kesten, supra note 92, at 505-07.
470
After Citizens United, the very success of the corporate form as a wealth-
generating tool is in tension with conservative corporate theory because if the
wealth impounded in corporations can be used in unlimited amounts to
influence who is elected to the offices that determine the ‘rules of the game,’
the range of policy options is likely to move in a direction where there is
greater danger of externality risk.
Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 342 (emphasis added).
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acquisitions of Connecticut corporations.471 Section 100 of that act
defined the duties of directors, including a fairly standard
recitation of the duty of care.472 Subsection 100(d) of the
legislation, however, contained a provision that was then and has
since remained unique in the annals of American corporate law: a
mandatory corporate constituency statute.473 The operative
language required that a director
shall consider, in determining what he reasonably believes to be in
the best interests of the corporation, (1) the long-term as well as the
short-term interests of the corporation, (2) the interests of the
shareholders, long-term as well as short-term, including the
possibility that those interests may be best served by the continued
independence of the corporation, (3) the interests of the corporation’s
employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, and (4) community
and societal considerations including those of any community in
which any office or other facility of the corporation is located. A
director may also in his discretion consider any other factors he
reasonably considers appropriate in determining what he reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.474
By using the mandatory “shall” rather than the discretionary
“may” found in other state constituency statutes,475 the
Connecticut statute as enacted in 1994 imposed an affirmative
obligation on directors to consider the nonshareholder
constituencies that are identified in the statute.
In 2010,476 the Connecticut legislature amended
Connecticut’s constituency statute to bring it into alignment with
those of other states, changing the word “shall” to “may” and
thereby making the statute discretionary rather than
mandatory.477 The reason offered for the change was that, as the
471 See 1994 Conn. Legis. Serv. 94-186 (West).
472 See id. § 100(a) (“A director shall discharge his duties as a director,
including his duties as a member of a committee: (1) In good faith; (2) with the care an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances; and (3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation.”).
473 See id. § 100(d).
474 Id. (emphasis added).
475 See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715 (2015) (providing that directors, in
discharging their duties, “may, in considering the best interests of the corporation,
consider to the extent they deem appropriate” the effect of their actions on groups other
than shareholders, including “employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of the
corporation, and upon communities in which offices or other establishments of the
corporation are located” (emphasis added)); McCall, supra note 265, at 563 n.276.
476 Ironically, the statute’s amendment took place in the February 2010
Regular Session of the Connecticut state legislature, immediately after the Supreme
Court decided Citizens United in January 2010, but we are not aware of any connection
between the two events.
477 See 2010 Conn. Legis. Serv. 10-35 (West); McCall, supra note 265, at 563 n.276
(describing the legislative history of the change of the word “shall” to “may” in 2010).
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only state with a mandatory constituency statute, Connecticut
was imposing a burden on corporate directors that directors in
other states did not face.478 Whatever the merits of that argument
at the time, the recent (and growing) recognition of the potential
pernicious impact of Citizens United and Hobby Lobby on
corporate constituencies other than shareholders justifies a
reexamination of the merits of mandatory constituency statutes
by state legislatures. If, as commentators are increasingly
recognizing, the corporate political spending permitted by Citizens
United (and, as we believe, the corporate religious expression
permitted by Hobby Lobby) presents a risk of harm to “non-
stockholder constituencies and society generally,”479 then it seems
to us to make eminent sense that state legislatures should act to
minimize that risk by imposing an affirmative duty on corporate
directors to consider the effects of their actions on those
constituencies and society at large.
Furthermore, we suggest going beyond the scope of the
original Connecticut mandatory constituency statute as enacted
in 1994. The 1994 Connecticut statute is most frequently
referenced in passing as the only mandatory state constituency
statute, with no further examination of its provisions and
application. What is seldom mentioned is that, by its terms, the
1994 Connecticut statute applied only to directors of publicly
traded companies480 and to certain director actions relating to
acquisitions or mergers of public companies incorporated in
Connecticut.481 These limitations made sense for a statute enacted
478 See also McCall, supra note 265, at 563 n.276 (“In 2010, the legislature,
noticing that changes to the statute would ‘make Connecticut more attractive for public
corporations considering whether to organize under Connecticut Law . . . . Connecticut
is the only state that requires rather than permits directors to consider . . . other
constituencies . . . [which] imposes a burden on directors of Connecticut corporations
that directors of corporations . . . under other state laws do not face.’” (quoting CONN. J.
FAV. COMM. REP., H.B. 5530, AN ACT CONCERNING THE CONNECTICUT BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACT (2010))).
479 See Strine & Walter, supra note 64, at 342.
480 See 1994 Conn. Legis. Serv. 94-186 (West) (limiting application of the
mandatory constituency provision to directors of companies with a class of voting stock
registered pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); see also McCall, supra
note 265, at 563 n.276 (referencing “public corporations” in describing the 2010
amendment of the Connecticut statute). The constituency statutes of other states are
not limited in application to directors of public companies. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1715 (2015).
481 See 1994 Conn. Legis. Serv. 94-186 (limiting application of the mandatory
constituency provision to director actions pertaining to sections 134, 139, 140, 142, and 145
of the new act, provisions that would make it more difficult to implement a change in control
of a Connecticut public company). The constituency statutes of most other states are not
limited in application to directors’ decisions concerning takeover attempts (although, as
discussed supra in note 462, it is widely recognized that constituency statutes were initially
conceived as an antitakeover measure). See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715 (2015)
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as part of a comprehensive revamping of a state’s corporate code
that obviously was intended to make takeovers of Connecticut
public companies more difficult for “corporate raiders” that might
then close plants and fire employees within the state. In fact,
viewed in this light, the mandatory provision of the 1994
constituency statute also makes sense, as a discretionary
provision would have provided less protection against unwelcome
acquisitions of Connecticut companies.482 We think that the risks
to other constituencies posed by Citizens United and Hobby Lobby
justify the enactment of new mandatory constituency statutes by
state legislatures, but these new statutes should not be limited in
application to publicly traded companies or to director decisions
relating to takeover attempts.
Instead, we propose that state legislatures respond to
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby by enacting mandatory
constituency statutes that will apply to all corporations
incorporated in their state—whether public, private, or closely
held.483 As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her Hobby Lobby
dissent, privately held companies can be huge, with billions of
dollars in assets and thousands of employees.484 Those companies
obviously present the same externality risks as large public
companies, so they too should be subject to the mandatory
constituency statutes that we propose. As to closely held
companies, the Hobby Lobby case itself illustrates how even small
companies like Conestoga and Mardel485 can adopt policies that
(applying to action by boards, directors, and board committees “[i]n discharging the duties of
their respective positions”).
482 We are aware, of course, that Delaware law had essentially followed the
opposite course, with no constituency statute and cases like Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), Grand Metropolitan Public
Limited Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 588 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988), and their progeny
requiring that directors give precedence to the short-term financial interests of
corporate shareholders in change-of-control situations. Connecticut was not alone in
taking a different approach in 1994 with its mandatory constituency statute, one that
sought to protect the interests of constituencies other than shareholders in change-of-
control situations. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715 (commentary) (rejecting
Delaware approach).
483 For a description of the differences between publicly traded companies,
privately held companies, and closely held companies, see supra note 263 and
accompanying text.
484 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797 n.19 (2014)
(discussing Cargill, Inc., which is this country’s largest privately held company, and the
candy and confections giant, Mars, Inc.).
485 As explained in notes 260-61, supra, we question whether Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., is in fact a closely held corporation, rather than (as we believe may be the
case) a privately held corporation with nonvoting common shareholders. Conestoga and
Mardel, however, are closely held companies, and even though the dollar amounts at
stake may be smaller, the holding in Hobby Lobby resulted in shifting health care costs
from those companies to the federal government. Subsequent cases may involve other
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may harm the interests of their employees and other constituent
groups. These groups are no less entitled to protection because
the stock of the companies for which they work is not publicly
traded, even if it is closely held.
Moreover, the application of mandatory constituency
statutes should not be limited to decisions relating to takeover
attempts or any other circumscribed area of corporate activity;
they should apply to all actions and decisions of corporate
directors that the business judgment rule has historically
protected.486 Otherwise, employees, creditors, and other
nonshareholder constituency groups have no legal protection if
corporations engage in political spending or adopt religiously
motivated policies that harm their interests (or the interests of
the general public). To address this problem, we believe that state
legislatures should adopt mandatory constituency statutes,
applicable to all companies incorporated in their state, to ensure
that corporate directors consider the impact on all affected
constituencies before they decide to engage in corporate political
spending or set corporate policies based upon religious beliefs.487
“sincerely held religious beliefs” asserted by closely held corporations, which now must
be recognized under Hobby Lobby, that will harm employees, customers, or other
constituencies of those companies. Without a mandatory constituency statute the
directors of those companies have no legal duty to consider the harm to those
constituencies when making decisions.
486 For an alternative methodology to determine which decisions should be
governed by a mandatory constituency statute, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board
of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 13 (2002) (describing the
“existence of a boundary within which the firm’s decision maker [(the board of
directors)] has power to exercise fiat”).
487 We recognize that present case law applying corporate constituency
statutes does not assure that nonshareholder constituencies would have standing to
sue under a mandatory constituency statute. See Charles Hansen, Other Constituency
Statutes: A Search for Perspective, 46 BUS. LAW. (ABA) 1355, 1375 (1991) (concluding
that Connecticut’s mandatory constituency statute arguably provided stakeholders
standing to sue corporate directors); Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency
Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 108 (“Although
only four states specify that [nonshareholders] lack enforceable rights, in all other
states, consideration of constituent interests is discretionary, and it is unlikely that
courts would imply standing under a discretionary statute.” (footnote omitted)). This is
not surprising, of course, as Connecticut is the only state ever to adopt a mandatory
constituency statute, and no cases were decided during the time that statute was in
effect addressing the standing issue for nonshareholder constituencies. Cf. In re Picard,
339 Bankr. 542, 552 n.8 (Conn. Bankr. 2006) (citing a 1909 Connecticut case, but not
referencing the Connecticut mandatory constituency statute then in effect, for the
proposition that “[s]ince 1909, Connecticut courts have recognized that at times a
director of a corporation may assume fiduciary duties to other persons beyond the
corporation and its shareholders” (citing Baldwin v. Wolff, 74 A. 948 (1909)); Thames
River Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo, 720 A.2d 242, 253 (Conn. App. 1998) (holding that a
director of a corporation occupies a fiduciary relationship to both the corporation and
its stockholders and has a duty to act in good faith). We do not, however, see this
uncertainty as a crippling impediment to the efficacy of a mandatory constituency
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We expect that this proposal will be met with heated
objections. Staunch defenders of shareholder primacy will argue
that this kind of constituency statute will leave corporate boards
in an untenable position of having to weigh the interests of, and
choose among, diverse corporate constituencies without any
guidance as to priorities, where the shareholder primacy rule
provides boards with clear guidance as to which interest must
prevail in corporate decisionmaking. While perhaps superficially
appealing, we think that this argument is overblown and ignores
both (1) the important effect of Citizens United and Hobby Lobby
on the shareholder primacy model and (2) the fact that the states
already differ markedly in the extent to which boards can weigh
the interests of constituency groups other than shareholders.
Delaware has no constituency statute and in general requires
boards to maximize shareholder financial interests when making
decisions.488 Pennsylvania and other states have discretionary
constituency statutes that permit boards, if they wish to do so, to
take into account the interests of other constituencies without
“regard[ing] any corporate interest or the interests of any
particular group affected by such action as a dominant or
controlling interest or factor”—both in takeover situations and
otherwise.489 If state corporate law regimes with this degree of
variation can coexist in our legal system, we do not see why those
state legislatures that choose to do so cannot go a step further by
enacting mandatory constituency statutes.490
We cannot respond fully to all anticipated objections to
our mandatory constituency statutes proposal in this already-
too-lengthy article. We would like to note briefly, however, one
additional important reason we believe that continued knee-
statute, because we expect that in cases where a corporation engages in aberrant
political spending or adopts religiously motivated policies that harm corporate
constituencies, at least some shareholders will object and would have standing to bring
suit claiming that the corporation’s directors had not complied with the mandatory
constituency statute.
488 SeeMcCall, supra note 265, at 563 & n.275.
489 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715 (2015). The commentary to the
Pennsylvania constituency statute makes clear that the Pennsylvania legislature
rejected the Delaware approach that “the current or short-term interests of
shareholders overwhelm the interests of the corporation or of all other corporate
constituencies in a possible change-of-control context or any other context, or that
directors are required to maximize current share value at any particular time.” Id. at
1990 committee cmt. (emphasis added).
490 We do not view the 2010 repeal of the mandatory provision of Connecticut’s
constituency statute, see supra note 465 and accompanying text, as undercutting our
argument for mandatory constituency statutes in any way. All the developments
described in this article have occurred since Connecticut changed its law, and the
gravity and import of those developments are more than adequate reason for state
legislatures to reconsider the merits of a mandatory constituency statute.
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jerk obeisance to the shareholder primacy model is misplaced
after Citizens United and Hobby Lobby. As discussed above, the
business judgment rule is the linchpin that supports American
corporate law. Integral to the business judgment rule is the
requirement that in taking a corporate action a director
“rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best
interests of the corporation.”491 The other two requirements for
business judgment rule protection are that the director is
informed and “is not interested in the subject of the business
judgment” (which means the director’s decision is not based on
self-interest or any other conflict of interest).492
The holdings of Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, if left
unchecked, threaten to eviscerate the business judgment rule. If
corporate managers are given unfettered latitude to make
“business” decisions based upon their personal religious beliefs, as
an expansive interpretation of Hobby Lobby would permit, then
the business judgment rule requirements of acting disinterestedly
and in the best interests of the corporation have effectively been
discarded. Similarly, Citizens United gives corporations a new
constitutional right to spend shareholders’ money for political
purposes, and shareholders are left with the heavy burden of
proving that such expenditures are not in the best interests of the
corporation or are not disinterested.493 Corporate expenditures of
this nature were not permitted in the decades during which the
business judgment rule evolved, and the business judgment rule is
simply not up to the task of constraining this new constitutionally
protected corporate conduct. For this reason alone, mandatory
constituency statutes that require directors to weigh carefully and
be responsible for the effects of their actions on all corporate
constituencies are essential in the strange new corporate law
world that Citizens United andHobby Lobby have created.
3. A Proposal for Enhanced State Law Disclosure
Requirements
As in the case of mandatory constituency statutes, we
have legislative precedent to draw on in advocating for enhanced
disclosure requirements at the state level. A Maryland law
491 See PRINCIPLES OFCORPORATEGOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS ANDRECOMMENDATIONS
§ 4.01(c), at 133 (AM. LAW INST. 1994).
492 See id.
493 See id. § 4.01(d), at 133 (“A person challenging the conduct of a director or
officer under this Section has the burden of proving a breach of the duty of care,
including inapplicability of [the business judgment rule] . . . .”).
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requiring reporting of independent expenditures took effect
January 1, 2015.494 The law requires reporting of independent
political expenditures in excess of $10,000 in any four-year
Maryland election cycle.495 It is noteworthy that the Maryland
independent expenditure reporting requirement applies to
corporations,496 but what is most significant is a provision in the
Maryland law that requires corporations to make the required
independent expenditures report available to shareholders on the
corporation’s website within 24 hours after the report is made
public and keep the information available on the website until the
end of the election cycle in which the independent expenditure
report was filed.497
So far as we are aware, Maryland is to date the only state
that has responded to Citizens United by enacting an enhanced
independent expenditure disclosure statute that requires
corporations to inform their shareholders (and when disclosed on
a corporation’s website, also the general public) of the
corporation’s independent political expenditures.498 We believe
that this is an important innovation in election law generally and
especially for enhancing the transparency of corporate political
spending post–Citizens United. While it may be theoretically
possible for corporate shareholders to piece together the political-
spending activities of a corporation in which they own shares by
searching state and federal499 websites and databases by company
name, the difficulty of that task and the lack of uniform reporting
494 See MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 13-306 (West 2015). The law also
required reporting of electioneering communications. See id. § 13-307.
495 See id. § 13-306; see also ROBERT M. STERN, CORPORATE REFORM COALITION,
SUNLIGHT STATE BY STATE AFTER CITIZENS UNITED 18 (2012), https://www.citizen.org/
documents/sunlight-state-by-state-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/HGT7-RYUB] (summarizing
Maryland law).
496 See MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 13-306 (“‘Person’ includes an individual,
a partnership, a committee, an association, a corporation, a labor organization, or any
other organization or group of persons.”); see also id. § 13-306(a)(5)(ii) (providing that a
“[p]erson” as defined above “does not include a campaign finance entity organized”
under Maryland law).
497 See id. § 13-306(j). If the corporation does not maintain a website, the same
information must be disclosed to shareholders in the regular periodic report for the
time period in which the disclosure obligation takes effect. See id. The same disclosure
requirements are imposed for electioneering communications by corporations. See id.
§ 13-307(j).
498 Cf. STERN, supra note 495, at 1 (describing the Maryland law as among the
“most creative provisions adopted by the states” after Citizens United and the only one
to “require that shareholders be informed of corporate political spending directly”).
499 As of the time of this writing, the FEC was still in the process of
implementing federal independent expenditure reporting requirements for corporations
and labor unions. See Independent Expenditures and Electioneering Communications
by Corporations and Labor Association, 79 Fed. Reg. 62,797 (Oct. 21, 2014) (to be
codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 104 and 114).
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requirements among the states500 make it unlikely that many
shareholders could successfully determine the amount and extent
of their company’s independent political expenditures. And even
when that might be done, the effort required is so burdensome
that it is likely to deter all but the most determined shareholders
from obtaining the information.501 A state law that makes this
information directly available to shareholders and imposes an
affirmative duty on corporations to post the information on their
websites represents a major step forward in transparency of
corporate political activity.502 There should be no doubt, even
post–Citizens United, that states have the authority to require
this reporting of corporate independent expenditures in state
elections, as Maryland has done, under the states’ general
election law regulation powers.
500 Cf. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATES’ INDEPENDENT
EXPENDITURE REPORTING 2014 (2014), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/
2014_Independent_Expenditures_Chart.pdf [http://perma.cc/ME5L-VWCN] (summarizing
themany different state reporting requirements for independent expenditures as of July 2014).
501 Shareholders are not the only constituency that will want access to information
about corporate political spending. Institutional investors such as state retirement funds
will also want access to information about political spending by corporations in which they
invest. For example, in 2013, the New York State Common Retirement Fund (the third
largest institutional investor in the nation, with over $150 billion of assets under
management) filed a “books and records” lawsuit in Delaware against Qualcomm, Inc.,
seeking access to information about Qualcomm’s political spending. See New York State
Common Ret. Fund v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 8170-CS (Del. Ch. Jan. 2, 2013). The lawsuit
stated that the fund was seeking “to determine whether Qualcomm’s political expenditures
have been consistent with the objective of enhancing stockholder value, rather than simply
furthering the particular political beliefs and causes of Qualcomm’s board members or
senior management.” See id. at 4. The lawsuit was settled the following month when
Qualcomm agreed to implement a new disclosure policy to “provide stockholders with
comprehensive information regarding its corporate political spending.” See Press Release,
N.Y. State Comptroller, Qualcomm Implements Industry-Leading Political Spending
Disclosure Policy; DiNapoli Commends Action (Feb. 22, 2013), http://osc.state.ny.us/press/
releases/feb13/022213.htm [http://perma.cc/U74G-XWCK]. Later in 2013, the New York
State Comptroller issued a press release praising Qualcomm for achieving the highest score
among publicly traded companies in the United States in a national ranking of public
accountability and disclosure. See Press Release, N.Y. State Comptroller, DiNapoli
Statement on Qualcomm Leading CPA-Zicklin Index of Corporate Political Spending
Disclosure (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/sept13/092513a.htm
[http://perma.cc/KHA3-8SQU].
502 Furthermore, it is not clear that all large corporations would oppose a state
law requirement for greater transparency in reporting of political expenditures. The
Complaint in the New York Common Retirement Fund’s lawsuit against Qualcomm,
Inc., alleged that “dozens of major public companies . . . voluntarily disclose their use of
corporate funds for political purposes.” See New York State Common Ret. Fund, No.
8170-CS, at 2 & app. A. We would hope that most responsible companies would
recognize the benefits of the greater transparency afforded by voluntarily disclosing
their political spending on their company websites, and we note that such disclosure
would be consistent with the call for “prompt disclosure” of corporate political spending
in the Supreme Court’s Citizens United majority opinion. Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310, 370-72 (2010); see also infra note 505 and accompanying text (quoting the
Citizens United majority opinion).
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While we applaud what Maryland has done, we believe
that state legislatures should go further if they wish to protect the
integrity of the political process now that Citizens United has
given corporations a constitutional right to make unlimited
independent political expenditures. We suggest that state
legislatures consider enacting new disclosure statutes, modeled
on the Maryland statute described above, but extending their
reach to require direct reporting to corporate shareholders of all
independent expenditures within that state in any state or federal
election.503 In other words, if a corporation wishes to spend its
shareholders’ money on independent political expenditures in a
state, then that state should require the corporation to disclose
the spending to its shareholders—whether or not the corporation
is incorporated in that state or the expenditures are intended to
influence state or federal elections.
We expect this proposal will encounter significant
resistance—from First Amendment absolutists who will argue
that it burdens constitutionally protected corporate speech, from
division of powers purists who will argue that it violates
preemption doctrine under the Supremacy Clause, from corporate
law traditionalists who will argue that it goes beyond the power of
states to regulate the internal affairs of “foreign” corporations
that are incorporated in another state, and probably from others
whose arguments in opposition we have not anticipated. While all
these expected attacks raise legitimate legal issues, we think that
the better interpretation of the law is that the kind of state
statute we propose is constitutional and within the legitimate
regulatory power of the states. Each of these issues could in itself
comprise a lengthy law review article—and we welcome that kind
of thorough analysis and criticism in response to our proposal—
503 We recognize, of course, that this proposal would not capture corporate
funding of “dark money” political spending by nonprofit organizations within a state,
because even if state or federal law requires disclosure of political expenditures by
nonprofit organizations, nonprofit organizations are not required under current law to
disclose the identity of their contributors, whether individuals or corporations. Similarly,
our proposal would not cover corporate-funded Super PAC spending within a state. While
we applaud efforts to propose comprehensive political spending disclosure regimes (see,
for example, JOHN WONDERLICH, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION, A COMPREHENSIVE
DISCLOSURE REGIME IN THE WAKE OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN CITIZENS
UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, http://assets.sunlightfoundation.com/pdf/
policy/sunlightfoundation_policy_citizens_united.pdf [http://perma.cc/KHP2-TTJV] (last
visited June 7, 2016)), as of yet neither federal nor state lawmakers have been willing to
enact such regimes. We offer a more modest and we hope more politically attainable
proposal, but as with our other proposals, we welcome suggestions to build upon or
supplement our proposed state law disclosure requirement to achieve more complete
transparency and greater accountability for corporate political spending.
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but here we limit ourselves to a brief rebuttal of the principal
opposition arguments that we anticipate.
a. A State Disclosure Law Should Survive a First
Amendment Challenge
First, a state law requiring only disclosure of corporate
independent political expenditures should not run afoul of the
First Amendment. Since Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court
has consistently recognized that disclosure can reduce the risk
of corruption in the political system,504 and the Citizens United
majority opinion itself contains a ringing endorsement of the
benefits of “prompt disclosure” of corporate expenditures.
With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can
provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold
corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and
supporters. Shareholders can determine whether their corporation’s
political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making profits, and
citizens can see whether elected officials are “‘in the pocket’ of so-called
money interests.” The First Amendment protects political speech; and
disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of
corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the
electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to
different speakers and messages.505
As this quote should make clear, calling for state statutes that
require disclosure of all corporate independent political
expenditures, directly to shareholders and by means of the
Internet whenever possible, is exactly what the Citizens United
majority opinion anticipated would follow in the wake of its
holding; therefore, those state statutes should withstand First
Amendment challenges. Moreover, the Citizens United majority
opinion recognized that “disclosure is a less restrictive alternative
to more comprehensive regulations of speech.”506
504 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976).
505 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370-71 (emphasis added) (citations omitted)
(quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 259 (2003)). We note that the portion of this
quote we have italicized suggests that the majority in Citizens United expected that
corporations would engage in political expenditures to “advance[ ] the corporation’s
interest in making profits,” thus explicitly inviting the dangers to the traditional model
of corporate governance that have been identified by Professors Yosifon and Kesten,
see supra, Section II.A.1, and by Delaware Chief Justice Leo Strine and Nicholas
Walter, see supra, Part IV, which our proposal for mandatory constituency statutes
attempts to address in Part V, infra.
506 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369. Citizens Unitedmade clear that disclosure
requirements “‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities’ and ‘do not prevent anyone
from speaking’” and therefore are subject to “exacting scrutiny” (not the strict scrutiny
applicable to laws burdening political speech), which requires only a “substantial relation”
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b. A State Disclosure Law Should Survive a Preemption
Challenge
The state disclosure statutes we propose should also
survive a preemption challenge. While the Federal Election
Campaign Act does contain an express preemption provision,507
the FEC has promulgated a regulation that defines more
precisely the reach of the preemption by listing the three areas
where federal law supersedes state law: “(1) [o]rganization and
registration of political committees supporting Federal candidates;
(2) [d]isclosure of receipts and expenditures by Federal candidates
and political committees; and (3) [l]imitation on contributions and
expenditures regarding Federal candidates and political
committees.”508 Disclosure of independent expenditures, whether
made by individuals, corporations, or other groups or entities, does
not come within any these three areas, although we acknowledge
that it also does not come within the areas of state law that the
regulation identifies as not preempted by federal law,509 and
therefore the regulation on its face does not conclusively dispose
of the issue. We note two reasons, however, why the regulation
supports our view that the state disclosure statutes we are
suggesting should not be preempted. First, although Citizens
United dramatically changed federal election law by permitting
independent expenditures by corporations, independent
expenditures by individuals were permitted prior to Citizens
United, and the preemption regulation, which has been in place
since 1980, has never treated disclosure of individual independent
expenditures as preempted by federal law. If disclosure of
independent expenditures by individuals is not preempted, it is
between the disclosure requirement and a “sufficiently important” governmental interest.
See id. at 366 (citation omitted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976); McConnell
v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003)). “[A] governmental interest in ‘providing the electorate with
information’ about the sources of election-related spending” can satisfy this requirement.
See id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66). Accordingly, we believe that the enhanced
disclosure requirement that we propose should survive post–Citizens United First
Amendment scrutiny. Cf. Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576, 598-99
(8th Cir. 2013) (holding unconstitutional under the First Amendment an Iowa disclosure
requirement providing that “after a group makes a single independent expenditure, it must
continually disclose funds it raises over $1,000—regardless of the group’s purpose, and
regardless of whether it ever uses those funds to make an independent expenditure”
(emphasis added)); Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864,
876-77 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding unconstitutional a Minnesota statute’s corporate
independent expenditure “ongoing reporting requirement,” but suggesting that initial
reporting requirement is constitutional).
507 52 U.S.C. § 30143 (2012).
508 See 11 C.F.R. § 108.7(b) (2014).
509 See id. § 108.7(c).
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difficult to see why disclosure of corporate independent
expenditures should be treated differently. To the contrary, in fact,
the language of the Citizens United majority opinion quoted above
suggests that such state disclosure requirements should be
permitted. That is our second, and we believe most powerful,
argument against interpreting the regulation in favor of
preemption—the Citizens United majority clearly preferred more
disclosure of independent expenditures, not less.
c. States Have Authority to Regulate Activity of “Foreign”
Corporations Within Their Borders
Finally, as to the argument that states lack the regulatory
authority to require “foreign” corporations (those that are
incorporated in other states) to disclose independent political
expenditures, that argument would have merit only if a state
sought to regulate activity outside its borders. So long as the
activity that is subject to the disclosure requirement—here,
spending money to influence an election (whether state or
federal)—occurs within a state’s borders, the state has authority
to require disclosure of that activity. In fact, the disclosure
requirements we propose are much less burdensome than almost
all the regulatory requirements that are routinely imposed on
foreign corporations doing business within a state—environmental
regulations, labor and employment relations, health and safety
regulations, etc.510 In short, if a corporation chooses to spend money
in a state to influence the outcome of an election, that state
should have the power to require disclosure of that spending,
particularly since the Supreme Court has expressed strong
support for disclosure of political spending.
For all these reasons, we believe that states should
consider following the model provided by the Maryland statute,
but expanding it to encompass independent expenditures in both
state and federal elections and requiring corporations to disclose
that spending promptly and directly to their shareholders.
Statutes imposing this disclosure requirement will increase
transparency and reduce the possibility of corruption in the
510 Certainly a state may regulate all manner of corporate activities inside
that state. For example, a state or local zoning regulation regarding the placement of
billboards would be upheld so long as it does not impose too great a burden on speech.
See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Daniel R. Mandelker, The Free
Speech Revolution in Land Use Control, 60 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 51 (1984).
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political process, while staying within the vision of political
expression set out by the majority opinion in Citizens United.511
B. How Constituency Statutes and Disclosure Statutes May
Work Together to Promote a Race to the Top
Our proposals for mandatory constituency statutes and
increased political spending disclosure at the state level are both
complementary and mutually reinforcing. For all the reasons
described above, we believe that increasing the accountability of
corporate boards to encompass nonshareholder constituencies
such as workers and communities is essential. As a practical
matter, statutory enactments at the state level can best achieve
this increased accountability, as state law continues to be the
legal regime that governs the creation and the internal affairs of
business corporations (and this remains the case notwithstanding
the ever-growing body of federal corporate and securities law that
for the most part applies only to publicly traded corporations).
These proposals would result in both more accountability
and more transparency as corporations exercise the new rights
bestowed upon them by Citizens United and Hobby Lobby. While
both are needed, from our communitarian perspective, increased
accountability is of paramount importance, and it is increased
accountability that is most responsive to the “externality risk”
that Citizens United created. Greater accountability to other
constituencies can be achieved only if those constituencies have
access to timely and complete information about corporate
actions, however, so the increased disclosure we propose is
necessary to effectuate the enhanced accountability that
mandatory constituency statutes can provide.
We recognize that our proposals are unlikely to be adopted
in some states. Delaware, for example, would almost certainly
never adopt a mandatory constituency statute given that state’s
strong shareholder primacy jurisprudence. Nonetheless, we think
that these proposals are worthy of serious consideration in light of
the growth in corporate political spending since Citizens United
and the potential for this greater corporate political spending to
tilt the regulatory political playing field in favor of corporations.
511 We rely on the Citizens United majority opinion, despite having criticized it
extensively, because it is now the law (whether or not we agree with it), and also
because we believe that the reform we are proposing, enhanced state law disclosure
requirements for corporate independent expenditures, will help cure what we believe is
one of the most critical deficiencies in the opinion—the reliance on existing state law
“procedures of corporate democracy” to curb abuses of the new corporate political
spending the opinion permits.
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Add to this the potential created by Hobby Lobby for corporations
to assert religious exercise rights that, whether by design or
chance, result in shifting costs and social burdens from private
corporations to government and society as a whole, and the
combined result cries out for regulatory and policy reforms. Our
proposals are two modest attempts to “tame the monster” that
was created when Citizens United and Hobby Lobby gave
corporations new rights without any requirement that these new
rights be exercised in a socially responsible manner.
We hope that state legislatures will consider acting on our
proposals, and even where state legislatures do not act, we hope
that some corporations will act unilaterally to implement them.
For example, in states like Pennsylvania that already have
nonmandatory constituency statutes, nothing precludes corporate
boards from fully and fairly considering the way their companies’
actions will affect nonshareholder constituencies. Some corporate
boards might welcome the opportunity to unshackle themselves
from a regime of shareholder primacy. Similarly, nothing
prevents corporations that wish to increase the transparency of
their political spending from posting on their corporate websites
complete and accurate information concerning the companies’
political spending. Whether state-by-state or company-by-
company, our proposals can make corporations more
communitarian, and in doing so, can help avoid the problems
created by Citizens United andHobby Lobby.
C. Communitarian Implications of These Measures
Both of the above proposals are, indeed, communitarian in
nature. “Other constituency” statutes recognize that corporate
conduct has implications well beyond shareholder enrichment.
The statutes appeal to the “brother’s keeper” aspect of
communitarianism, acknowledging that corporations cannot and
should not exist as atomized, senseless “monsters” and that they
owe their very existence to the notion that a variety of
participants—investors, managers, employees, customers,
suppliers, and supporting communities—are required to achieve a
corporate purpose. Disclosure statutes allow for effective
participation of shareholders and other groups. They provide a
means to jettison misplaced allusions to corporate democracy and
embrace the possibility of informed participation by shareholders
and other interested constituencies.
We have no illusions that the measures we propose will
solve the problem of externality risk. The enactment of
constituency statutes and disclosure measures will not prevent
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corporations from engaging in regulatory capture. But mandatory
constituency statutes will require that corporate managers give
more than lip service to the interests of broader constituencies,512
and disclosure requirements will bring an essential element of
transparency to corporate political spending. “Sunlight is said to
be the best of disinfectants,”513 and corporations might well be
discouraged from harmful behavior if these two types of measures
come to be enacted.
CONCLUSION
Most human beings’ drive for material gain is tempered
by altruistic concerns: a healthy regard for the environment,
benevolence toward the weak and infirm, and fairness toward
workers, to cite a few examples. A corporation, in contrast, has
“no soul to be damned and no body to be kicked.”514 For those
subscribing to the traditional value-maximizing role of the
corporation, there is nothing to temper the relentless drive for
profit, no sense of altruism, no human soul. Corporate directors
and managers feel obliged to provide maximum return to the
shareholders, whatever their personal altruistic tendencies.
Under such a regime, a corporation permitted to make political
expenditures will make only those expenditures calculated to
maximize corporate profits—expenditures for politicians and
programs favoring deregulation of business and less protection
for workers, the environment, and affected communities.
Citizens United allows corporations to make political
expenditures as if they were people, while lacking the human
constraints of real people. And while Hobby Lobby allows
corporations to act upon religious beliefs, it allows them to do so
without regard to external consequences and as if the owners’
beliefs are the only ones that matter.
It is only when corporations are allowed, and even
required, to adopt a more communitarian view—one that does not
see profit maximization as the corporation’s sole raison d’etre and
512 We do not address the issue of whether enactment of a mandatory constituency
statute would give nonshareholder constituencies the same standing and litigation rights
that corporate shareholders have traditionally enjoyed, but we note that in a mandatory-
constituency-statute jurisdiction, corporate shareholders sympathetic to the interests of
another, nonshareholder constituency presumably could bring suit if corporate directors
violated the statute by ignoring the interests of that nonshareholder constituency.
513 Louis D. Brandeis,What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’SWKLY., Dec. 20, 1913, at 10.
514 William A. Cohn, How Does a Corporation Speak?, INFO. CLEARING HOUSE
(Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article24758.htm [http://perma.cc/
ZW92-VELY] (quoting Edward, 1st Baron Thurlow, English jurist and Lord Chancellor
(1731-1803)).
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the owners as the only people that matter—that corporate
activity, whether in the form of charitable works, regard for
workers, the environment, the community, or even political
expenditures, can take on a less rapacious, more humane form.
And it is only when light is shed on their activities that most
corporations will be sufficiently motivated to take humane
considerations into account. It is in that spirit that we have
proposed the reforms outlined above, and welcome others.
